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This study seeks to evaluate Paul Tillich's theological bases for affirming the validity and
comparability of the many understandings of reality, especially as they bear on important issues
in the theology of religions. The task here is specifically that of identifying Tillich's theology-of-
religions position. Is his approach to the religions open enough to be regarded pluralist, given
Tillich's statments which seem to suggest an 'absolutist' stance and sometimes a 'universalist'
one. We discuss relevant theological definitions of Tillich's and his observations of other
religions and their important concepts to show that he does not claim superiority for Christianity
a priori. Despite his observation of certain unique features of Christianity, he does not put
forward criteria from Christianity and show that other religions do not satisfy them. His criteria,
actually, are formal and derive from (1) his larger definition of religion as ultimate concern, (2)
the type-determining elements of religion, and (3) the nature of religious symbols. Tillich's
concept of religion indicates his pluralist stance by reason of its identification and treatment of
"motives" present m the "prereligious and religious life" of humans, including secular
movements which have a religious source. The type-determining elements, namely the
sacramental, the mystical and the ethical, are seen as uniting differently to embody themselves in
various forms in the concrete religions, thereby providing a religious typology that would
facilitate understanding in intra-religious and inter-religious contexts. This typology therefore
affirms the uniqueness of every religion, and the important role of historical and cultural
determinants in the making of the special forms. So Tillich's apologetic intent, which drives him
to show Christianity as having actualized the various typological elements, despite distortions
which Christianity, like any other religion, cannot avoid, is that of demonstrating the nature and
dynamics of religion from one example, namely Christianity, rather than that of claiming
Christian superiority. We find that both Tillich's concept of religion and his religious typology
point m the direction of the pluralist paradigm on account of its provision of the frame in which
the unity or common basis and the plurality of religions can be appreciated.
Through the significance he attaches to symbols in respect of religion and theology,
Tillich is able on the one hand to point out that one symbol can express a number of rational
meanings (the many articulations of a single symbol in its long or short history), and on the
other to demonstrate that symbols manifest a concrete-universal character. The symbol is
concrete in that it belongs to a specific religio-cultural tradition, and it is universal in that it
refers to self-transcendence, which then is the basis of judging the limitations of each spiritual
act. It is in this light that the concepts Tillich uses in elaborating his theology of religions, such
as 'Christ the Criterion' and 'Protestant Principle', should be taken. Then they no longer suggest
Christian superiority, but reflect the concrete-universal character ('Christ the Criterion') and
especially the judging character ('Protestant Principle') of a religious symbol. Symbols therefore
demand theological criticism and consequently theological reconstruction.
Tillich's theological method is discussed to appreciate the dialectic character that Tillich
sees in the religious substance itself and m the experience and analysis of the religious
phenomenon. It is found that the correlation that Tillich maintains between the universal and the
concrete in his theology of culture and his systematic theology is present in Tillich's analysis of
the various expressions of other religions. In respect of the world religions, as a "mediating
theologian" his attempt is to affirm and develop both sides of a correlation, the correlation
between the Christianity and the religion(s) encountered. Hence his boundary situation between
Christianity and the world religions and quasi-religions, a boundary that offers a new
opportunity to save kerygma from narrowness and to revive religious symbols through an
"interpenetration of systematic theology and the history of religions". It is suggested that his
pluralism is a "dialectical pluralism", which engages in a dialectical analysis of the universal
and concrete in Christianity and other religions.
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THE PLURALISM OF PAUL TILLICH
INTRODUCTION
Paul Tillich saw theology as having a task beyond showing the coherence and
significance of the religious symbols of one's own tradition in a given historical
situation. Working at a time when it was more common for the Christian theologian
to suggest the aims of, and terms on which, dialogue should be carried out with other
religions than to be engaged in dialogue itself, Tillich ventured to be involved in actual
conversations with masters and scholars of other religions and has shown relatively
briefly the importance of the concepts of other faiths for a more 'dialogical' or
'comparative' or 'pluralistic' theology,1 which also speaks to the situation. It can be
said legitimately of Tillich that he took seriously and responded to the fact of religious
pluralism, of the presence and co-existence of various faiths in a time when the world
was rapidly moving (and is continuing to move) towards a universal history. No
wonder Wilfred Cantwell Smith's verdict on Tillich has been countered by Hughes:
"Future historians will perhaps recognize Tillich as a watershed figure who aided the
Christian theological escape from the corporate subjectivism of the West."2 Earlier,
Eliade remarked "that Tillich's influence will prove to be more powerful and
stimulating after his death".3 Parrinder recalls (with appreciation) Tillich's plea for "a
'Here "pluralistic" demands that Christian theology develop fuller understanding and
articulation of religion as ultimate concern, identified and pursued in similar and different
ways by people of other faiths, through study of and contact with these faiths. This enterprise
is also designated as 'comparative theology' by Neville (Robert C. Neville, Behind the Masks
of God: An Essay Toward Comparative Theology, Albany: State University of New York,
1991) and Ward (Keith Ward, Religion and Revelation. A Theology of Revelation in the
Worlds Religions, Oxford: Claredon, 1994). Tillich himself did not go beyond a Christian
theology that responded to the interreligious situation, as we shall see.
^Edward J. Hughes, Wilfred Cantwell Smith: A Theology for the World, London: SCM,
1986,p.165.
3Mircea Eliade, "Paul Tillich and the History of Religions" in Paul Tillich, The Future of
Religions, Jerald C. Brauer (ed), New York: Harper & Row, 1966, p.35. Hereafter cited as
Tillich, FR.
1
vision of the spiritual presence in other expressions of the ultimate meaning of man's
existence", while commending John Dunne's The Way ofAll the Earth 4 Showing to
what extent Tillich actually influenced future thinking in this regard, however, falls
outside the scope of this study, as the attempts here are that of coming to grips with
Tillich's pluralism and of evaluating it. Tillich's earlier recognition of and later
proclamation of "the significance of the history of religions for the systematic
theologian",5 with the suggestion of the "interpenetration" of both disciplines, is the
basis for reviewing Tillich's writings to appreciate the ways in which and the extent to
which his proposal has been carried out by him as a means of appreciating his
pluralism. Further, the fact that some recent surveys in the theology of religions
classify Paul Tillich as a pluralist6 on the one hand, and that others see him as an
inclusivist7 on the other hand, calls for a thorough examination ofTillich's approach in
the light of current thinking in theology of religions. The offer by Tillich of some basic
principles to view the mutual relationship between religions, without any sustained
effort on his part to show the connection between his somewhat tentative theology of
religions and his systematic theology has left him open to much criticism. This study
argues that although Tillich's theology claims that Christian theology's answers to the
existential questions of human existence are more adequate than those of other
religions, a dialectic tension between a concrete religious form and the universal or
^G. Parrinder in his introduction in John S. Dunne, The Way ofAll the Earth: An Encounter
with Eastern Religions, London: Sheldon Press, 1973, p.xv.
5The title of Tillich's last public lecture, included in Tillich, FR.
6Alan Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism: Patterns in the Christian Theology of
Religions, London: SCM, 1983, p.71.
7Langdon Gilkey, Through the Tempest: Theological Voyages in a Pluralistic Culture,
Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991, p. 182: Paul Knitter, No Other Name?: A Critical Survey
of Christian Attitudes to Other Religions, London: S.C.M., 1985, pp.xiii,103; John Hick,
Review ofGlynn Richards' Towards a Theology ofReligions in Religious Studies, 26
(1990), p. 176 and Gavin D'Costa, Theology of Religious Pluralism: The Challenge of
Other Religions, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986, pp. 12,16.
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formal religious principle underlies Tillich's theology to save this theology from
absolutism.
The task of identifying Tillich's pluralism involves investigating whether Tillich
recognized the uniqueness of the concepts of other religions while using systematic
and analytical principles to understand and interpret them. The way Tillich
acknowledges the validity of various religious experiences, understandings of them
and their common basis will be examined in order to ascertain his theology of
religions. 'Pluralism' as a paradigm of the theology of religions was not yet in use in
his time8 but we shall identify concepts and methodological principles in Tillich and
test them against criteria that a framework should satisfy in order to be pluralist. As
this study itself is an attempt to contribute to a pluralist theology of religions by
drawing out Tillich's insights in respect of the concrete and unique character of each
religion and in respect of the possibility of identifying some common ground among
the religions, no fixed pluralist criteria can be accepted a priori to test Tillich's
approach. These two general norms which pluralists seek to establish through their
special methods and analyses will direct our enquiry to identify Tillich's special
concepts, criteria and method.
In Part A, Tillich's concept of religion, which is fundamental both for his
Christian systematic theology and his appraisal of religious phenomena and beliefs of
other religions, will be discussed first, in Chapter I. This will be done in three sections.
The first section will identify and explore the relation between his larger and narrower
definitions of religion. Tillich's claim that the larger definition of religion is universal
8Keith Ward notes that John Hick was the first to use "pluralism" as a position that stood in
contrast to exclusivism and inclusivism (Ward, Keith, A Vision to Pursue: Beyond the Crisis
in Christianity, London: S.C.M. Press, 1991, p. 170). 'Pluralism' is also often used
synonymously with "plurality" referring to the plurality of religions (Schubert Ogden, Is There
Only One True Religion or Are There Many? Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press,
1992, p.3).
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will be seen to suggest the religious substance underlying all cultural expressions. So
the relation between religion and culture will be discussed next. This will give special
insight into the way the religious sphere and the cultural spheres are immanent in each
other and hence influence each other in unique ways. This will then lead to the third
section, which will appraise the suggestion of Tillich that the concept of religion
should include the quasi-religions because their religious source can be identified in
historical and systematic terms. The chapter as a whole is an attempt to see the
relation between religion and religions through a systematic approach, as demanded
by Tillich's concept of religion. It will be suggested that this concept, with its
affirmation of a common basis underlying theplurality of religious manifestions, is the
key to unravelling Tillich's pluralism.
The focus of the discussion then shifts from the side of religion, that is, the
systematic concept, in Chapter I, to the side of the religions, that is, the historical
religions and quasi-religions, in Chapter II. The task is that of critically seeing if
Tillich's account of the presence of the sacramental, mystical and ethical elements,
either manifestly or latently, in all religions, with one of the elements being
predominant, is true in the case of the historical religions. The basis of Tillich's
religious typology, developed from the dynamics of the three elements mentioned, will
be appreciated first. Then the three types based on the predominance of one of the
elements will be briefly presented, with some reference to the special historical
expressions of the concrete religions. A fourth type, 'Religion of the Concrete Spirit',
towards which all the first three types point for their fulfilment, will receive treatment
next to see if it fully comprehends the goal and the dynamics within the historical
religions on the one hand, and validates the systematic concept of religion from the
side of the concrete religions on the other hand. The chapter will close with a final
section which will evaluate Tillich's typology of religions and show the way in which it
lends support to the case for Tillich to be a pluralist. It will be argued that the higher
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stage in which all the three typological elements are present is not just a possibility for
Christianity, although this stage is described by Tillich from the Christian tradition.
Next (in Part B) we address Tillich's theology of religions more directly. The
assumption of the title of the thesis, that pluralism is the most tenable theology-of-
religions position, will also be discussed in the course ofPart B. First, in Chapter III,
we discuss the approaches Tillich rejects. Three broad ones are identified from
Tillich's main and well-known works to show certain emphases which he appreciates
in each of them. Absolutism and Relativism are identified as polar positions.
Universalism as the third position will be seen to be based on what is valid in each of
the polar positions. Universalism, which Tillich attributes to the early Christianity,
inherits the universal consciouness of the Roman Empire (as against the national
consciousness of the city-states) historically, and is influenced by the sense of
universal justice proclaimed by the prophets of Judaism theologically. This position
itself divides into two approaches, especially in the modern and contemporary
periods: absolutist universalism and relativist universalism. Tillich's appreciation of the
positive features in each of the two positions points will serve as the basis for the
argument that Tillich's position transcends both these and points in the direction of
pluralism.
In reaching this point of identifying some special features, which point in the
direction of pluralism, from general principles, we now move on to Chapter IV to
discuss Tillich's pluralism by drawing out four important theological criteria relevant
to the discussion of his theology-of-religions position. First, revelation will be seen as
the important theological concept which helps appreciate the epistemological basis of
the unique, concrete religious knowledge which comes from each religion. The
subject-object relation in terms of which the analysis will be conducted will show how
the manifold expressions of the ultimate are valid and meaningful, relative to the
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theological circle or spheres of reflection or of praxis. How the divine-human
encounter shows the common basis as well as the diversity of religions will be
discussed. Second, the nature of the God who gives Godself in the encounter, and
thereby influences the particular revelatory situation in unique ways, will be discussed.
While every concept ofGod will be seen to have both concreteness and transcendence
or universality, one of them will be prominent in a particular conception of God. The
determining character of the typological element prominent in the particular religious
tradition and other factors relevant to the revelatory situation will be found as
responsible for the diversity in understanding God. The appreciation of the concrete
and universal elements in God anticipates a Christology which will share the same
elements, but in a different way.
In the third section we discuss the role of the central symbol in a religion. This
symbol for Christianity is the symbol of the Christ. The discussion will proceed in
three stages. First, critical phenomenology will show theology's two-fold task present
in Tillich's development of every theological concept, particularly the Christological
doctrine. The first function is to grasp one's experience or the symbols of one's own
tradition in all its concreteness, and the second function is to interpret this experience
in universal terms. The way these two functions characterize the Christology will then
be discussed under "The Christ, the Foundation of Christianity" and "The Christ, the
Centre of History". These two-fold aspects in respect of the Christ on the one hand
affirm all revelatory situations, and on the other hand affirm every, or a universal,
overcoming of estrangement in the name of the universal Christ, who is the meaning
of history. It will be argued that the fact of a universal theological vision or the
developing of a formal principle from a concrete standpoint, without losing the
tension between the concrete and the universal, points in the direction of pluralism.
And fourth, the Protestant Principle, which is basically related to the self-critical
function of Tillich's Christology but which is shown by Tillich to be operative in all
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religions and secular movements, will be discussed. Tillich's account of the role of this
most universal and most concrete principle which protests against the elevation of
anything finite to ultimacy in every religion will support the case that Tillich is a
pluralist.
Part C will discuss the way Tillich's theological method takes account of
various analytical and descriptive methods that focus on the religious reality, either
directly as in the case of theology, or indirectly as in the case of philosophy, history
and other cultural endeavours. This will help appreciate the way Tillich deals with a
plurality of methods. Three correlations are identified in Tillich, which show his
attempts to understand and interpret the meaning of the religious reality. The
kerygma-situation correlation will discuss Tillich's attempt to discover the eternal
message from the traditional religious symbols in the light of the existential questions
arising from the situation. This will show Tillich's affirmation of plural forms in which
the religious answer is given in a context, but that the answers must be constantly
open to judgment. The second correlation, between philosophy and theology, is aimed
to provide theology with a theoretical frame that is supposed to approximate to the
universal frame of being. The third correlation, between the systematic and the
historical, is Tillich's attempt to examine the question of meaning asked in the present
in the light ofmeaning as contained in the universal structure of being, which has been
approximated by various religious traditions and worldviews. All three correlations
show Tillich's use of the dialectic method to hold together the concrete and the
universal, without absolutizing or relativizing of either side. Pluralism here refers to
the various forms and actualizations, which are not simply evaluated on the basis of a
static frame. Nevertheless the proper significance and meaning of the forms is
affirmed only in terms of finding the connection between the universal structure of
being and the concrete forms. This pluralism, which is analytical and dialectical,




This part focuses on Tillich's attempt at a definition of religion that is common
to all concrete, historical religions, and also focuses on his descriptions of the
common elements which are present in the concrete religions but expressing
themselves in varying importance. The definition is claimed to be universally valid by
Tillich, and he puts it in a dialectical relation with the vast data that the concrete
religions contain. A study that dialectically focuses on the definition and the concrete
phenomena of the religions is suggested by Tillich to be most fruitful. So in Chapter I,
we discuss this point in terms of the larger and narrower definitions of religion. The
fact that the narrower definition testifies to the role of cultural forms in a concrete
religion will demand an analysis of religion (as substance) and culture (as form). The
religion-culture analysis includes quasi-religions, because the religious dimension is
implicit. So the concept of religion is, for Tillich, an attempt to deal with the plurality
of religious manifestations. It will be argued that the larger definition's uniting and
judging role in relation to the concrete religions is an affirmation of pluralism, because
no one religion or no criteria from any philosophy of religion is used to bring together
the concrete religions. The two-way religion-religions analysis allows a mutual
dynamic between the common basis and unique features of the religions and quasi-
religions.
In Chapter II, Tillich's typology of religion will be discussed, pointing out how
the central object of theology, namely the holy, is experienced and expressed in
different ways. Two basic elements which characterize the holy, corresponding to the
to the vertical and horizontal as observed in the religion-culture correlation in Chapter
I, will be discussed. What is special here is that the two elements are related to a
revelatory object or symbol. The dynamics of the two elements in relation to the
revelatory symbol, the dangers the symbol is prone to and the critical ways in which
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the meaning and significance of the symbol is reestablished together make up the basic
structure and dynamics of the typology. In what ways the revelatory symbol, which
affirms the fact of universal revelation, the critical movements ofmystical religion and
ethical religion, which arise to counter the distortion in the revelatory symbol, and the




THE CONCEPT OF RELIGION
The increasing awareness of the plurality and the variety of religious forms has raised
serious questions not only about the procedure of offering a definition of religion at
the start of an enquiry but also about the possibility of arriving at an inclusive
definition which captures the essential emphases and structures of the many concrete
religions. The procedure of starting with a definition has been pointed out by Hick as
a late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century approach. Hick also doubts the
possibility of a viable definition of religion because of the immense difficulty of
including "religious definitions", based on the fact of plural and diverse human
responses to the ultimate, and "naturalistic definitions" in which religion is seen as a
pure human activity or state of mind, in a "religious interpretation of religion".
However, Hick sees Tillich's definition of religion as ultimate concern as a basic
religious definition of religion.1 But in contrast to Hick's appreciation of the important
but limited scope of Tillich's definition, which takes account of concrete religions
defining themselves on the one hand and humanistic studies defining religious
behaviour and institutions on the other hand, we shall see that Tillich's attempt is one
involving the defining of culture itself. The fact that the cultural dimensions imply the
religious ground, will suggest the possibility of a formal definition of religion
informed by the concrete expressions of religion in culture. There is another concern
about the validity of a definition of religion: it is most likely that a definition of
religion will be more representative of the religion of the theologian concerned, and
not representative of all religions. This criticism is appreciated both by Tillich and by
this study, as will be seen shortly. Nevertheless the concept of religion is the starting
John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent,
Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1989, p. 16,n.3 and pp. 1-4.
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point of this study for three main reasons. The first has to do with Tillich's statement
about the need for a "systematic" discussion of the nature of religion in respect of its
many forms. "Systematic" here does not stand for a logical or deductive approach, but
suggests the possibility of showing how a core understanding of the nature of religion
is present in the concrete religions (or rather religious expressions) in a positive,
negative or modified way. Tillich does appreciate that "life is a continuum and [that]
all functions and all productions are in a continuous change", and so seeking a final
definition in any of the human disciplines is a futile attempt. Yet for a meaningful
enquiry into the proper subject matter, limits have to be put "between the different
functions in spite of their overlapping" and similarly "between the ever changing
productions" 2 A definition does nothing but identify these limits. Second, our early
discussion of Tillich's definition of religion and the related issues will prove immensely
fruitful, as we have gained some idea of his key concepts and analytical processes.
And third, Tillich's concept of religion makes an important contribution to the
cumulative arguments towards seeing him as a pluralist.
The discussion will proceed in three stages. First, the bases of and connections
between Tillich's different definitions (or descriptions of various aspects) of religion
will be spelt out in order that an overall picture of Tillich's understanding of religion
might emerge. Second, the dynamic relationship between religion and culture as
proposed by Tillich will be discussed in order to appreciate a fundamental, essential
bond between religion and culture. And third, we shall examine the legitimacy of
including quasi-religions in the concept of religion. Their relationship with the
religions proper at the point of their original emergence in particular will provide the
basis for critiquing them on the one hand, and for mutual reconceptions of the
structure of reality on the other hand.
Paul Tillich, The Encounter of Religions and Ouasi-Religions, Terence Thomas (ed.),
Lampeter: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1990, p.4 (hereafter cited as Tillich, ERQR).
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1. Defining Religion
Tillich often defines religion and does so in a few significant ways to serve
different purposes, which include elaborating what religion is, appreciating religion
from different dimensions and standpoints, and showing how corruptions arise in a
concrete religion. In his three exclusive treatments of the question of Christianity's
relationship with other religions and quasi-religions, namely his Matchette Lectures,
Bampton Lectures and a Seminar on "the problems raised by the encounter of major
religious systems: Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, Islamic, Buddhist, Hindu; and the
quasi-religious movements: Nationalism, Socialism, Fascism, Communism",3 he
begins with a definition of religion, pointing out that it can only be a "preliminary
definition". As such the definition "is open and can be developed from generation to
generation", because the "definition itself is a part of the development of the reality of
which it is a concept" 4 The purpose of the definition is thus expressed here, which is
that of identifying religion in as broadly a way as possible so that it can be appreciated
in all its specific forms. In fact there is a two-fold purpose: first, the definition leads
the enquirer to the reality that s/he should focus on and comprehend in all its
complexity, and second, it should result in its own content becoming clarified and
more fully defined (and revised if necessary). These observations take seriously the
question whether the realities on which Tillich casts his eyes are the world religions
as they express themselves and not as filtered through Christian categories.
The lectures were delivered in 1958 and 1961 respectively, and the seminar was conducted in
the Spring of 1963 in the University of California, Santa Barbara and published as (following
the same order):
Paul Tillich, ERQR. (First published only in 1990, together with another lecture on "Christian
and Non-Christian Revelation" and transcriptions of three recorded conversations between
Paul Tillich and Hisamatsu Shin'ichi.)
Tillich, Paul, Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions, New York and London:
Columbia University Press, 1963 (hereafter cited as Tillich, CEWR).
Paul Tillich, Ultimate Concern. Tillich in Dialogue, D. Mackenzie Brown (ed ), New York:
Harper & Row, 1965 (hereafter cited as Tillich, UC).
4Tillich, ERQR, p.5.
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The frequently used definition (or concept) of religion, which is also his basic
or larger definition, features in Tillich's treatment of the world religions:
Here we have the concept of religion which helps us to understand the
encounter of the world religions... Religion is ultimate concern or unconditional
concern. It is concern about the ultimate or the unconditional in meaning and
being. It is ultimate concern, ultimate seriousness.5
Through such a definition Tillich intends to show that religion or faith is "basic and
universal". Hence he challenges "the idea that world history is the battlefield between
faith and un-faith"6 Religion in its primary sense is present in human life, but could be
left unaddressed or confused:
There is no human being or group or period entirely unconcerned with their
own being and meaning. But there are individuals and societies in which this
concern is not admitted to full awareness and full expression. This is our
situation. We are not irreligious; no man can be irreligious if religion means
being ultimately concerned. But we confuse ultimates with important or
unimportant preliminaries. We try to hide our own religious concern from
ourselves and from others.7
Religion is thus a universal experience, "for everything that is participates in being-
itself, and everybody has some awareness of this participation, especially in the
moments in which he experiences the threat of non-being."8 So even those who are no
longer influenced by traditional religions and are in a state of religious indifference
cannot remain unconnected with the religious principle for long, because they will be
5Tillich, EROR, p . 12; Tillich, UC, pp.4,6; P. Tillich, Theology of Culture, ed. by Kimball,
Robert C., New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. pp.7-8 (hereafter cited as Tillich, TC).
^P. Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol.3, Digswell Place: James Nisbet & Co., 1964, p. 139
(hereafter cited as Tillich, ST III).
Tillich, "Anxiety-Reducing Agencies in our Culture" in P.Tillich, Main Works, Vol.2:
Writings in the Philosophy of Culture, ed. by Michael Palmer, Berlin and New York: De
Gruyter - Evangelisches Verlagswerk GmbH, 1990, p.242 (hereafter cited as Tillich, PTMW
2). As religious reality in the cultural sense is not shared by the greater majority in the
Western nations it is possible that there is no religious prompting of ultimate concern. This
however does not exclude other ways in which ultimate concern grasps individuals and
groups. See P. Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1957, p.69
(hereafter cited as Tillich, DF), for his argument that in the present time 'secular faith' is
replacing the different forms of religion, but secular faith is still faith and not "unbelief'.
8Paul Tillich, The Courage To Be, London: Collins (Fontana Library), 1962, p.153.
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driven by the religious spirit that appears in quasi-religious forms such as "the desire
for liberation from authoritarian bondage, passion for justice, scientific honesty,
striving for a more fully developed humanity and hope in a progressive transformation
of society in a positive direction".9 Such a broad understanding of religion cannot
accept an idea of God alone as the basis of religion. An understanding of God, which
is common to some concrete religions (especially in their popular affirmations) and
present in the minds of secular humanists (though they would deny its truth), is
criticized by Tillich, who states that his
concept of religion has little in common with the description of religion as a
belief in the existence of a highest being called God, and the theoretical and
practical consequences of such a belief. Instead, we are pointing to an
existential, not a theoretical, understanding of religion.10
How universally acceptable and how valid is Tillich's definition of religion as
ultimate concern can only be ascertained after some further discussion of Tillich's
larger concept of religion and after introducing his narrower concept. By proceeding
to establish the nature of ultimate concern from a "formal definition of faith",11
Tillich's desire to see religion in universal terms is obvious. Speaking of religion, faith
and ultimate concern in identical terms, he suggests that faith is an act in which the
unity of reason, will and emotion is actualized.12 So faith is not identified purely as
rational or irrational but as including both reason and non-rational strivings, while
transcending them.13 The state of faith includes both a transcending character and a
historical character: "In the ecstasy of faith there is an awareness of truth and of
°Tillich, CEWR, p. 14. How quasi-religions express ultimate concern and hence the need to
include them in the 'concept of religion' will be discussed shortly.
10Tillich, TC, p.40.
11Tillich, DF, p.4.
12Tillich, DF, pp .4-8.
13Tillich, DF, pp.6-7.
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ethical value; there are also past loves and hates, conflicts and reunions, individual and
collective influences."14
Dreisbach's failure to appreciate the universal character of faith in these terms
has led him to charge Tillich with inconsistency in respect of the latter's claim that
everyone has an ultimate concern. To show this, he first presents one of Tillich's
statements on the universality of ultimate concern. This accords with what Tillich
states everywhere else, including the following statements that form part of the
conclusion of the same work to which Dreisbach refers.
Faith is not a phenomenon beside others, but the central phenomenon in man's
personal life, manifest and hidden at the same time... it is universal and
concrete.... Faith is an essential possibility ofman, and therefore its existence is
necessary and universal ... It is the triumph of the dynamics of faith that any
denial of faith is itself an expression of faith, of an ultimate concern.15
But then Dreisbach goes on to quote a passage from Tillich and to argue that if Tillich
has described the condition of a person with no ultimate concern to be one of
"disintegration" it is "at least logically possible" to have or to be such an existence.
And he makes the suggestion that Tillich offers "a plausible foundation for the weaker
but still interesting claim that life without an ultimate concern is less than fully human
and that there might be a natural tendency to center one's life on some ultimate
concern" .16 This is more or less a functional interpretation of ultimate concern, and
there is an uncertainty about its role in human life. Tillich on the contrary accords
ultimate concern foundational status, which regards ultimate concern as present in
preliminary concerns. This is why ultimate concern can give meaning to every
preliminary concern as well as criticize it. Tillich's "formal" definition of faith claims
14Tillich, DF, p.7. Ecstasy, for Tillich means "standing outside of oneself' - without ceasing
to be oneself' - with all the elements which are united in the personal center" (ibid.).
15Tillich, DF, pp. 126-127.
1 (SD. F. Dreisbach, Symbols & Salvation. Paul Tillich's Doctrine ofReligious Symbols and
his Interpretation of the Symbols of the Christian Tradition, Lanham/New York/London:
University Press of America, 1993, p. 13.
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that ultimate concern is present even in the atheist, for it is the ultmate concern in
her/him, which cannot allow any inadequate conceptions of the ultimate to prevail,
that s/he attacks the conception of God as "the highest being". With regard to our
attempt to see how Tillich qualifies as a pluralist, his insistence on the universality of
ultimate concern is significant. If a common basis is required for pluralism to be
affirmed (an issue that will be discussed later), then Tillich has put forward ultimate
concern as an idea (explicit or implicit) common to primal, classical and traditional,
and modern cultures.
This claim of the universality of ultimate concern in relation to the various
religions will be discussed under "Typology of Religion". But the fact of ultimate
concern having different contents for different people and communities, or the idea of
the ultimate being immanent in the different ultimate concerns that people have is not
properly grasped by Tillich's critics. Dreisbach, following Alston's and Rowe's lead,
criticizes Tillich for failing to make a proper distinction between the object of ultimate
concern a person chooses and being-itself as the object of ultimate concern.17
Dreisbach and his company seem to demand an objective, non-existential character of
being-itself as distinct from the ultimate concerns of humans which can be identified
eventually as nothing more than preliminary concerns. But, for Tillich, there is only
one ultimate, being-itself, which expresses itself in many ways, as in the existential
passion of the philosopher,18 in the concern for justice of the prophet, and in the
spiritual discipline of the mystic. Ultimate concern stands both for the attitude of the
one who is concerned and for the object of her/his concern. "That which is ultimate
gives itself only to the attitude of ultimate concern." Being-itself as the object of
17
Dreisbach remarks that "being grasped by an ultimate concern is not obviously the same as
being grasped by the ultimate in being and meaning" . (D. F. Dreisbach, Symbols & Salvation,
p. 11) Rowe had earlier pointed out that Tillich had "confused a psychological ultimate
concern with a metaphysical ultimate"(z/u£/.,p. 12).
18Tillich, ST I, p.27.
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theology reveals its special character by "making us its object whenever we try to
make it our object".19 And as something cannot be object and subject at the same
time, the ultimate can only be described as "transcending" both subject and object. As
such, being-itself is not encountered through rational means because being-itself
precedes the distinction between the rational and irrational. Rather it is experienced in
the "unforethinkable fact that we 'are' and not 'are not"'. This confidence in one's being
is not from oneself, nor received primarily from any other source (religious
community, scripture, etc.). The assurance can come only from the "original fact" of
"the mystery of being", which in fact "is the ground of the experience of the holy" .20
It is this character of transcendence or "unity" of subject and object that makes
"ecstatic reason" (or knowledge of the infinite) or revelation possible. The implication
of this for theological enquiry is that although being-itself is the object of theological
enquiry, the limits are set by the ultimate concern of the enquirer.
The assertion of the relativity of theology based on the experience of the
theologian is also an expression of Tillich's pluralist stance in relation to Christian
theology and in relation to other religions. The varied (religious) experiences of
theologians in their most fundamental level can be seen in terms of the subject-object
structure of human existence:
on the one hand, our being ultimately concerned - the subjective side - and on
the other hand, the object of our ultimate concern, for which of course there is
no other word than "ultimate."21
The ultimate does not grasp humans by destroying this structure. In fact, only the
ultimate as unity of subject and object can preserve this structure and address us in a
"total" manner, "no part of ourselves or of our world [being] excluded from it".22
19Tillich, ST, I, p. 12.
20Tillich, ERQR, p. 11.
21Tillich, UC, pp.11, (italics original) See also ibid.,12,13,15.
22P. Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol.1, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951, p. 12
(hereafter cited as ST I).
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Maintaining the distinction between the divine and human sides helps save the divine
from being a function of the human and the human from being controlled by magical
or monarchical power sometimes identified with the divine.
Ultimate concern as discussed so far has taken account of the way Tillich
presents it from the framework of his philosophical anthropology and from an
epistemological consideration. Now we shall look at the way Tillich treats ultimate
concern in relation to the historical religions.
The "content" of ultimate concern takes on a central role in a discussion of
ultimate concern as present in the different religions. According to Tillich, the content
of ultimate concern is identified or described differently by different communities. As
linguistic, cultural and social orderings specific to a community influence both life and
thought, ultimate concern will be conceived differently from one community to
another. Hence the diversity in referring to ultimate concern in the history of religions:
Whether it's a little fetish, a tool used daily by a very primitive tribe, or the
mana power that permeates all reality, or Olympus, with its Greek gods and
every special god there, or the God of Israel who, through prophetic criticism,
finally became the word "God", the object is always the same. The object of
ultimate concern has many names.23
The diverse ways of expressing ultimate concern points in the direction of
Tillich's narrower concept of religion, which concerns the specificity of the religions.
The larger concept is present in each concrete religion. The distinction between the
larger and narrower concepts is also expressed as the concept of ultimate concern
(which is universal) and the content of ultimate concern (which is specific to each
religion) respectively.24 The relation between the the larger and narrower concepts
can also be conflicting, as is evident in the expression "the fight of religion against
23Tillich, UC, pp. 11-12. "The holy" is another of Tillich's way of representing the larger or
all-embracing concept of religion. (See Tillich, ERQR, p. 10)
24Tillich, UC, pp.21-22. See also Tillich, ST III, p. 110.
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religion",25 where religion in the larger sense fights the self-absolutizing tendency in
certain aspects of the life of a concrete religion. This point will be discussed shortly
(under "Religion and Culture").
The narrower concept stands for specificity, which in the context of many
cultures means a plurality of the manifestations of ultimate concern. The larger
definition is more an affirmation of the truth or reality of religion. It needs the
narrower concept for expressing its function in actual life. The holy or ultimate
concern can only be described in terms of experiences familiar to the specific culture:
You cannot describe the holy in terms which belong to that realm from which
the holy is separated by its very nature. And therefore you need the symbolic
language for everything that has to do with the holy. Every religion uses finite
material, concepts like life and being and love and power and action and
repentance - even God repents in the Old Testament - in order to express the
infinite.2*'
The particularity of symbols to a culture necessarily means the plurality of ways of
apprehending ultimate reality. This is spelt out by Tillich in his Biblical Religion and
the Search for Ultimate Reality, where religion is regarded as "the name for the
reception of revelation". Revelation might have a universal claim but it is always
concrete in the way it is received, namely in terms of the personal, social and
historical conditions of the receiver.27
If the larger concept takes account of the universal element in religion, then
the narrower concept should include the concrete religions in which the universal
element is manifest. The concrete religions are classified as premythological (when
there were not yet gods), mythological (the cultus deorum) and postmythological
(when there were no longer gods - Zen Buddhism for example) in the history of
25Tilhch, UC, p.50.
26Tillich, ERQR, p. 14.
27P. Tillich, Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality, Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1960, pp.3-4 (hereafter cited Tillich, BRSUR).
19
religions. Hinayana Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism and Shintoism, which in their
original expressions have no idea of transcendent gods, are still included in Tillich's
concept of religion.28 This is so because ultimate concern is present in the "Buddhist
way of life, in the Confucian relation to the ancestors, in the Shinto relation to the
Emperor."29
Tillich states that a concept of religion should take account of the character of
primal religions, and sees his definition as fulfilling this aim. A major difficulty in
appreciating the nature of primal religion is the magical worldview that determines it.
The magical worldview is a combination of a "primitive" science (and technique) and
a religious element. Magic as a primitive technique produces effects without physical
contact between the performer and his object. It takes on more than a technique-role
when magic causality "becomes causality exercised upon the gods by us and by the
gods upon us and others and the whole universe". Magic here includes a religious
element in the role of higher powers which are not accountable by the words of magic
but in their own terms. Tillich observes that the magical notion invades even the
higher religions, and hence the difficulty in excluding the religious element in the
magical worldview from any definition of religion.30 The distinction between higher
and lower religions in Tillich is that the higher includes a critical element that resists
the tendency towards idolatry; this critical element is absent in the lower, sacramental
religion, as we shall see in the next chapter.
The classical and traditional religions provide Tillich with the experiential and
philosophical basis for his definition of religion. Unlike Hans Kiing, who emphasizes
the difference the particular religion makes on the followers, almost conditioning
28Tillich, ERQR, pp.8,61
29Tillich, ERQR, p. 13.
30Tillich, ERQR, pp.6-8.
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them,31 Tillich identifies the structure of reality, with ultimate reality as its basis, as
common to all religious expressions. So he states: "God is the basic and universal
symbol for what concerns us ultimately."32 Although Tillich's preference for theism is
evident, it should be taken in the light of certain critical observations of his. Thus,
while challenging theologians of the neo-orthodox kind and secularists for their denial
of religion from opposite ends, he points out that their mistake lies in the common
conception of "religion as man's relation to divine beings", a conception "which makes
any understanding of religion impossible".33 This error, according to Tillich, leads
"believers" to affirm the "existence" of the divine on the authority of divine revelation,
and the "unbelievers" to deny the "existence" of such a deity. It will suffice to note
here what will be discussed under "The Ground of Religion: God" (Chapter IV),
namely that theism is not the only but important narrower concept for the
understanding ofultimate concern.
The importance of denoting the two concepts which Tillich has himself
distinguished34 has been stressed by Clayton,35 who represents "ultimate concern" or
"depth dimension" as religionj and "the religious sphere" alongside other spheres as
religio^. According to Clayton, Tillich is following Hegel, who spoke of "absolute"
religion and "specific, existing religions". But we must point out that Tillich is
cautious in accepting Hegel's conception in two ways: first, whereas Hegel does not
see all ideal elements of religion present in all particular religions, Tillich sees them
"J 1
For Kling, humans do not have religion as an ornament to being human but that one is
human in a Buddhist, Christian, Hindu and Islamic way. (Hans Kiing, "The Debate on the
Word Religion" in Hans Kiing & Jiirgen Moltmann, Christianity Among the World Religions,
Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1986, p.xii.)
32Paul Tillich, Love, Power and Justice: Ontological Analyses and Ethical Applications,
London: Oxford University Press, 1954.
33Tillich, 7X2,4-5.
34Tillich, t/C,4-7; Tillich, TC ,7,9.
35John P. Clayton, The Concept of Correlation: Paid Tillich and the Possibility of a
Mediating Theology, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1980. pp.88-101.
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present in all religions, but one of the elements is predominant; and second, whereas
Hegel sees absolute religion realized in Christianity alone, Tillich makes such an
equation mainly to show through Christianity the possibility of a proper and balanced
relationship between the typological elements of religion. Further, we must point out
that whereas Hegel demands specific religions to fit the predetermined structure,
Tillich is ready to see how the universal structure and the specific event imply and
qualify each other. Concerning our question of the distinguishing of the larger and
narrower concepts of religion, therefore, the issue becomes more acute when one
finds that a number of meanings of religion is found in Tillich's typology of religion
alone, as we shall see in the next chapter. The larger concept is comprehended in
"ideal structures", each structure presenting religion differently. The narrower concept
represents the various religions which approximate to these ideal structures in their
unique ways. The content of religion in each ideal structure is different, thus requiring
to be qualified (as "sacramental", "mystical", "ethical" and "religion of the concrete
spirit"). Thus in this study only the difference between the larger concept and the
narrower concept is denoted by religion in singular and in plural respectively or by a
pair of terms - namely, "religion itself' and "religion"- terms Tillich himself has
used.36 This brief introduction to the different definitions of religion in Tillich should
serve as an aid to identifying the proper meaning of the term religion in its context.
This discussion also anticipates Tillich's pluralism, that is, affirming religion in its
many unique historical forms, seeing within these forms the role of different
typological elements with one of the elements being predominant, and appreciating all
of their having a common basis in the concept ofreligion.
36P. Tillich, The Protestant Era, trans, bv J. L. Adams, Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1948, p.248 (hereafter cited as Tillich, PE). It might be noted there is a parallel
between this pair and the following pair: divme Spirit (capital S) and spirit as the creative life
ofhumans (small s). (Tillich, ST I, p. 15 n.4) See also ST III, p.22.
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There are yet other ways in which Tillich defines religion. But they should fall
into either one or both of the concepts. One such important definition sees religion as
the "direction of the conditioned toward the Unconditioned".37 It puts the emphasis
on the human movement toward the divine, while taking for granted that there is a
prior divine "grasping" of the human. Ultimate concern is here conceived as a
movement from either side towards the other. And although both the movements are
important, Tillich consistently holds that divine grasping is more fundamental because
it alone is power of being, or the power of being-itself reaching every being. This
power ofbeing is therefore what humans receive rather than are themselves. This also
well serves Tillch's intention to be consistent with the (Christian) theological idea of
divine initiative, that is, God first loving humans. Religion as movement toward the
divine, on the other hand, presupposes the concrete religious symbols, worship, etc.,
in terms of which the participating individual or religious community moves towards
the ultimate. So this definition of religion affirms both the larger and narrower
concepts and also shows their relatedness.
An important point that should be noted in connection with the relation
between the larger and narrower concepts of religion is that they should be seen in the
light of Tillich's Christian theological interpretation of human existence. As
everything related to humans reflect the predicament of being in a state of separation
from (but not total separation as if there were no union with) their essential nature,
religion cannot be exempt, for in the first place the idea itself is a religious one. So
Tillich sees the sphere of historical religions as a consequence of "the tragic
estrangement of man's spiritual life from its own ground and depth".38 Concrete
religions also bear the marks of this estrangement. Hence the importance of the larger
37P. Tillich, The Religious Situation, trans. H. Richard Niebuhr, New York: Meridian Books,
1956, p. 158 (hereafter cited as Tillich, RS).
38Tillich, TC, p. 8. How ultimate concern is present in quasi-religions will be discussed under
"Religion in Quasi-religions".
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concept of religion for a proper understanding of religion: "Religion itself, however,
does not talk about religion, but about God, the world, and the soul."39 The sharp
distinction that is made here between the larger and the narrower concepts might
suggest that religion in its cultural symbols and rituals does not embody proper
understandings of God and of God's relationship with the worlds of humans and
nature. This is inevitable because in Tillich's philosophical thought there is a definite
separation between the essential and the existential: hence the finite can express the
infinite only partially. The same is the case from a theological point of view, for the
fallen state of humans suggests the potential danger of granting ultimacy to that which
is the bearer of the ultimate. Every specific manifestation of religion, therefore, needs
to be criticized: "The first word ... to be spoken by religion to the people of our time
must be a word spoken against religion".40 This is why deliberate effort must be made
by the theologian to attend to the larger concept. There is also a further reason for
focusing on the larger concept. Despite the fact that the secular is increasingly
becoming more influential on human lives than the religions proper, Tillich claims that
everyone has an ultimate concern. And Tillich sees ultimate concern expressed in
secular movements too: "The most important religious movements are developing
outside of religion."41 These movements, regarded by him as quasi-religious, are on
the one hand positive by bearing the ultimate concern, but on the other negative by
becoming radicalized so as to be destructive. Yet the fact is that the larger concept of
religion is common for the religions proper and the quasi-religions.
Tillich's presentation of the narrower concept as a vehicle of the larger one has
been appreciated. The concrete religion is thus important despite the necessity of the
constant criticism that must be made on the basis of the larger concept. In fact Tillich
39Tillich, PTMW2, p.210.
40Tillich, PE, p. 185.
41Tillich, RS, p. 157.
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shows that his larger concept is actually abstracted from a specific experience-cum-
expression in the Judaeo-Christian tradition. The concept cannot be arbitrarily chosen
but "must be developed out of the centre of the actual life of the concrete historical
religions".42 For the Christian, "ultimate concern" has its source in the Mosaic Law
and in the Great Commandment of the New Testament.43 And Tillich points out that
ultimate concern in the sense of unconditional concern is found in much earlier times
in religious sacrifice, which refers to the sacrifice of all other values for that which is
of unconditional value44 Such specific expressions are found in other religio-
philosophical traditions, for example in Kant's "moral imperative" and in Advaita
Vedanta's "Brahma-consciousness". It might be pointed out that the mutual
relationship between the larger and narrower concepts that is evident here saves
Tillich's formal definition of religion as ultimate concern from being charged with
lacking a concrete basis. This mutuality of the larger and narrower concepts can also
be seen to preserve the universal and concrete character ofultimate concern.
One important consequence of this mutuality is that there is in principle an
openness towards a revision of Tillich's larger definition of religion in the event that
the contents of the concrete religions do not endorse it. To what extent Tillich's larger
concept is valid and the mutuality of the larger and narrower concepts maintained can
be ascertained only after the analyses of the religion-culture correlation, quasi-
religions, typology of religion, revelation-religion correlation, God, etc. Hence the
42Tillich, EROR, p. 10. One should first participate in the concreteness of the ultimate concern
hefore abstracting it.(/N<2.,13-4)
43Tillich, ST I, p.11; Tillich, TC, p.40; Tillich, ERQR, pp.11-12. Tillich observes that there is
a tension and yet a necessary relation between the larger and narrower concepts. He
recognizes that a formal definition cannot commit itself to a content, though "the content
matters infinitely for the life of the believer". So in the great commandment of Judaism (Deut
6:5)(Tillich, DF, pp.2-3.) and that of Christianity both one's attitude of 'ultimate
concernedness' (loving ... with heart, soul and might) and the 'content of the concern' (the Lord
God) are present, thus providing the concrete understanding of religion in the two cases.
44Tillich, ERQR, p. 12.
25
significance of the two concepts will be appreciated in all these analyses and in the
three correlations discussed in Chapter V.
We now proceed to examine Tillich's correlation of religion and culture in
order to appreciate his larger and narrower concepts in the light of his wider
framework for analyzing religion as it is expressed in the religions.
2. Religion and Culture
The principle that "all universals are concretely expressed" is exemplified in the case
of the relation between the larger and the narrower concepts of religion. Thus it has
been appreciated that religion on the one hand is a universal element, power,
structure, in human life, and on the other hand that it is found only as distinct,
concrete religions in history, determined by different cultural forms. The relation
between religion and culture, therefore, comes to the forefront, and will be seen as
having important implications for the religion-religions correlation.
We have seen that the universality of ultimate concern is for Tillich as good as
established from his philosophical-anthropological and the Judaeo-Christian "Great
Commandment" bases. His understanding of religion as ultimate concern which
appears in his treatments of the religion-culture correlation will be highlighted first;
his understanding of culture and its importance in his theology will be appreciated
next; and finally the correlation itself with the difficulties it gives rise to and its
significance for the concept of religion will be discussed.
Ultimate concern as expressed in the "summary of the law" is seen by Tillich
to affirm two inseparably related movements, one represented by the metaphor
"vertical line" and the other by the metaphor "horizontal line". The first line, the
vertical one, symbolizes the attitude of "in spite of' or the state of "religious
reservation." The second line, the horizontal one, symbolizes the attitude of "because
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of' or a state of "religious obligation."45 The "mutual interdependence" of both is
affirmed. We can argue that this is the case by pointing out on the one hand that
neither of the religious movements can be deduced from the other, and on the other
hand that the one implies the other. Religious reservation has the character of
transcending the existential and the rational, without eliminating them (as we have
seen), and so it cannot be deduced from religious obligation, which has the character
of concrete expression of religious life and creativity. Similarly, religious obligation
cannot be deduced from religious reservation because no law or answer can be
received in a defined, authoritative way from the divine source. Every religious act
will have the marks of existential creativity and destructiveness in contrast to the
essential, which characterizes the state of religious reservation (actualized only
fragmentarily). The fact that religious reservation and religious obligation imply each
other is evident from the former's expression within and in terms of the cultural
context where religious reservation is actual; and religious obligation implies religious
reservation in the event of the former requiring to be valued and critiqued in the light
of the latter.
That the one cannot be without the other is also evident in the way Tillich
describes the vertical line as the meaning-giving dimension and the horizontal line as
the "temporal realization of eternal meaning". The horizontal line must be connected
continuously to the vertical line if it is not to become empty, and similarly the vertical
line must be connected to the horizontal as "we are not asked to enter the religious
reservation [the vertical] in order to stay in it"46 One-sidedness expressed as an
"exclusive surrender to the vertical line (in scepticism) leads to the impossibility of
45 Tillich, PE, p. 186
4^Tillich, PE, pp. 186-189. Tillich uses the Word in the vertical sense when he says: The
Word is certainly from beyond us, to us but at the same time becomes "immanent, creating a
divine structure of reality" . (Tillich, PE, p.210)
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expressing anything and acting in any direction" 47 One-sidedness expressed as an
"exclusive surrender to the horizontal line (in what one could call "forwardism") leads
to the loss of any meaningful content and to complete emptiness"48 If the horizontal
alone is recognized then God is "put alongside the world", God being made unable to
judge the world.49 And for Tillich this would mean denying God God's true character.
Moreover, the horizontal cannot have complete control of the human situation
because "human nature is not expressed in its full potentialities by the horizontal line".
So human life will revolt against the predominance of the horizontal.50 At the same
time the horizontal should not be left unpursued for fear of its tragic consequences. It
should be continued "under the criteria coming from the vertical line".51 And Tillich
asserts that even in the present period when the horizontal is the driving force, the
human "stature and condition" has not changed so as to be unable to experience the
breaking in of the vertical.52
Seeing the vertical and the horizontal in such inseparable terms, Tillich is able
to recognize and view positively developments which are horizontal in nature,
including those in such specialized fields as astronomy, and identify their theological
implications. He sees "the cosmic frame of man's religious self-evaluation"
tremendously changed from the idea of the human "as the bearer of the history of
salvation for the universe, as the only creature in whose nature God could become
fully manifest, as he who will experience his own historical end as the end of the
universe" to one of accepting "the possibility of other religiously meaningful histories
in other parts of the universe, with other beings in whom God could have become
47 P.Tillich, The Future ofReligions, ed. by Jerald C. Brauer, New York: Harper & Row,







fully manifest for them, with another beginning and another end"53 This changed
worldview is the source of relativism, which affirms the validity of each system and its
unique character of representing the world for itself. But at the same time Tillich
believes that there is a basic structure which underlies varying interpretations of
reality. So, from a theological perspective, he affirms that the new cosmic frame with
which humans are familiar "has not changed the divine-human relationship which had
been experienced and symbolically expressed" in the earlier frames.54 This confidence
of Tillich in regard to a fundamental theological structure is essential for his pluralist
hypothesis. It will suffice here to say that Tillich's basis for such a claim is the
identification of the structure of polar elements united in their ground, which
underlies any theory of reality or existence (being-nonbeing) or theory of knowledge
(subject-object) or theory of symbols (conditional-unconditional).
The mutuality of the vertical and the horizontal is consistently affirmed by
Tillich. But he does impose an order of priority between the two in terms of their
functions. He says: "Religion is, first, an open hand to receive a gift and, second, an
acting hand to distribute gifts."55 The vertical for him symbolizes one's relationship
with being-itself, a relationship which affirms the dependence of individual, society
and all reality on being-itself, and the judging character of being-itself. The idea of a
vertical relationship between God and humans has been criticized by Page for its
failure to affirm a mutual relationship between God and humans; a consequence of
this failure is its hindrance to the cause of liberationist theologies, because liberationist
theologies demand a rejection of all hierarchical models. Page calls for a change of
emphasis from God's omnipotence, which is synonymous with the hierarchical, to
God's omnipresence, and suggests that God's "infinite transcendence radiates out from
53Tillich, FR, p.48.
54Tillich, FR, p.48.
55Tillich, PE, p. 188.
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every given present", attracting humans to Godself.56 God's judging nature is not
stressed so much in Page as in Tillich; rather, God showing Godself in a positive
relationship and seeking to influence humans by being beside them "as a presence of
good, justice and beauty" is suggested as a more viable approach.57 That Tillich's
transcendence-immanence idea is an affirmation of the immediacy of God to humans,
an idea which corresponds to what is here demanded, will be discussed in Chapter IV.
It must now be observed that Tillich's two-fold description of religion in terms
of the vertical and horizontal is actually synonymous with the religion-culture
correlation, the vertical being identical with religion and the horizontal with culture.
The vertical-horizontal correlation and the religion-culture correlation appear different
because they arise from different sources. The vertical-horizontal derives from the
Great Commandment of the Judaeo-Christian tradition, where both the vertical and
horizontal stand for religious acts. As we have seen, the Godward movement is more
fundamental, for it is nothing but an affirmation of the divine presence in the human.
The human-to-human movement is also equally important and has "religious"
significance, for religious obligation requires transformation at all levels, especially in
one's relationship to others. The religion-culture correlation, on the other hand, arises
from Tillich's theological enterprise which seeks to consider worldviews and situations
beyond the boundaries of the Christian tradition, which Tillich testifies as having
engaged him throughout his career.58 This is his concern with culture, not just as a
source of theology but as a necessary part of the theological function itself. We shall
show how Tillich sees culture in terms of ultimate concern, despite each cultural act -
56Ruth Page, Ambiguity and the Presence ofGod, London: S.C.M., 1985, pp.137-139.
57R. Page, Ambiguity and the Presence ofGod, pp. 141-142.
5 8 In his Foreword to 'The Theology of Culture', which is a collection of some of his papers
over the years, he states that the papers of the volume were consistent with the title of his first
published speech " Uber die Idee einer Theologie der Kulture" and that the forty years of his
theological career had been devoted to understanding and explaining the religious dimension of
culture.
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the technical, cognitive, aesthetic, moral and religious (and also language which is
present in each of these59) - having its own inner aim and dynamics. This shows that
for Tillich culture is identical with the horizontal movement of religion.
Culture is primarily taken in its root meaning of "that which takes care of
something, keeps it alive, and makes it grow".60 In his emphasis on the change or
growth that humans produce on the encountered realities, Tillich is taking note of J.G.
Herder's understanding of culture as the "historical self-development of humanity",61
without, however, falling into Herder's and Hegel's idea of steady universal progress
(through conflict) guaranteed by "divine providence" or "world spirit".62 Tillich sees
developing "something new" as the aim of culture in all their distinct functions,
"materially, as in the technical function; receptively, as in the functions of theoria, or
reactively, as in the functions of praxis" 63 All these functions presuppose that a
human person, as a "developed self',64 has a world before her/him, world being the
experiencing of something universal in everything particular.65 One's relationship to
one's world is in two ways: theoria and praxis. These correspond to the two basic
functions (the logos and the technical act) of culture, which are based on the
ontological polarity of individualization and participation.66 The ontological elements
50Tillich says: "Logos precedes everything. If man is called homo faber, he is implicitly
called anthropos logikos, i.e., man who is determined by the logos and who is able to use the
meaningful word." (Tillich, ST III, p.65)
60Tillich, ST III, p.61.
61 Delwin Brown, Boundaries ofOur Habitations: Tradition and Theological Construction,
Albany: State Univ. ofNew York, 1994, p.61. Brown himself understands culture as a social
concept reflecting the processes of change - such as process and structure, dissolution and
construction, past and present, action and givenness, etc., and without the progressivism of
Herder, (ibid., pp.66-7)
62J, P. Clayton, The Concept ofCorrelation: The Possibility ofaMediating Theology,
Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1980, pp. 130-133.
63Tillich, ST III, p.61.
640nly humans have the quality of being a fully centred being in contrast to other beings,
which lack both centredness and individualization. (Tillich, ST III, pp.34-35).
65Tillich, ST III, p .61.
66Tillich, ST III, pp.61-72.
31
of individualization and participation are not just applicable to any special realm but
characterize everything, every being 67 Individualization is the affirmation of one's
unique identity.
Individualization points to that which is self-centered, which, in other
words, is particular. As self-centered it resists being merged into the universal.
The degree to which something is self-centered determines its capacity to
maintain its own identity in an infinite variety of relations.68
This element is reflected in the biblical creation accounts in which God creates
individuals and not universals.69 The other element, participation, is evident in one's
communion with another individual self in order that one might become a person
oneself - becoming a person requiring communion with the other and consequently
resistance from that other. So individualization and participation need each other:
"Without individualization nothing would exist to be related. Without participation
the category of relation would have no basis in reality. "70 And only in their mutual
striving, the elements reach their perfect forms: "When individualization reaches the
perfect form which we call a 'person', participation reaches the perfect form which we
call 'communion'."71 We might suggest here that Tillich's use of the two ontological
categories helps him to affirm his fundamental view of the distinct identity of culture,
such that culture is not subjected to any normative theological system.72
The two basic cultural functions, namely the technical act and the Word
correspond to individualization and participation respectively. The technical function
regards the encountered object as a thing for one's "handling" (Zuhandensein - "being
at disposal" - in Heidegger) to reach ends, which may in turn become means to other
67Tillich, ST I, pp.174-175.
68Tillich, PTMW 1, p.382.
69Tillich, ST I, p . 174.
70Tillich, ST I, p i 77.
71Tillich, ST I, p. 176.
77 .
See P. Tillich, Paul Tillich: Theologian of the Boundaries, ed. by Mark Kline Taylor,
London: Collins, 1987, pp.38-39 (hereafter cited as Tillich, PTTB).
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ends. The danger of the technical function is that ofmaking the production of means
as an end in itself, with no reference to the inner aims of organic processes, or more
importantly with no recognition of any ultimate end. The other function is that of the
Word, which represents a cognitive relationship with reality (Vorhcindensein - "being
in existence" - in Heidegger) 73 These two functions then come into play in the
dimension of spirit as individuals or groups related to her/his/their world. The logos
function now expresses itself as the act of receiving the encountered reality as a
structured whole into one's centred self. Tillich calls this act theoria, and sees its aim
as that of "truth", which is a fragmentary realization of the union of subject and object
in the act of knowledge, and "authentic expressiveness", where not just the
subjectivity of the individual or the object without the depth dimension appears but
also a hidden aspect of the universe united with a "hidden receptive power of the
mind" appears. On the other hand, the technical function now expresses itself in the
act of reacting to the encountered world and finding the appropriate "tools" to
transform various parts of it. Tillich calls this act praxis, which aims at the fulfilment
of the essential human potentialities at the personal level and at the attaiment of
universal justice in the social level.74
From this account of culture in Tillich, it is possible to see that there is a
consistent picture of a polarity in the structure of reality and in the performance of
cultural acts. Identity and separation at the one end, and communion and participation
at the other end determine the nature of reality as well as every cultural act. It must be
pointed out that although both polar elements are present in each act, in their concrete
actualization one of the elements is predominant. Thus in an exercise of the technical
function, separation is predominant, with participation present as the subject-object
encounter; and in a cognitive approach to reality as a whole, participation is
73Tillich, ST III, pp . 61-66.
74Tilhch, SriII, pp.66-72.
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predominant, with separation characterizing the concrete standpoint of the
individual.75 These two tendencies in culture will be seen to have significance for
understanding the nature of concrete religions, presented by Tillich in a religious
typology (Chapter II). But now we must show how these two tendencies influence the
religion-culture correlation.
Religion is presupposed by the two basic cultural functions. This approach of
affirming and understanding religion from the side of culture can be regarded to justify
Tillich's claim to be a "theologian of culture", but more importantly we can place him
among those doing theology from below. This is possible because first, Tillich does
not claim for religion or God a supranatural status (meaning an actual realm beyond
the natural world), and second, he proceeds to develop a theological concept from
concrete human experiences and from general principles identified in those
experiences. The definition of religion as self-transcendence of life in the dimension of
the spirit has the decisive implication that religion must first of all be considered as a
quality of the two other functions of the spirit (cultural and moral) and not itself as a
function. At the same time, his is not a theology from below that subsumes the
religious substance under culture:
Substance cannot be intended. It is unconsciously present in a culture, a group,
an individual, giving the passion and driving power to him who creates and the
significance and power ofmeaning to his creations.76
So religion cannot be fully defined by culture and assigned a special sphere within
culture. Nor can religion be regarded just as "an effect of changing psychological and
sociological conditions", for religion is "a necessary aspect of man's spiritual life".77
75Tillich states that "the scientific type of thought favors the side of separation while the
metaphysical type favors the side of participation." (Paul Tillich, Main Works, Vol.1:
Philosophical Writings, Gunther Wenz (ed ), Berlin and New York: De Gruyter -
Evangehsches Verlagswerk GmnH, 1989,p.384. Hereafter cited as Tillich, PTMW1.
76Tilhch, ST III, p. 64.
77Tillich, TC, p.3 (italics added).
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"Religion is the substance, the ground, and the depth of man's spiritual life."78
Religion or the religious element is to be seen, for Tillich, not as a special function,
capacity or dimension of humans but as the depth of all functions, capacities or
dimensions of humans. "Spiritual life" and all creative (and destructive) acts of the
different human dimensions are represented by culture.
We must now see whether Tillich convincingly argues that religion is present
in every human dimension or cultural act but as transcending it. Tillich claims that the
cognitive, aesthetic, social and political are rooted in the spiritual.79 If "mythological
imagination" and "mystical intuition" do not suggest religion as having a cognitive
element and transcending it at the same time, then cognition gains control of religion
and demands that religious knowledge subject itself to the criteria of pure knowledge.
This leads to religion receiving the judgment of science-dominated pure knowledge
that religious knowledge is invalid.80 Similarly, if religion does not have some element
of otherness in relation to the aesthetic function while being present in it, it will be
seen as consecrating all art, which is absurd. Tillich points out that religion has to
transcend the aesthetic function and influence other functions at the same time. Only
then can it do more than art's task of expressing reality, by transforming reality. Thus
religion's connections with the causes of "the good" and "the true", and not just with
the aesthetic function, should be appreciated. Another function with which religion is
related in a transcending manner is the moral one. Religion maintains its transcending
character as long as religion sees the moral as one of its special functions and does not
fall into the trap of serving the cause of the ethical in the social and political spheres.
Religion should lead not just to the performing of an ethical function but to a critical
78Tillich, TC, p.8.
70Tillich, DF, p.l.
80See Tillich, TC, p.6. For Tillich "the mind of man is necessary for religion", for it "is the
place we know in the universe. . .where the relationship to the ground of being comes to
awareness, and produces great movements which we call religion".(Tillich, UC, 13)
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function towards the ethical itself.81 Finally, feeling as an element that goes with all
the spiritual functions has in the history of religions been regarded as arising from a
religious source. But if feeling claimed that religion could be identified with feeling
itself, then religion would cease to have relevance for theoretical and moral
discourses, because of being assigned to the realm of the private and subjective along
with feeling.82 Nor is religion a particular psychic function.83 The fact of religion
being connected with and at the same time transcending each of the human spiritual
functions shows that religion belongs to the "depth" dimension, from which it could
inspire and criticize each of the human functions. This "dimension of the ultimate" is,
however, spoken about only symbolically when applied to God and metaphorically
when distinguished from other human functions. There is therefore no "dualism of
levels", all dualistic terminology being only "preliminary" and "transitory". Tillich
suggests correlation as the adequate approach to deal with the relation of the depth
dimension to the other dimensions because negatively it resists the dualism of levels,
and positively it witnesses to "the human spirit's essential relation to the divine Spirit",
where there is no correlation but "mutual immanence".84
The unity of all these cultural dimensions in the depth dimension is also the
basis of Tillich's "philosophy of meaning", expressed in terms of a religion-culture
correlation:
Religion as ultimate concern is the meaning-giving substance of culture, and
culture is the totality of forms in which the basic concern of religion expresses
itself. In abbreviation: religion is the substance of culture, culture is the form
of religion 85
81 See Tillich, TC,6.
82See Tillich, TC, p.7.
83Tillich, PTTB, p.39.
84See Tillich, ST III, p. 121.
8^Tillich, TC, p.42; Tillich, IH, p.50. See Tillich, What is Religion? New York: Harper
Torchbooks, 1969, p.60 (hereafter cited as WR). "In the cultural act . . .the religious is
substantial; in the religious act the cultural is formal."
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Such a 'simple' correlation claiming to bring all the human disciplines into an essential
relationship with theology calls for a rigorous consideration. This becomes more
important for a study of Tillich's pluralism in the light of his claim that through a
"philosophy of meaning" he would be able to dialogue with and comprehend any
historical religion.86
Both religion and culture is seen by Tillich to be concerned about meaning, but
to differ in regard to the kind ofmeaning each seeks:
If consciousness is directed toward the particular forms of meaning and their
unity, we have to do with culture, if it is directed toward the unconditioned
meaning, toward the import ofmeaning, we have religion 87
And Tillich points out that religion and culture have their common basis in their focus
on the unity ofmeaning.88 Morgan rightly suggests "meaning" as the concern of both
religion and culture in his comparison of Tillich and Geertz, and proposes the
possibility of fruitful exchange between theology and anthropology, noting the
complementarity of the two disciplines:
Whereas Geertz says anthropology does not seek to understand the "basis of
belief' but, rather, beliefs manifestations, Tillich says that theology is an
address to the basis of belief by means of beliefs religious and cultural
manifestations.89
It should however be borne in mind that for Tillich, the basis of belief of a particular
culture cannot be identified in any definitive way because as we saw earlier, religion
does not have its own object or analytical tools. For Tillich, unconditioned meaning,
or better "the unconditioned source and abyss of meaning", only gets designated 90 in
an enquiry from the side of religion, but has no form of its own to be expressed in
86Paul Tillich, WR, p.22.
87Tillhch, WR, p.59. (Italics added)
88Tillich, WR, pp.60-66.
OQ ir
John Morgan, "Religion and Culture as Meaning Systems: A Dialogue between Geertz and
Tillich", Journal ofReligion, 57:4 (Oct. 1977), p.373. See also ibid.,pp. 363-375.
90Tillich, IH, p.50.
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essential terms. Any criticism of conditioned meaning on behalf of unconditioned
meaning can only mean a new substance-form relation producing a new conditioned
meaning which is more transparent to unconditioned meaning. Here again, we meet
Tillich's case for plural correlations within a historical religion and among religions
and cultures, without any one of the correlations being definitive and hence superior
to others. Thus we see in one way Tillich's pluralist stance in regard to theological
pluralism and religious pluralism.
Pluralism, however, should not mean sacrificing anything vital to a particular
religion for the sake of an overall concept. So Tillich is open to criticism from the side
of religion, especially from those who see Christian doctrine in literal and normative
terms. Hamilton criticizes those, including Tillich, who speak of religion as 'meaning',
for recognizing meaning in religion generally and refusing to see meaning in its
"definite" and unique Christian sense.91 Such criticism of Tillich is unwarranted
because Tillich's larger definition is meaningful for the Christian from her/his concrete
appreciation of the presuppositions (e.g., the availability and reception of the New
Being) and implications (e.g., the act of transforming personal and social realities as
professed by the symbol Kingdom of God) of the Great Commandment.
Ways in which religion is over-emphasized as against culture have been
observed, and why the religion-culture correlation resists them has been shown by
Tillich. The substance character of religion is constantly forgotten, and it is often
considered form. When this happens, a further step is taken by religion, especially in
the ecclesiastical context, to claim superiority for its form. But once religion has
surrendered its substance character it has to share the destiny of form, which is that of
competing at the same level with the forms of secular culture. And religion as form
91 Kenneth Hamilton, God is Dead: The Anatomy of a Slogan, Grand Rapids: W.B.
Eerdmans, 1966, p.28.
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will gradually lose its importance. In order to save itself from this situation, religion as
form becomes intolerant and claims superiority for itself and its various expressions
(rituals, institutions, etc.) on the basis of an "authority" it gives to itself. And Tillich
points out that this happened in sectarian movements, fundamentalism and the Roman
church.92 The authority a concrete religion or a church claims for itself is however
due to the transference of ultimacy and absoluteness from the substance character of
religion to the form character of religion.93 Hence, Tillich asserts the proper character
of the religion-culture correlation in his 1919 presentation at the Kant Society in
Berlin: "the religious principle only exists in connection with cultural functions outside
the sphere of religion". Any attempt at domesticating the religious principle in the
religious sphere and competing with the various cultural systems would mean a
double system of values and existence, thereby fated with no actualization of the
religious principle in culture 94
Tillich's concept of religion requires, and benefits from, this limitation that he
puts on the religious sphere in the name of religion as substance, because the concept
allows religious elements in cultural creations to appear in their full significance. So
he criticizes religion's (specially Christianity's) claim to be at a superior level and its
attempt to control "autonomous cultural functions" such as science, the arts, ethics
and politics. Seeing "level" to be suggestive of superiority of one level over another or
reduction of one level to another on the one hand, and not suggestive of a mutuality
between religion and the cultural functions on the other, Tillich proposes the
metaphor "dimension", which he finds affirming the possibility of all dimensions
meeting in the same point, that is length, breadth and depth meeting at the same point
92Tillich, UC, p.36. See Tillich, PE, p.46: "Religion, if it acts heteronomously, has ceased to
be the substance and life-blood of a culture and has itself become a section of it ..."
93See Tillich, PE, p.57.
94Tillich, PTTB, p.40.
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without interfering with each other95 He finds this essential for a theological
understanding of humans, which calls for seeing a human being both in self-
relatedness as well as in relation to her/his ground, which reveals the universal
structure of being: "Man is one, he is self-integrating in all his dimensions, he
disintegrates in all of them, and he must be reintegrated, i.e., healed in all of them, in
order to be healed at all."96
A positive, preservative and facilitative character, therefore, has been
identified in the religious substance by Tillich. Only what is in a cultural dimension,
and not any thing from outside, can preserve the autonomy of that dimension.
Religion has this preserving character only when it is present in forms and not when it
identifies itself with certain forms. When the latter happens, religion as form can
impose its form on other concrete religions. The true character of the religious
substance is lost.
It is possible to show that, if ... a special religious culture be imposed on
dissenters or foreign cultures, it is not the ultimate, with its justified claim to
grasp the hearts of men, but something provisional and conditioned which uses
the religious ultimacy for its claims ... Theonomous thinking sides with
autonomous criticism, if such forms of religious culture present themselves as
absolutes 97
"Theonomy does not stand against autonomy"; for it "is the answer to the question
implied in autonomy".98 And theonomy takes the side of autonomy to fight
heteronomy, which "imposes an alien law, religious or secular, on man's mind" as
witnessed in "the 'terror' exercised by absolute churches or absolute states."99
Theonomy affirms autonomy because the latter is basically "obedience to reason", that
95Tillich, 57111, pp.14-15.
96Tillich, PTMW6, p.410.
97Tillich, PE, pp. 5 7-8.
98Tillich, PE, p.46.
Tillich, PE, p.46.It is this heteronomous attitude of institutional religion that Science had to
counteract. (Tillich, PTTB, p .46) Such heteronomy from the side of the Church, then, leads to
a public mistrust and rejection of religion.
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is, the act of grasping the structure present in mind and reality. So autonomy
"operates in the theoretical, as well as in the practical, spheres of culture" and must be
allowed to do so, because each sphere of culture reflects the "structure of being". But
theonomy criticizes autonomy at the point the latter separates itself from the religious
substance and "replaces mystical nature with rational nature".100 Hence autonomy
should be constantly related to theonomy.
"Theonomy" has been defined as a culture in which the ultimate meaning of
existence shines through all finite forms of thought and action; the culture is
transparent, and its creations are vessels of a spiritual content .101
However, although theonomy or theonomous culture represents for Tillich the
proper relationship between religion and culture, he does not see it as a final stage in
the religious and cultural development of humankind, nor as an experience possible
only within the Christian tradition. Rather, he sees plural manifestations of theonomy.
With every cultural sphere seeking ultimate meaning, the old theonomy must give way
to a new theonomy.102 Instead of subscribing to any progressivist idea which in
history has arisen from the side of culture and from the side of religion (the Church),
Tillich offers a principle by which a particular religion-culture correlation can be
evaluated: "The more the form, the greater the autonomy; the more the substance or
import, the greater the theonomy."103
The affirmation of plural manifestations of theonomy shows Tillich's pluralist
stance. How Tillich fares in relation to one important criterion emphasized in recent
pluralist theology of religions will now be discussed.
A pluralism which simply affirms the validity of all religions and cultures
without at the same time affirming the possibility of developing criteria for showing
100Tillich, PE, p.44.




the mutual significance of religions is one which would have no credibility in a
theology of religions discussion. Tillich's pluralism is obviously not a popular version
of pluralism. In fact we have already pointed out in the course of our analyses of
Tillich's definitions and correlations that one main criterion that Tillich puts forward
and satisfies in practice is the fact of one religious substance (even "one" as a qualifier
needs to be denied to affirm transcendence), one structure of being, one logos
structure, expressing itself in many ways. Hence the idea of the 'one and the many' is a
statement synonymous with Tillich's religion-culture correlation. The one fundamental
substance is for Tillich the basis for seeing the connexions between the various forms
and for understanding the change from one form into another (and the significance of
those changes for the personal, social and cosmic realms). One essential feature of the
religious substance is ultimacy: "The religious element in culture is the inexhaustible
depth of a genuine creation. One may call it substance or the ground from which
culture lives. It is the element of ultimacy which culture lacks in itself but to which it
points."104 One of the consequences of this criterion, which is the question of the
acceptability of determination from within (substance determining form), will concern
us here.
We have already seen Tillich calling the Church to recognize its "form" or
"cultural" character and to refrain from claiming superiority over other cultural
functions. Now, we must refer to Tillich's positive suggestion that Christianity relate
itself to and see itself in the light of the various cultural creations. He points out that
Liberal theology by accepting the role of the "Protestant principle" has taught us
to realize that Christianity cannot be considered in isolation from the general
religious and cultural, psychological and sociological, development of humanity;
that Christianity, as well as every Christian, is involved in the universal
structures and changes of human life. . .105
104Tillich, STIII, p. 101.
105Tillich, PE, p.xxvii.
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Every living religion, including Christianity, is in mutual engagement with the other
cultural functions, and hence cultural changes are reflected in the cultural context as a
whole, including the religious sphere. It is when the question whether Tillich is
concerned about distinguishing the better from the worse in cultural forms is raised,
for example by Page,106 that there is an ambiguity in Tillich about attempting answers
from within culture. On the one hand Tillich believes that the transcendent principle is
necessary and in fact is the basis of seeing cultural oppositions between good and evil,
an insight which Tillich attributes to Nietzsche.107 This is consistent with the fact that
a concrete cultural function has meaning only in relation to its ground. So it seems
that only separate relations between each cultural act and the religious ground exist,
there being no relations between the different cultural acts. Affirming the religious
substance as ground and as "a unity" in this way is absurd to Clayton, because it
amounts to the ground receiving a different "value" from each of the relations.108 On
the other hand, from Tillich's understanding that a human being is a unity, and from
his repeated statement that salvation or healing is something that happens to the
whole person, the point can be drawn that one cultural act has immediate
consequences for other acts. If such interaction is possible at the existential level, then
'06Ruth Page, "The Consistent Christology of Paul Tillich", Scottish Journal ofTheology,
Vol.36, p.209.
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In Nietzsche's idea of the human person being 'beyond good and evil', Tillich finds the
form of the individual-concerned 'ethics of virtue' violently shattered by the religious import to
give rise to the new form of the 'ethics of grace'. And instead of suggesting any ideal
substance-form relation, Tillich is content to go with Nietzsche's assertion that the person
characterized by the 'beyond good and evil' existence is better than the person who practises
the ethics of virtue. (Tillich, PTTB,47-8) Despite its implicit affirmation of the religious
substance, Nietzsche's approach does lead to an opposition between the universal and concrete
frames. This then is the source of denial of all cultural attempts and ofmeaning itself.
108Clayton, The Concept of Correlation, pp. 147-50. Clayton's concern about the proper
'value' of the religious substance is misplaced. A form cannot assign a value or content to its
ground. We will see under "Religion in Quasi-Religions" that secular forms can be a matter of
ultimate concern, and as such a dynamic relation with a yes and a no should be present
between the religious ground and the secular object of one's ultimate concern. This means that
any attempt to give a value to the religious ground in terms of a particular form will amount to
demonization.
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intellectual distinctions of "more true" and "less true" are possible. In fact Tillich
speaks about the "mutual immanence of religion and culture" and the responsibility of
both philosophies of religion and philosophies of culture to close the gap from both
sides.109
This immanence might not always be obvious in some of Tillich's
considerations of the substance-form correlation. His idea of cultural forms being
broken by the religious substance is a case in point. But this does not mean that for
Tillich forms are dispensable, as his comment about expressionism shows: "a form-
shattering religious import is struggling to find form".110 What Tillich is saying is that
if present cultural forms are shattered, then a new form takes its place, the religion-
culture correlation not being lost at any point.
The relation of import to form must be taken as resembling a line, one pole of
which represents pure form and the other pole pure import. Along the line itself,
however, the two are always in unity. The revelation of a predominant import
consists in the fact that the form becomes more and more inadequate, that the
reality, in its overflowing abundance, shatters the form meant to contain it; and
yet this overflowing and shattering is itself still form.111
Tillich does not say how this point of the intensity in the religious import is reached,
nor the means by which higher or sophisticated forms are found by the religious
substance for its actualization. The question of the import appearing in a more
revealing way can be answered either by claiming that religious import by definition
has the best and the only form in which it can appear or by saying that being-itself is
grasped in terms of her/his concrete ultimate concern. The first possibility reflects a
supranaturalist answer, and hence cannot be Tillich's. The other answer is certainly
Tillich's, but it has an ambiguity. If being-itself is grasped in terms of one's concrete
ultimate concern, is not being-itself more likely to appear in quite the same way as
109Tillich, PE, p.56.
11 °Tillich, PTTB, p.46.
1UTillich, PTTB, p.42.
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expected through one's ultimate concern rather than in a radically new and revealing
way? Tillich's important affirmation must be about the essential character of the
"religious principle", "Unconditional", "import", "ultimate meaning", which is to
"shak[e] the foundation of all things and [to] build them up new."112 This statement
does not simply mean that forms are neutral things available to the religious principle.
Rather culture itself has a telos that directs it to the universal structure of being. There
is, however, a circularity in this, because to say that the universal is present in the
particular will imply that the particular has to point to the universal. Tillich does not
seem to face or answer this difficulty. What is present in Tillich and can be used to
lessen the force of the attack is his claim presented earlier, that the ultimate is never
present in itself so that a particular form can point back at it. Rather every criticism of
an earlier form is done in the power of the religious principle which is present in the
new form.113 Tillich's insistence is on the inseparability of religion and culture.
Here we reach one of Tillich's clearest expressions of his pluralism. His idea of
many valid religion-culture or substance-form correlations without any one of them
being the criterion of the rest corresponds to a pluralist notion. The religious
substance within each correlation is the criterion that judges the respective correlation
and creates a new correlation. The pluralism we identify here is more general,
although it can apply to the case of the diversity of religions as well. As cultural acts
are performed in a specific situation and with a specific religio-cultural heritage, the
various correlations within that context or tradition will be more intelligible,
comparable and mutually influencing than correlations outwith it. Normative criteria
specific to each concrete religion will not easily allow comparison of correlations
112Tillich, PTTB, p.41. Tillich's use of "religious principle", "Unconditional", "import" and
"ultimate meaning" for being-itself in his 1919 Kant Society presentation indicates that, for
Tillich, one encounters being-itself through the cultural disciplines, which affirms the fact of
being-itself expressing itself in manifold ways.
1' 3See Tillich, ST III, p.53: "Every new form is made possible only by breaking through the
limits of an old form."
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between traditions. Tillich's theology of culture would need to undergo further
development in the light of insights coming through interreligious dialogue.
Lastly, we discuss some final problems which must be dealt with in the
interests of Tillich's pluralist stance and of the inner consistency of his religion-culture
correlation theory. The idea of religion as the meaning-giving aspect of culture would
without doubt appear to be a religious imperialism to those who seek to interpret
culture from within culture. Hence they would claim autonomy for the subject matter
of each of the cultural disciplines and an inter-disciplinary approach which respects
the method of each discipline. Although Tillich does not share the relativism inherent
in this claim, he affirms the autonomy of the cultural disciplines from his own
perspective:
Every universal concept in cultural science is either useless or a normative
concept in disguise, it is either an alleged description of something that does not
exist or an expression of a standpoint, it is a worthless shell or it is a creative
act.114
But there is a difference between the relativist proposal of an inter-disciplinary model
and Tillich's "theology of culture" model. Relativism on the one hand recognizes no
common principle or structure underlying the various disciplines and on the other
suggests only a custom-built, tentative model that is determined by the subject-matter
of each of the participating disciplines. Opposed to this is Tillich's model which
assumes that the religious substance has the structure that comprehends and informs
all the cultural spheres. He speaks of the "universal significance of the theologian of
culture" with regard to the theologian's role in articulating the basis of the cultural
disciplines.
Far removed from every restriction to a special sphere, he can give expression
from the standpoint of substance to the all-embracing unity of the cultural
functions and demonstrate the relations that lead from one phenomenon of
1 ^4Tillich, PTTB, p.36 (italics in original).
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culture to another, through the substantial unity of the substance finding
expression in them; he can thereby help, from the viewpoint of substance, to
bring about the unity of culture in the same way that the philosopher helps from
the viewpoint of pure forms and categories.115
The affirmation here of a "substantial unity" (and the consequent task of showing the
cultural sciences their respective aims) and the previous quotation safeguard the
universality of religious substance from being replaced by any concept of one of the
sciences, including theology as a cultural science. The approach of a theologian
therefore must be one of a sensitive analysis of the various cultural forms on the one
hand, and a reflection on the religious substance on the other hand, with both leading
to an identification of the universal concepts.116 It is Tillich's going for such a formal
answer that often irritates his critics,117 who at this point are expecting Tillich to give
a proper account of the nature of religious substance. But Tillich cannot do that, for
that would mean creating a new form for the religious substance, which form would
then become authoritative for all other forms. This is a heteronomy he must resist. So
he can give only a formal answer, that the logos which is present in mind and reality
represents the structure of religious substance. With the receiving of the unconditional
in every form such as truth, goodness and beauty, one is acquainted with the logos-
element in each of the forms (thereby appreciating the validity and the mutual
significance of the forms), although it is the task only of theology or of 'theonomous
science' to deal with the "ultimate meaning" and "existential significance" of the
"logical foms" and "factual material of things".118
115Tilhch, PTTB, p.45.
116See Tillich, PTTB, pp.42-43.
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Thompson suggests that a formalistic statement is not a proper criterion of truth because it
does not help in distinguishing the true from the false (Ian Thompson, Being andMeaning:




However, although in theory theology should not surpass its original
limitations as a cultural science, in practice it can parade itself solely as a "higher"
science in one of two ways: either theology turning the concepts of its concrete
religious standpoint into universal concepts - thereby losing the truly universal, or
theology imposing universal concepts on the concrete religious standpoint - thereby
destroying living, actual religion. Thus in principle, Tillich's theological method
implied in his theology of culture cannot be suggested to be more expressive of
religion and less of culture, especially with Tillich's statements about concrete cultural
standpoints influencing, or bringing out hidden aspects of, universal concepts. An
example of the utter mutuality of both sides of the correlation of religion and culture
might be given from a late article (1960) of Tillich's entitled "The Impact of
Psychotherapy on Theological Thought". After pointing out how concrete
psychological factors of experience in some Christian thinkers have influenced their
respective ideas ofGod, Tillich states: "no statement about God can be made which is
not rooted in the correlation between man's self-awareness and the experience of the
divine presence. Every change on one side of this correlation changes the whole
correlation."119
From this analysis of a particular correlation (religion-culture), which is one
among other correlations of Tillich's overall theological method, it is possible to affirm
his pluralism. This means, however, that Tillich's theological method can be said to be
pluralist only after examining the other correlations, which will be done in Chapter V,
in addition to analyzing his religious typology and some important theological
concepts.
A question regarding the universality of the religion-culture correlation arises
at this point. In the above discussion on the distinctive character of theological
119Tillich, PTMW 2, p.311.
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method, we have seen Tillich speaking about theology, not simply Christian theology.
This means that on the one hand he has claimed the religion-culture correlation to be
the most adequate way of interpreting the entire philosophical, theological and
historical traditions of the West, which is what he studies and addresses directly. And
on the other hand, despite his acknowledgment of his Christian presuppositions in
other contexts, he has proposed that theology in other than the Western situation can
be analyzed in terms of the religion-culture correlation. He seems to think that
because the religion-culture correlation is drawn from the most basic character of
human existence and creative acts, it should hold good for every human context.
Wherever human existence in thought or action becomes a subject of doubts
and questions, wherever unconditioned meaning becomes visible in works which
only have conditioned meaning in themselves, there culture is religious.120
Given Tillich's presuppositions that human existence attains its essential state by
receiving its meaning from above or from its ground (which is the same thing) and
that one's creative acts in some fragmentary way fulfil the personal, social and cosmic
realities, his claims about the absoluteness of ultimate concern and of the religion-
culture correlation make sense. Tillich indicates Plato as the source of his
presuppositions, for Plato had drawn into his system aspects of the religious period
following the Homeric period of reform (hence inspired by both religion and culture)
and produced a philosophy which has since become classical for the Western
world.121 This heritage, along with Plato's theory of Ideas, which suggests both the
absoluteness and universality of Ideas, make the religion-culture correlation relevant
for the West. (By stressing the word relevant, we are admitting only that Plato's
thought is one important stream for the development ofWestern religious and cultural
traditions.) So if his basic assumption that the human being is a unity interactively
performingplural anddifferent cultural acts, which is the basis of his religion-culture
120Tillich, IH, p.49.
121 See Tillich, UC, p.35.
correlation, is not shared by another culture, then the religion-culture model cannot
immediately serve as a means of evaluating the religious data of that culture without
first appreciating its philosophical and anthropological presuppositions.122 But here
we must point out a distinction between the religion-culture structure and various
religion-culture models to comprehend this structure. Tillich would say that the
former is common to all cultures, and that even philosophical and anthropological
presuppositions emerge from the religion-culture structure reflected in existence (self-
world structure) and thought (subject-object structure). So Tillich's pluralism would
require on the one hand an absolutist affirmation of the structure of reality and on the
other a relativist evaluation of the different religion-culture models. This approach of
Tillich will be examined more carefully while spelling out his criticisms against
absolutist, relativist and universalist theologies of religions in Chapter III.
For the present it might be useful to cite an example from the Indian religio-
philosophical tradition to show that Tillich's insistence on the possibility of a universal
structure and the importance of formal definitions and criteria for analyzing that
structure does have a parallel outside the West. One of the most important
philosophical concepts, dharma, has a metaphysical as well as an ethical meaning. In
its metaphysical sense, it refers to the essential nature or structure of reality as a
whole. In its ethical sense, it refers to the essential character of one's actions in
relation to society. At the ethical level, distortions are abundant, "duty" being assigned
to people hereditarily. There is a clear connection made between the metaphysical
structure and the ethical, the former being the basis of the latter.123
1 ??We will see in the next chapter that Tillich finds that different cultures and societies have
ultimate concerns with different contents and also emphasize different poles of the respective
dialectic. These, along with other theological concepts and methodological principles of
Tillich, have to be exammed for a more adequate evaluation of his pluralism, which will be
done m the remaining chapters.
^3See Devaraja, N. K., The Mind and Spirit ofIndia, Varanasi/Delhi/Patna: Motilal
Banarsidas, 1967, pp. 157-9,166-8. However, we must be open to the possibility of original
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In conclusion, we have seen that the religion-culture correlation satisfies the
basic conditions of pluralism by showing the universality of religion and by affirming
both sides of the correlation. A summary with regard to the relevance of the religion-
culture correlation for Tillich's concept of religion, which is the concern of this
chapter, is that the correlation provides helpful ways of affirming Tillich's
understanding of religion and of seeing the significance of his concept of religion for
the whole sphere of human existence, including culture. Tillich's basis for considering
ideologies and cultural movements within his concept of religion has been appreciated
in our discussion of the religion-culture correlation. So, although technically no
significant argument is required to show how quasi-religions are covered by Tillich's
concept of religion, we shall briefly discuss some special features of the quasi-
religions, because for Tillich they are of the utmost importance in the encounters of
groups professing different ultimate concerns.
3. Religion in Quasi-religions
The theoretical basis of religion's presence in quasi-religions has already been
established in terms of the larger definition of religion and the religion-culture
correlation. The emphasis here, however, shifts from religion being the ground or
substance of each of the cultural dimensions to cultural forms which claim to be
alternative worldviews to the religions proper. Are secular movements based on
cultural ideals regarded as alternative worldviews because they share a common basis
with the religions proper? Or are the two complexes totally different? Our task will be
to appreciate how Tillich's concept of religion takes account of the religious element
in quasi-religions, and to ascertain any special implications the concept may have for
Tillich's generally pluralist approach.
sources of Indian traditions showing other relationships between religion and culture.
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Quasi-religions are so called because of the religious character that they
clearly reveal, namely the "unconditional character of an ultimate concern" .124 The
religious structure is satisfied in that there is the one who is ultimately concerned
(subjective) and the content of his concern such as freedom, society, nation,
etc. (objective). But the question here is, whether the power of being which is both the
basis of and beyond the subjective and the objective is present in a quasi-religion. In
contrast to Kiing, who answers negatively and hence calls systems based on secular
concerns "pseudo-religions" rather than quasi-religions (suggesting that pseudo-
religions are "surrogates for religion"),125 Tillich sees quasi-religions as having a
religious character potentially, although not actually. Thus he rejects "pseudo", which
"indicates intended but deceptive similarity", and prefers "quasi", which "indicates a
genuine similarity, not intended, but based on points of identity".126 Although these
are secular movements and hence "profoundly different" from the religions proper,
they show "decisive characteristics of the religions proper". And hence for Tillich they
are to be included in the concept of religion.127
It is the "analogy of religion" in movements in the West such as humanism,
liberalism, democracy, socialism, and even anti-humanist Fascism and pseudo-
humanist Communism that make them alternative worldviews to the religions proper.
And it is only in terms of the common basis of the religious principle that the success
of these secular movements can be explained.128 Tillich's support for this can be
found in his tracing the origin of these Western movements in Christianity. They are
124Tillich, DF,2.
19S
Hans Kung, "A Christian Response" in Hans Kiing (ed.), Christianity and the World




Tillich, CEWR, pp.3-4. Quasi-religion indicates the fact that "ultimate concern can
express itself in secular terms".(ibid., p.94)
l28Tillich, ERQR, p.9.
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inspired by the common aim of a radical transformation of society symbolized in the
'Kingdom of God'.129 It is when Christianity ceased to fulfil what was within it that
other movements needed to arise to fulfil it. In making this claim Tillich is not blind to
the fact of new developments themselves such as the idea of the individual, scientific
inventions and new explanations for life and the physical world having arisen
independent of Christianity's own practices and initiatives. For Tillich acknowledges
the possibility of new cultural forms and sees cultural changes taking place "by the
inner dynamics of culture itself'.130 What Tillich actually sees as Christian and hence
of religious substance in the secular movements is the truth offuller realization and
fuller understanding of all beings represented by the ought-to-be element in the holy.
So the success of the secular movements derive their strength from what is religious
in their claims such as human dignity and science. It is the Church's refusal to
recognize the religious element in the new movements and the Church's attack of the
movements that the cleavage between the sacred and the secular came about in
modern times. Hence liberal humanism had to fight against "the absolutisms of the
past".131 Various other movements such as the Renaissance, Enlightenment and
naturalism arose to emphasize autonomy from the respective defensive and oppressive
Church which functioned after the manner of the "church of the Inquisition".132
Tillich's analysis therefore finds a continuation of the religious spirit in the secular
movements in essence, though in historical expressions the church and secular
movements remained opposed, because of a sort of power struggle between them. So
Tillich stated that "a merely matter-of-fact culture is dishonesty or illusion"133 and
129Tillich, CEWR,p.'72
130Tillich, TC, p.50.




that "atheism is an impossibility and an illusion", because the state of grace operates in
it in a "transparent form" - though not in a "tangible" form.134
If the claim that secular movements have a religious basis is to be verified, one
way in which this can be done is to show that these movements will fail when they
lose the religious element. Tillich's understanding of religion as the affirmation and
transformation of life, which involves criticism of present forms, makes this possible.
According to him Christianity had inherited the element of the "ought to be" from the
Jewish prophets.135 This prophetic, critical spirit is the religious element that is seen
by Tillich to be present in the cultural movements, without which scientific autonomy
and freedom will lose themselves.136 Similarly, he refers to the case of humanism,
which "has no historical reality as such because it has no overarching symbol which
could produce unconditional concern".137 In humanism's history, starting from the
time a correlation was made between the goddess Athene and the humanist Pericles in
ancient Greece upto its flourishing on Christian soil in modern times, humanism could
survive only as long as it was related to the religious substance. Tillich finds
humanism undercutting its own roots in modern times "as for example, in a scientism
which deprives all nonscientific creative functions, such as the arts and religion, of
their autonomy".138 With reference to future developments, Tillich pointed out that
humanism would have no chance of resisting Communism and Fascism because "a
self-defying radicalization would take place and the loss of that very liberal humanism
which is to be defended would be almost unavoidable". History, however, has proved
Tillich partly wrong here, especially in the collapse ofCommunism in the West. But it
might be suggested that Tillich's criticism of Communism for its "a-personal




138Tillich, CEWR, p. 10.
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subjection under the demands of a neocollectivistic system"139 points to a possible
critical force responsible for the overthrowing of Communism from within.
It appears that Tillich is not adequately recognizing the genuine developments
of critical functions of the human spirit in various spheres by claiming that they derive
from a religious source. But this charge is unfounded because his various statements
in relation to the cultural movements bear two related strains in his thinking in this
respect, the ontological and the historical. Through the ontological approach he
affirms that humans have the potential for creative and critical functions, whose actual
expressions depend on individual, social and historical factors. When talking from a
historical perspective Tillich makes connections between preceding and/or succeeding
periods of history to show how the creative or critical functions express themselves in
relation to the demands of the respective situations. There is no contradiction between
Tillich's ontological and historical analyses.
A further analogy of religion in the quasi-religions is significant in view of
both the religions proper and quasi-religions being open to the two same dangers,
namely demonization and profanization. The former happens when that which is finite
or of a matter of preliminary concern is elevated to the ultimate or to ultimacy, after
the manner of the church's "defensive heteronomous forms" to resist the various
renaissances of the middle and later Middle Ages. A modern example is that of a
'nation' being attributed qualities "which far surpass the reality and being and
functioning of the nation" and considered almost divine.140 Through an absolute
symbol such as "a new meaning of life", sacrifices are demanded by Fascism and
Nazism: the sacrifice of "freedom for security, autonomy for certainty, individuality





develop doctrines and symbols to express an ultimate state of being in the world. "But
this ultimate is not truly ultimate because it does not transcend relative interests and
concerns. It tries to invest a particular loyalty with unconditional validity."142 Tillich's
religion-culture correlation is also able to show the reason for the fall of the systems.
The concern of nation being only a preliminary concern and not an ultimate concern,
it cannot unite humankind (which involves reunion with the ground of being) but
disrupts it.143 A form of practical Christianity where religion and ethics influenced
each other mutually, on the contrary, had the power to resist nationalistic
144
paganism.
Profanization happens when the secular forms become empty when deprived
of their religious substance as was the case with the ancient world's Skepticism.145
Modern expressions are the "idea of progress", influential in the West since the
Renaissance, and Utopian ideas of a stage of reason in bourgeoise thinking, of a stage
of classless society in working-class movements and of a stage in the evolutionary
process.146
It is important to conclude this section by pointing out that Tillich regards the
revelatory situation to be common to both religions proper and to quasi-religions, for
'revelation' is an important criterion for a pluralist theology of religions, as we shalll
see in Chapter IV. So if quasi-religions also satisfy the 'revelation' criterion, then they
make the scope of interreligious dialogue broader and suggest Tillich's pluralism to be
more radical (that is, a pluralism that affirms more religious frameworks which share a
common basis). Tillich points out that quasi-religions have even myth and cult to
142Tilllich, PTMW 2, p. 192.
143Tillich, PTMW 2, p. 169.
144Tillich, PTMW 2, p. 194.
143Tillich, UC, pp.33-34. Profanization is the case of the religious substance being lost to
rational form, and thereby becoming empty, (ibid., p.35)
l^Tillich, FR, pp.67-69. Utopia, from 'outopos', can never be completely secular for it
expects a reality which 'has no place in history'. (Tillich FR, p.68)
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preserve and express the respective revelatory situations. After stating that myth and
cult "are present in every religion and quasi-religion, even in the most secularized
forms", he argues:
An existential protest against myth and cult is possible only in the power of
myth and cult. All attacks against them have a religious background, which they
try to conceal, but without success. We know today what a secular myth is. We
know what a secular cult is. The totalitarian movements have provided us with
both. Their great strength was that they transformed ordinary concepts, events,
and persons into myths, and ordinary performances into rituals; therefore they
had to be fought with other myths and rituals - religious and secular. You
cannot escape them, however you demythologize or deritualize. They always
return and you must always judge them again and again.147
The ongoing task of a concrete religion therefore is that of judging itself as well as
judging quasi-religions because both are on the one hand based on the religious
ground and on the other hand prone to demonization and profanization.
The relation ofProtestantism to the secular realm is the most positive, due to the
Protestant principle that the sacred sphere is not nearer to the Ultimate than the
secular sphere. It denies that either of them has a greater claim to grace than the
other, both are infinitely distant from and infinitely near to the Divine.148
We have seen here that Tillich's larger concept of religion, namely, "ultimate
concern can express itself in secular terms".149 This means that quasi-religions, which
are based on the secular, should be included in the concept of religion because they
show the "decisive characteristics of the religions proper".150 The religion-culture
correlation came in use in the identifying of the religious element in the cultural
movements. Quasi-religions were seen as more susceptible to demonization and
profanization than the religions proper. The criticism to which both the historical
religions and quasi-religions should subject themselves was finally pointed out. The
common basis of the two as brought out by Tillich's approach is very useful for









A TYPOLOGY OF RELIGIONS
That religion as ultimate concern cannot be understood in itself and that it is only
expressed in cultural forms has been appreciated. A historical religion is constituted
by a number of such cultural forms bearing the holy and forming a separate sphere
within the larger sphere of the culture of the particular community. It is Tillich's claim
that a religious typology which pays attention to the history of religions is necessary
to comprehend the relation between ultimate concern and how it is experienced and
represented in the religions. Why Tillich uses typology and what religious object he
focuses on to develop his religious typology are questions that will be discussed first.
Then we shall present the different types that he identifies and the connections
between them. And finally we shall evaluate the typology in the light of two main
concerns: one, identifying the common basis of the concrete religions if any, and two,
identifying the way(s) in which the special features of concrete religions are affirmed
as valid.
1. The Basis of a Religious Typology
The importance of his "dynamic typology of the religions" for his analysis of the
relationship between Christianity and the religions proper and the quasi-religions is
stated by Tillich in the preface to his volume CEWR. In fact he lists four other
considerations with it,1 not particularly in any order of priority; and we might suggest
that the rest are comprehended in his "typology", even "the elaboration of the
universalist element in Christianity" is implied by the last type of the typology,
"Religion of the Concrete Spirit".
^Tillich, CEWR, pp .vii-viii. The other four are: "the characterization of the quasi-religions";
"the elaboration of the universalist element in Christianity"; "the dialogical character of the
encounter ofhigh religions"; and "the judgment of Christianity against itself as a religion".
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A religious typology is Tillich's answer to the question of the theological
significance of the concrete religions. It is a result of correlating the central features of
religion as ultimate concern and the important elements of concrete religions. The
former is indispensable for theology, for without it "no assertion is a theological one"2
and the latter is equally important, in two ways: first, because it is only in a concrete
situation, whether religious or quasi-religious, that ultimate concern is present, and
second, because a theological method that interprets ultimate concern satisfies the
conditions of methodological adequacy only if it can carry out its task in relation to
the various expressions of ultimate concern. So Tillich testifies that the history of
religions had an essential part to play in the development of his theology:
I have tried to look at Protestantism from the outside as well as the inside. From
the outside: first from the point of view of a passionately loved and studied
philosophy, and, in later years, from the point of view of a powerfully
developing history of religion; and, finally, from the point of view of the
experienced and interpreted general history of our period.3
How does Tillich correlate his theological concept of ultimate concern and the
history-of-religions accounts of the different religious elements? He attempts to
engage with both sides in terms of the concept of the holy. So the types are built on
the "holy" and its manifestations. The "foundations" of historical religions are
"revelatory experiences" 4 Although the history of religions is certainly not only about
the holy, there is no other concept that is central to theology for him. The history of
the idea of God "is the basic element in the history of religion".5 Tillich seems to
suggest that from a theological perspective the history of religions can be
comprehended by studying the concrete revelatory situations: "the tension between
2Tillich, PE, p.87.
3Tillich, PE, p. 11.
4Tillich, ST III, p.358. Keith Ward would agree here, for in his recent book he claims that
"Comparative theology is an enquiry into ideas of God and revelation, of ultimate reality and
its disclosures to human minds, as such ideas arise across the full spectrum of human history
and experience." (Keith Ward, Religion and Revelation, p.50)
-'Tillich, jSTI, p.218.
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medium and that which is mediated" as "the dynamo which moves the history of
religion" 6 This would mean that other aspects of religion should be interpreted
primarily in the light of the revelatory situation. The question is, whether such an
attempt to integrate and interpret the numerous myths, rituals and institutions of the
history of religions amounts to an insensitivity to the complex and unique character of
the religious reality tied up with the cultural situation of the respective historical
periods. This concern will call for some criticism of Tillich, which will be done later
(under 'The Correlation of the Systematic and the Historical'), but Tillich immunizes
himself against it in a certain way by seeing religion in its fundamental character as not
belonging to a sphere separate from other spheres but as influencing the individual
from within and without. "Revelatory experiences are imbedded in general experience.
They are distinguished from it but not separated from it."7
But there arises the question whether the concrete character of religion will be
properly captured in a typology which is most likely to develop types that have some
logical basis. Tillich regards such a basis as necessary for any understanding: "Types
are logical ideals for the sake of a discerning understanding; they do not exist in time
and space, and in reality we find only a mixture of types in every particular example. "8
But even this logical basis would make better sense in some religio-philosophical
frameworks than in others. It could thereby express one religion in a better light than
others. Tillich cannot ignore this danger, for his own proposal (which we saw under
"Religion and Culture") of theology's starting point is one's concrete religious
standpoint. It is from this standpoint that one explores universal structures. Thus
while proposing a typology in relation to interpretations of history, where the types
are actually mutually exclusive, he states: "A merely objective typology is impossible
6Tillich, ERQR,p.68.
7Tillich, ST I, p . 157.
8Tillich, CEWR, pp.54-5 5.
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in the realm of the spiritual life. Understanding spiritual things means participating in
them, deciding about them, and transforming them."9 Therefore, in principle Tillich
would see a concrete-universal tension, which implies the impossibility of any rigidity
of the typology.
Using his substance-form correlation in relation to the phenomenon of
religion, Tillich constructs a typology which he thinks is capable of comprehending
the various manifestations of the religious substance. He sees types as "ideal
structures" which are present in special events, although not in their pure forms. So
the religious reality in history is understood by seeing structures and events in their
mutual interdependence.
Historical understanding oscillates between the intuition of the special and the
analysis of the typical. The special cannot be described without reference to the
type. The type is unreal without the special event in which it appears. Typology
cannot replace historiography; historiography cannot describe anything without
typology.10
However, for Tillich the historical instances of the types are not so significant from a
theological point of view, because "the forces" or the "type-determining elements"
which brought about the historical religions and which "belong to the nature of the
holy and with it to the nature ofman, and with it to the nature of the universe and the
revelatory self-manifestation of the divine" are more important. For Tillich these
elements explain how religions arise and die.11 A one-sided emphasis on one of the
elements in a type or a claiming ultimacy for a bearer of the ultimate can lead to the
irrelevance or death of one religion and the emergence of another.
9Tillich, PE, p. 16. See ibid., pp. 16-27, esp. p. 17.
^Tillich, ST I, p.219. Cf. Joachim Wach, who commends typology for its function as a
"bridge between empirical and normative inquiry" in the "characterization of religions as
wholes"? (Joachim Wach, The Comparative Study ofReligions, ed. with an Introduction by
Joseph M.Kitagawa, New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1958, pp.25-26)
11Tillich, CEWR, p.57.
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Another doubt that is usually raised about typological thinking which Tillich
recognizes is that types are thought to stand beside each other rigidly with no
interrelationship. This, he points out, is due to the spatial character that is often
attached to 'types', and he states that "types are not necessarily static", for the tension
within every type drives the type beyond itself.
The kind of dialectics which, I believe, is most adequate to typological inquiries
is the description of contrasting poles within one structure. A polar relation is a
relation of interdependent elements, each ofwhich is necessary for the other one
and for the whole, although it is in tension with the opposite element. The
tension drives both to conflicts and beyond the conflicts to possible unions of
the polar elements. Described in this way, types lose their static rigidity, and the
individual things and persons can transcend the type to which they belong
without losing their definite character.12
Given Tillich's basic substance-form correlation and the various polar
correlations under it (participation and individualization, the cognitive and technical
functions, theoria and praxis, etc.), his portrayal of the manifestation of the holy can
only assume a corresponding two-fold form:
The holy in relationship to us, wherever we meet it, has always two elements in
its manifestation. It gives and it demands. The holiness of what is, in which we
participate, and the holiness ofwhat ought to be, in which we participate. These
two elements are in some way present in every religion.13
Tillich also points out that these two elements determine the character of experiences
and expressions of faith within a historical religion and between historical religions.
The dynamics of faith within and between the religions are largely determined
by these two types, their interdependence and their conflicts. Their influence
reaches into the most intimate cells of personal faith as well as into the
movement of the great historical religions.14
12Tillich, CEWR, pp.55-56.
13Tillich, ERQR, p.21.
14Tillich, DF, pp.56-57; Tillich, CEWR, p.57. Macquarrie also sees the possibility of an
intra-religious typology corresponding to a typology of religions, as religions are not
homogeneous but contain many variations (John Macquarrie, "The Meeting of Religions in
the Modem World" in his Theology, Church andMinistry, London: SCM, 1986, p. 132).
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The two elements of faith are inseparable and are "omnipresent in every act of faith",
but "one of them is always predominant",15 which is the source of conflict and of new
acts of faith. Such a process being evident in concrete religions, we can see Tillich as
an heir of Herder and Hegel, who according to Wach had begun to use typology for
"the characterization of religions as wholes".16 We shall now see what important
religious elements Tillich draws out from his concrete religious and theological
standpoint to "erect signposts pointing to types of religions, their general
characteristics, and their positions in relation to each other".17
2. Sacramental Religion
In its most fundamental and pervasive state, religion, for Tillich, is the immediate
experience of the holy in something that bears the holy. A sacred universe is
presupposed at this level of religious experience, thus making it possible for anything
in the universe to become the bearer of the holy. The bearer might be said to have
sacramental power, or the power to reveal the holy through a particular object (water,
light), place (temple), act, person or book.18 And as this revelatory process is evident
in all religions it might be called "the sacramental basis of religions", or simply
"sacramental religion".19 Although sacramental religion in principle underlies all
religions, as we shall see shortly, Tillich sometimes speaks of it as a separate type, the
first type,20 which then divides into two main types.
15Tilhch, DF, p.57.
'6Wach, The Comparative Study ofReligion, p.26.
17Tillich, CEWR, p.54.
1 O
Tillich does not subscribe to Schelling's Romanticist approach which "speaks of plants
having a god" because there is no evidence of plants having an awareness of their ultimate




"Sacramental" has reference to "sacrament", and the reason for Tillich thus
naming his first type can be found in ST III, where he suggests that sacrament refers
to the most fundamental expressions of religion, as "objective sign" (the visual
symbol) and "subjective sign" (the word), the former being older than the latter
because "the word is implicit in the completely silent sacramental material"21 The
stress on the objective evident here suggests the importance Tillich gives to "thing"
symbols (and also "word" and "concept" symbols) of different cultures and their
abilities in their own right to express the divine to the respective communities. He
argues that no special claim can be made for any sacrament or set of sacraments.
After pointing out that "sacramental" embraces more than the seven, five or two
sacraments prescribed by the churches, he states:
The largest sense of the term denotes everything in which the Spiritual Presence
has been experienced; in a narrower sense, it denotes particular objects and acts
in which a Spiritual community experiences the Spiritual Presence.22
Sacramental religion is maintained by cult, ritual and myth, which are stronger in this
form of religion than in others 23 The sacramental object, event or person, which is
the content of the ultimate concern of a religious group, receives this content from the
"visionary experiences of individuals". This content is then "accepted by the collective
reaction of groups, surrendered from generation to generation, changed, reduced,
increased". So the correlation between the specific object and the one who has taken
the object as the content of her/his ultimate concern is important in sacramental
religion.24 Tillich's theological definition and characterization of sacramental religion
shows evidence of his attempt to include primal religion in this type.
? 1
Tillich, ST III, p . 128. Word and Sacrament are the two modes in which Spiritual Presence
is received. When words communicate Spiritual Presence they become Word of God, and
when objects become vehicles of the divine Spirit they become sacraments, {ibid.)
22Tillich, ST III, pp. 128-129.
23See Tillich, CEWR, pp.89-92. Tillich points out that "higher' religions arose by showing the
finite character of symbols in relation to divine transcendence, {ibid.,91)
24Tillich, DF, pp.58-59. This correlation removes the danger of conferring sacredness to
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This will also be obvious from a few of his remarks about sacramental religion.
Thus he suggests that in the sacramental stage, a natural literalism in relation to
myths is inevitable because the primitive mind does not "separate the creations of
symbolic imagination from the facts which can be verified through observation and
experiment". Tillich grants validity to this religious mode until such time as the
questioning spirit arises in them.25 Literalism, which cannot distinguish the ultimate
from the symbol of the ultimate, is seen by Tillich to be a mark of "primitivism" as
against the "higher" religions.26 Another fact that shows the closeness of sacramental
and primal religions can be seen from a psychological fact that distinguishes the
primitive period from the classical and modern periods. The primitive period is
characterized more by unconscious stimuli and reactions, and the latter periods by
rational decisions. However, Tillich refers to the discovery of the unconscious in
recent psychology and says that it has reinforced the theological fact of the Spiritual
Presence as "using" the visual sacrament, which impacts on the human unconscious, in
addition to the Spirit communicating through the word.27 So, according to Tillich, the
sacramental's special connection with the unconscious gives it an important place,
rational approaches stimulated by the conscious in modern or post-modern societies.
Another important analysis of Tillich that shows the closeness of the
sacramental and the primal is his treatment of the concepts of time and space, which
represent the "most fundamental tension of existence".28 He shows how space being
more characteristic of sacramental religion determines the understanding of the divine
in this form of religion. The fact that each human group in primitive periods was
profoundly influenced by a special space, to which a unique deity Was associated,
some finite objects, as against others, in their own right.
25Tilhch, DF, p.52.
26See Tillich, ERQR, p.64.
27Tillich, ST III, p. 130
28Tillich, TC,30. See also ibid., pp.30-35.
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polytheism was in its original development not belief in 'many' gods but an affirmation
of the fact of gods being beside each other in the manner of spaces being beside each
other. Each special space by virtue of its connection with the existence of the
respective group demanded ultimate commitment and worship from the group. It is
the identification of the special deity with the respective space that makes defence of
one's space defence of one's deity. Tillich sees such elevation and the consequent
imperialism of a spatial god in the nationalisms of the twentieth century. In contrast to
the imperialism that polytheism cannot avoid because of "beside-each-otherness"
necessarily leading to "against-each-otherness", we shall show later (under "The
Ground ofReligion: God") that pluralism is possible only in terms of God understood
as both universal and concrete.
Tillich's sacramental characterization of primal religion differs from other
significant accounts of primal religion. He does not distinguish between pre-axial and
post-axial religions as Hick, who follows Jaspers. Hick sees the liberation idea arising
in the axial age, "a uniquely significant band of time" when "all the major religious
options, constituting the major possible ways of conceiving the ultimate, were
identified and established". This idea of salvation together with the concepts of the
ultimate became the basis for distinguishing post-axial religion from the pre-axial
religion.29 There is no idea of a saviour god, only that of a high God who is creator
and preserver in primal religion. Hick also observes how human existence in relation
to such a God helped the tribes endure hardship, share joy communally and value
earthly life highly. Keith Ward observes that the orientations of the primal societies
were cosmic and communal. Hence they lacked a "clear distinction between morality
and ritual or sacred law",30 nor did they possess a definite sense of individuality.31
?QJohn Hick, An Interpretation ofReligion, pp.22-33.
30K. Ward, Religion and Revelation, p.85.
31K. Ward, Religion and Revelation, p.63.
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Though Hick and Ward are right in their depiction of the character of primal religion,
they do not identify any factor from within primal religion that demands a move
beyond their existing form. It is likely that they would want to see a number of
historical, social and psychological factors together being the cause of new forms of
religion, in contrast to Tillich who would want to see a basic dynamic within religion
as the driving force towards attaining a higher religious level.
Although Tillich, like the others, affirms the importance of the cosmic order in
sacramental religion (because reality is pervaded by the divine), he at the same time
suggests the potentiality of sacramental religion to transcend itself on account of the
divine's two-fold nature of "giving" and "demanding". Tillich acknowledges the
stronger impulse in sacramental religion to live as an integralpart of the cosmic and
social orders, but at the same time he believes that the "ought" aspect is present in the
spiritual life of humans, which, unlike the realm of nature which is filled with
exemplars of a species, "creates unique embodiments of something universal".32 The
polarity model that Tillich uses to analyze the dynamics of sacramental religion is
taken from the Judaeo-Christian tradition, as we have seen. So it has a historical basis
and is not just an ideal model developed by Tillich. As Tillich's idea of the two-fold
self-manifestation of the divine, with one of the elements being potential, is a
principle that is followed in every realization and not the description of an actual
transition from the sacramental to the higher stages, it cannot be rejected outright; it
has to be and can be tested and modified.
The fact that the "sacramental" by definition expresses the revelatory situation
has already been highlighted. Now it is important to show how revelation is the basic
characteristic of sacramental religion, which at the same time makes sacramental
religion the fundamental type of religion, a type which needs to be transcended but
32Tillich, STl, p. 107.
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with its basic character preserved. The holy that manifests itself in the sacrament can
only reveal itself in its two-fold nature, the holy which is present and gives and the
holy which demands. But in all sacramental religion the holy as given prevails, without
any complete break with the holy as ought-to-be. This is why one sees the special
deity totally identified with one's special place, thereby needing protection rather than
manifesting its power to transform. It is when the ought-to-be element begins to
express itselfmore strongly that "the transition of the sacramental to ethical holiness"
happens. Tillich describes the ought-to-be element as "special inner personal
attitudes" and "attitudes towards others" which must follow when the holy is
encountered.33
The greater the sacramental power in a symbol, the greater is its proneness to
"demonization", which is the elevation of the holy object from its state of being the
bearer of the holy to that of the ultimate itself.34 Tillich shows the tendency in
sacramental religion to become "magic", "in the sense of the identification of the holy
thing with the holy itself'.35 A "confusion between the medium and the content of
revelation" occurs.36 Behind Catholicism's positive valuation of the visual arts37 lurks
a danger in the doctrine of "opus operaturn", which regards sacraments as effective by
their mere performance without the centred act of faith.38 When a king or a high
priest takes on a sacramental character, justice can be denied, because justice has to
be suspended before the ultimacy of what is sacramental.39 The polytheistic gods are
demonic "because the basis of being and meaning on which they stand is finite" but
claimed to be infinite. Tillich observes this distortion as a general mark of the religious
33Tillich, EROR, pp.22-23. The term 'ethical' is a little ambiguous here, having nothing to do
with Tillich's usual sense ofprophetic criticism.
34Tillich, TC, p.60.
35Tilhch, EROR, p.69.
36Tillich, ST I, p. 140.
37Tillich, UC, p.39.
38Tillich, ST III, p. 129.
39Tillich, ST III, p.218.
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sphere: "Demonization of the holy occurs in all religions day by day, even in the
religion which is based on the self-negation of the finite in the Cross of the Christ."40
So the move beyond the sacramental stage is demanded for the fuller
manifestation of the holy and for the overcoming of demonization when it happens.
This move leads sacramental religion towards becoming a world religion, through
sacramental religion's freeing itself from its "bondage to a particular realm of sacred
objects or persons or books" 41 Sacramental religion becomes universal by accepting
the criticism that comes from the Logos which represents the universal structure of
being. The tendency of divine powers identified with objects to become independent
gods can be checked only by subordinating them to the Logos "as the self-
manifestation of the divine".42 With this vital criticism, the sacramental can be
preserved in the higher religion because its concrete sacramental objects are now in
tension with the universal Logos. Thus Tillich's description of the a kairos event
reflects the character of the sacramental in union with the universal:
The "sacred" or the "holy" inflames, imbues, inspires all reality and all aspects of
existence. There is no profane nature or history, no profane ego, and no profane
world. All history is sacred history, everything that happens bears a mythical
character; nature and history are not separated. Equally, the separation of
subject and object is missing, things are considered more as powers than as
things.43
So the sacramental survives in the higher, serving as its basis:
No church can survive without a sacramental element. However effectively
prophetic criticism serves to make impossible an absolute reliance upon the holy
as present, however effectively it opposes every fixation and every
objectification of the sacrament, it cannot do away with the sacramental
background; indeed, prophetic criticism itself is possible only by virtue of this
background.44
40Tillich, ST III, p. 109.
41Tillich, EROR, p . 23.
42Tillich, UC, p. 16.
43Tillich, PE, p.43.
44Tillich, PE, p. 109.
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It is in the sacramental that Tillich finds the multi-dimensional character of life
affirmed, expressing a holistic approach towards reality. Thus he criticizes churches
which emphasize the "word", calling for transformation in a legalistic way and in an
"exclusively personalistic form", but which fail to include all dimensions of life in their
fulfilment (ffagmentarily realized in history) as do the strongly sacramental churches,
such as the Greek Orthodox.45 Contrary to this positive way in which the sacramental
is present in the higher religions, it can also enter them without the necessary critique
in the name of the universal-concrete ultimate. So "primitive religions are indirectly
present and have a persisting influence in every religion",46 as in the worship of
ancestors in Confucianism and in the ritual elements in Islam.47 In essence, the
sacramental is both necessary for and not fully overcome in the higher religions.
The facts of the sacramental type being built around the concept of revelation
and of the other types being built upon this type have important consequences for our
understanding of Tillich's pluralism. Although revelation will be discussed as a
criterion of Tillich's pluralism later ("Revelation and Its Reception"), it is important to
show its (foundational) place in his religious typology. We have already shown that
Tillich has fulfilled his intention of defining the concept of revelation "in such a way
that the idea of a universal revelation is accepted", which concept then "becomes the
presupposition of every concrete and particular revelation"48 So the sacramental type
affirms each revelation and consequently each corresponding religion which satisfies
the sacramental (or revelatory) structure. This is nothing other than an affirmation of
the plurality of both revelations and religions in a fundamental way by virtue of the
sacramental type being the foundation of all other types. But is not affirmation of a
pluralism based on a common revelation structure an ignoring of other interpretative
45Tilhch, 57TII, pp.402-403.
46Tillich, ERQ, p. 6.
47Tillich, DF, pp .66,65.
48Tillich, ERQR, p.64.
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methods in the history of religions for the interpretation of the vast phenomena of the
history of religions? The revelation structure that Tillich presents here mainly suggests
the unconditional seriousness with which an individual or community relates to the
sacramental object. So in principle other interpretative methods are necessary to show
how the unconditional devotion was expressed in actual terms in a religious
community.
The rise to a world religion, according to Tillich, will take one of two forms,
the mystical or the ethical,49 the difference between the two types primarily
attributable to the two respective emphases of the holy and their consequences. So the
holy as "given" and the holy as "ought-to-be" in their manifestations as higher
religions are defined in a way similar to the substance-form correlation. Mystical
religion regards the eternal "as present, as that which supports and fills the present
and its temporal forms with meaning". And ethical religion regards the eternal "as that
which stands beyond all time and every temporal form, which lays its demands upon
them and judges them".50 We discuss mystical religion now.
3. Mystical Religion
Tillich's understanding of mystical religion should be seen primarily in terms of the
two-fold manifestations of the holy and of the revelatory situation in which the
manifestations take place. The holy as "given" and the holy as "ought-to-be" in their
manifestations to the human person impact on her/him as immediately present or as
exercising a judging and transforming influence. Human finitude does not allow an
experience of these two manifestations of the holy in an integrated or balanced
manner, resulting in the predominance of one of them. But since the judging function
will in a stronger or weaker way raise the question whether the medium through
49Tillich, ERQR, pp.23-24.
50Tillich, RS, p. 160.
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which the ultimate is experienced in sacramental religion expresses real ultimacy -
exposing the inadequacy of a finite object to represent the infinite - a move beyond
the sacramental is demanded. Tillich says: "This question is the dynamic force in the
history of religion, revolutionizing the sacramental type of faith and driving faith
beyond in different directions."51 There are two main directions faith takes or types in
which faith operates.
One of these is the mystical type of religion. Now although the holy as "ought-
to-be" has been responsible for the transition beyond the sacramental, the holy as
"ought-to-be" is not predominant in every higher type of religion. In fact in the first
higher type which we are considering now the holy as "being" is predominant. Tillich
does not explain how this shift takes place. He is not inclined to introduce another
category to represent the mystical either, because that would threaten the two-fold
nature of the holy he has proposed. We might explain the shift by recalling the
"revelatory process": the infinite mediated through the finite to the receiving person or
community. This revelatory process is realized in the mystical path by the finite
medium being removed so that the individual or community participates in the infinite
itself. Tillich notes that this sense ofmysticism is present in the Augustinian tradition
which affirms "the experience of the identity of subject and object in relation to Being
itself'.52 We must stress here that what Tillich refers to as mystical in his typology is
primarily the element ofparticipation in every type of relation. Only in a secondary
sense does it refer to a special form of religion.53
But this idea of transcending the finite completely is not a common experience
in life. So lesser to greater forms of transcendence are to be expected. Tillich does not
51TiIlich, DF, p.59. See also ibid., pp.56-59.
52Tillich, TC, p. 14.
53P. Tillich, The Courage To Be, London: Collins (Fontana Library), 1962, p. 156 (hereafter
cited as Tillich, CTB).
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engage in identifying these, but simply defines the general mode of transcendence, that
is, transcending "every piece of reality as well as reality as a whole".54 This is
transcendence in its most comprehensive form, or rather a claim about the possibility
of a comprehensive transcendence: "a leap which must be made out of time, even
supra-mundane time, into eternity".55 Tillich believes that this transcendence is
possible in a fragmentary manner.56 R.C. Zaehner presents four forms of
transcendence.57 Earlier Otto identified the common mark of all types of mysticism as
"identification" attained by the self in relation to the ultimate "in different degrees of
completeness".58 Tillich would prefer to restrict the term "identification" to an
extreme claim only, and suggests that there is no point asking whether the reaching of
such a state is possible for human beings.59 Since identification suggests
transcendence of the subject-object split (of the divine as opposed to the human),
"every experience of the divine is mystical"60
An important question that arises here is whether it is the same ultimate that is
reached irrespective of the different religious traditions from which the striving takes
place. Tillich does not answer this question directly, but we can expect his answer to
be along the following lines. The content of one's ultimate concern should be being-
54Tillich, DF, p.60.
55Tillich, RS, p. 168.
56Tillich, iSTIII, p.257.
57RC Zaehner presents four forms of transcendence. The first two are transcending the
realities of space and time, and the third the resisting of becoming by identifying oneselfwith
being. The fourth and final stage ofmysticism is believed by Zaehner to have had
revolutionary impact on Indian mysticism since the Bhagavad-Gita's statement about the state
of communion with God in attaining union with God: 'Who standing firm on unity communes
in love with me as abiding in all beings, in whatever state he be, that athlete of the spirit
abides in me.' (Gita 6:31. quoted m R. C. Zaehner, Concordant Discord: The
Interdependence ofFaiths, London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1970, p.204. See also ibid., pp.200-
5. ibid ) We shall soon see how Tillich sees a union-communion dialectic in mysticism.
58RudolfOtto, The Idea ofthe Holy: An Inquiry Into the Non-rational Factor in the Idea of
the Divine and Its Relation to the Rational, John W Harvey (trans.), London: Oxford Univ.
Press, 1936, p.22.
59Tillich, CTB, pp. 153-154.
60Tilhch, ST III, p.256.
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itself. But in historical existence one has only a fragmentary experience of and
understanding of the universal structures of being-itself. So one can only be in a
creative tension with being-itself, maintaining both sides of the relation and
transforming the self in the power ofbeing-itself. Tillich's idealism is evident here: that
although from one's concrete religious perspective one can only express her/his
understanding of being-itself in a specific, and hence unique, way, being-itself and its
universal structures are the absolute, unchanging ground of one's being and thinking.
Kung too affirms the absoluteness of God in this connection,61 but disapproves the
idea of the availability of the same religious (mystical) experience to people of
different religions. The reason for his diapproval is that every religious experience
bears the stamp of the particular religion within which it is actual, that is, "religious
experience is a priori interpreted experience" 62
The issue of the same ultimate is also addressed indirectly by Tillich in terms
of one of his important theological presuppositions, namely that of the infinite
distance between the ultimate and human beings. In fact Tillich corrects his earlier
position of denying mystical religion this tenet. In his German period he stated that the
mystic's belief that the infinite can be reached "in degrees of elevation" fails to take
seriously the gap between the infinite and finite.63 But in his later Dynamics ofFaith,
he sees the mystical religion untenable without this theological presupposition: "The
mystic is aware of the infinite distance between the infinite and the finite, and accepts
a life of preliminary stages of union with the infinite, interrupted only rarely, and
perhaps never, in this life by the final ecstacy."64 Thus this tenet confirms the
f11
The two criteria that Kung suggests for the analysis ofmystical experiences in empirical
terms are: "Religion should remain religious not only so that god may remain God (the
Absolute); but religion should also not be disengaged from morality, so that man may remain
human."(Kung, "A Christian Response", pp. 169-173 (esp. pp. 171,173).




absoluteness of God, not in any sense of "radical otherness", but in the sense of the
certainty, ultimacy and universality of the ultimate as against the limited realizations
and understandings that the finite possesses of itself and of its ground. This, however,
seems to contradict the basic concept of mysticism, which is that of immediacy -
"immediate participation in the divine Ground by elevation into unity with it,
transcending all finite realities and all finite symbols of the divine...."65 There is no
contradiction as far as Tillich's theology is concerned, for it is dialectic and affirms
both tenets, that of "infinite distance" and "immediacy". Without the element of
"participation" one would be unaware of one's essential nature from which one is
separated infinitely, and without "infinite distance" participation in the proper sense of
participating in the divine would give way to regarding one's existential state as the
essential state. The acknowledgment of the importance of immediacy also has a
consequence for the mystical conception of God in that there is immediate certainty
about God.66
This approach of Tillich therefore has the promise of analyzing various forms
ofmysticism, mysticism as a whole, and prophetism, all ofwhich are regarded to be in
conflict with one another. Tillich identifies a form of mysticism, which, like some
idealists and spiritualists (the so-called Enthusiasts of the Reformation and of the early
eighteenth century), sees revelation as recollection of what one has potentially, and
not as reception of the Word of God that comes from without,67 which is the
understanding of revelation. In this form "infinite distance" is not affirmed because
both the knowledge and the power to attain to the infinite is within oneself. This form
therefore gives some basis for the absolute contrast made between mysticism and faith
by Protestant theologians from Ritschl to Barth. So the criticism of these theologians
65Tillich, CEWR, p.91.
66Tillich, RS, pp. 163-165.
67See Tillich, ST I, pp . 125-126.
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is based on knowledge of a very limited form ofmysticism. Tillich, on the contrary, is
aware of the more viable forms of mysticism which accord with mysticism's basic
premises, and contends that "faith" is present in the mystic in the mystic's recognition
that union with the ultimate is not a perfection to be achieved but a gift to be
received.68
The fact that mysticism transcends sacramental religion but does not destroy it
suggests that there are complex types (both genuine and distorted) of mystical
religion. Tillich does not develop these types, but shows their character by analyzing
particular cases in history. Thus he contrasts the impoverished character of modern
mysticism with the more positive character of ancient mysticism. Modern mysticism
states that by itself it cannot create religious forms - which is correct when mysticism
is defined as the transcendence of all finite forms. It sets aside concrete religion, and
instead of breaking through to the eternal in all seriousness confines religion to the
aesthetic forms of some special ancient period. The ancient mystic is shown to be
different. Although the mystic transcended cult and sacrament, s/he did not criticize
them.69 Thus mysticism that took on a sacramental-priestly spirit could provide a
"worshipful atmosphere which nurtured and maintained all life and in which the whole
personality, not only its central essence, lived and moved".70 Tillich's religious
typology recognizes subtle forms of mystical religion which emerge by association
with other types.
Now we turn to Tillich's identification of two main ways of understanding
transcendence of the historical existence, which are concretely expressed in Eastern
and Western (Christian) mysticism Transcendence in its most radical form can be said
to be the ultimate negation of one's existence in time and space,71 and is professed in
68Tillich, PE, p. 77.
60Tillich, RS, p. 165.
70Tillich, RS, p. 161.
71 See Tillich, ST I, p . 140.
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this way by the Indian traditions.72 This mysticism which tries to transcend the
subject-object character of human existence is however susceptible to "the danger of
annihilating the centred self, the subject of the ecstatic experience of the Spirit" .73 But
the following quotation from Dasgupta shows that the state of supra-consciousness
(prajnana) only temporarily surpasses the ordinary conscious states and allows them
to return to their ordinary functions.
This experience is not something which is wholly beyond, or wholly out of all
relation with, our conscious states of dual experience. For it is the basis, or
background, as it were, of all our ordinary knowledge involving the knower and
the known 74
There is a remarkable similarity between this and Tillich's idea of'ecstatic reason'. The
important difference between Dasgupta's and Tillich's understanding of transcending
the subject-object scheme is that, whereas the former believes in a special (supra-)
consciousness as distinct from ordinary consciousness, the latter's account suggests
the immediate presence of the holy experienced through transcendence as against the
mediated experience of finite objects. Another differentiating mark between the two
mysticisms that might be suggested is that, whereas in the Indian kind self is unreal
apart from the true self, Brahman, and consequently the human self identifies itself
with the divine self, in the Christian kind the emphasis is on the reality of both the
human and the divine, the holy not absorbing the human individual but being present
in the human and in all finite realities.75 Yet another difference is that, for Dasgupta
the spiritual aim is a "formless self', but for Tillich the aim is "to preserve in the
ecstatic experience the subjects of faith and love: personality and community".76 So
for Tillich, the mystical should maintain both the centred self and the ultimate ground.
72Tilhch, ERQR, p.52.
73Tillich, ST III, pp. 152-153.
7^Dasgupta, HinduMysticism, p.39.
75See Tillich, -ST III, p.257.
76Tillich, ST III, p.153.
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To briefly evaluate this section, Tillich has a dialectic tension between the holy
as given and the holy as ought, which while giving equal emphasis to both sides of the
relation suggests that the holy as given is the proper starting point for theology. The
reason for this was seen to be evident in human experience. We first acknowledge that
the holy is given or present in us and in bearers of the holy before the ought question
addresses us, again from the holy. This starting point has special significance for
appreciating the commonness of the different mysticisms and for the consistency of
Tillich's typology. Thus Tillich shows that even in the case of Christianity, which shall
very shortly see to be a prophetic religion, the mystical element is primary. For
instance, to overcome their experience of "the anxiety of meaninglessness" Thomas
Munzer and Martin Luther "transcended the courage of confidence which is based on
a personal encounter with God. They had to receive elements from the courage to be,
which is based on mystical union. "77
Nevertheless, Tillich rightly points out that the mystical on its own cannot be
an adequate form of religion because of its tendency to be non-personal, non-social
and non-historical 78 "The merely vertical line transforms history into a circle with the
belief that all human action is nothing other than a strengthening of maya, of the
world of illusion. "79 One loses one's personal nature by characterizing oneself in terms
of one's ground or by identifying oneselfwith one's ground. Mysticism does not take
the social dimension seriously because it gives importance to ethical demands only as
means, although Wach claims that the ethical aspect plays an "immense role" in the
life of Buddhists.80 The secondary character of ethics in the life of Buddhists is
77Tillich, CTB, p. 166
78Tillich, CEWR, p.88.
79Tillich, ERQR, p.51.
80Joachim Wach, "Introduction: The Meaning and Task of the History of Religions
fReligionswissenschaft)" in Joseph M. Kitagawa ef. al. (eds.), The History of Religions'.
Essays on the Problem of Understanding, Chicago & London: The University of Chicago
Press, 1967, p.5.
79
evident from the fact that moral commands are given as part of the way to end
suffering, which is nirvana, or final release. Despite Buddhism's criticisms of the
caste system, its mystical approach did not provide a theological basis for appreciating
the presence of the divine in society, but only made compassion an imperative for the
social sphere. So the solution here is one of escaping reality, not being creative, nor
emphasizing transformation in culture and history. We must also point out here that
the advaita vedantin's "neti, neti", which is a negation of the reality of every finite
reality, is an approach that does not see the relative value of encountered finite objects
because no aim is possible in history. In contrast to this absolute no is Tillich's
dialectic of yes and no, recognizing that history has an aim, a telos. Later (in Chapter
IV) we shall show the importance Tillich gives to history in terms of the concept
"centre of history".
Tillich finds Indian mysticism's emphasis on the vertical line, which "carries to
that which transcends all possibilities of man in his temporal and spatial existence,
namely the eternal", necessarily lacking in "an inner relation to time", time and the
temporal being regarded as "falling away from the eternity of the divine". It is in this
connection that Tillich strongly suggests a Christian approach in terms of the
Protestant principle that performs the vertical function by frilly affirming time, eternity
regarded not as "not without time" but as "another time".
In the application of the Protestant principle, time, like everything created, is
good and where there is time there is subject-object difference and there is a
possibility of everything which happens in the subject-object form is rooted.81
In conclusion, mysticism has been seen as a higher type than the sacramental
and as preserving the sacramental. We have highlighted Tillich's identification of
several kinds ofmysticism and have shown that they become comprehensible in terms
of Tillich's typology of religions. How some forms of mysticism connect with other
81Tillich, EROR, p.52.
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types in the typology has also shown the usefulness of Tillich's typology. His
development of the mystical type from basic tenets, which accord with Eastern and
Western mysticism, has proved to have a proper grounding as well as the flexibility to
comprehend various forms of mysticism. And, finally, we have seen that the polarity
of elements and polarity of types of approach have given Tillich the bases for defining
the mystical as an essential aspect of religion and for critiquing the mystical when its
creative tension with the prophetic is lost.
The first of the two directions, namely the mystical, in which the
transcendence of sacramental religion takes place has been discussed. The second
direction is towards "ethical holiness",82 which we shall now consider.
4. Ethical Religion
Ethical (or prophetic) religion emerges from sacramental religion by criticizing
and thereby dissolving "the primitive unity between the holy and the real". Due to this
criticism, although the holy is not unrelated to the finite realm and its objects, the
presence of the holy in the finite is denied. Thus, prophetic religion, unlike
sacramental religion, "denies that one can "see" God, for sight is the most objectifying
sense."83 "To the prophets the holy is primarily a demand. Nothing can be holy apart
from the fulfilment of the law."84 The emphasis is on "ethical" and "utilitarian"
demands as against sacramental religion's ritualistic demands.85 Thus the holiness of
what ought-to-be becomes predominant. Tillich regards the ethical type as
represented in a "basic way" by Judaism in the history of religions and later by
82Tillich, ERQR, p.23.
83Tillich, ST I, p.172.
84Tillich, PE, p. 108.
85Tillich, PE, p. 108.
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contemporary Judaism, Islam and partly Christianity. The shift from the sacramental
to the ethical is to be seen in the shift of emphasis from "holiness to righteousness" .86
Transcending the sacramental has been pointed out to mean the rise to a
universal religion. To give a concrete example from the history of religions to support
the relationship between sacramental and prophetic religion, Tillich refers to
Abraham's call. Stating that prophetism has arisen out of "paganism", but with a
mission against "paganism", he points out that the significance of Abraham's call
expresses a decisive change from understanding God in tribal terms to a
characterization of God as almost universal. Tillich sees the call as coming from the
unlocalizable God and as ordering Abraham "to leave the gods of soil and blood, of
family, tribe and nation".87 This idea slowly developed in the history of Israel, and
Tillich claims that the turning point in the history of religion in respect of the
understanding of God, which was also the overcoming of polytheism, was when the
prophet Amos said what was "unheard of in all other religions", namely "that the God
of a nation is able to destroy this nation without being destroyed Himself'. Time,
which gives rise to the idea of history, which in turn is universal, is the basis of the
suggestion that God is the God of justice. And for Tillich: "This and this alone is the
meaning of prophetic monotheism. God is one God because justice is one."88 Tillich
makes a definite case for the victory of the God of time against the gods of space,
even the gods of space of the present time.89 So in contrast to the mystical type, a
single concrete God who excludes all other gods is affirmed, which is the meaning of
86Tillich, ERQR, p.24. When Tillich is more precise, he sees holiness as including
righteousness. So the shift should be from the holiness ofwhat is' to the 'holiness of the ought-
to-be'.
87Ti!hch, TC, p.35. G. Fohrer suggests the rescue from Egypt as the time when faith in
Yahweh made "the transition from the religion of a group of nomads to a religion for the




exclusive monotheism 90 This prophetic tradition is seen by Tillich to give shape to
the New Testament message that "God must be adored neither in a temple nor on a
mountain, but in Spirit and in Truth". And later in the Christian tradition, at the
Reformation, a Protestant protest against the physical space of the Roman Catholic
priest took place, manifesting once again the "prophetic negation of the gods of
space".91 Hence in prophetism there is a preference of time and history in respect of
understanding God over against the category of space and space-related conceptions
of the divine.
It is important to note not only prophetism's affirmation of history, but the
way it is affirmed. Prophetic religion affirms that history has direction because God is
God of history. So history moves towards an end, from a beginning, and has a centre
which contains the aim of the end. Prophetism, which is also present in Marxism,
regards the "victory of justice" in the struggle between the forces of good and evil,
which make up the content of history, as the aim of history. History, in prophetism,
has the power to judge the existing order of society. Spiritual creations like Religious
Socialism and Marxism have, for Tillich, "an infinite, inexhaustible meaning because
they represent a lasting type of spiritual possibility. .. They will return again and again
in different shapes, based on their original, classical appearance".92 The directedness
toward the future is seen by Tillich to be the distinguishing feature of ethical religion
from the sacramental and mystical types.
So ethical religion is primarily concerned about the relationship between God
who is universal and the same God who acts in a concrete way. This is why "the
prophetic protest is necessary for every church and for every secular movement if it is




to avoid disintegration" 93 Prophetism calls for a creation of the new in person, in
society and in history, and even beyond history, through its symbols like "new
creature" and "Kingdom of God". Concrete transformation is required in the
particular cultural dimension and existential context but in the light of the criterion of
universality - the idea of universality being attained through another source, namely
history, although not unconnected with the concern for justice.94
Prophetic criticism is seen by Tillich to have been active in not only the Old
and New Testaments but also in religions and revolutions outside Christianity, "as in
the religion of Zoroaster, in some of the Greek mysteries, in Islam, and in many
smaller reform movements".95 But, as we shall briefly see, Tillich sees these other
religions to be less developed than Christianity. He distinguishes types within the
ethical and suggests prominent instantiations of the respective types in history:
The juristic type is most strongly developed in Talmudic Judaism and in Islam;
the conventional type is most prominent in Confucianist China, the ethical type
is represented by the Jewish prophets 96
The Islamic faith focuses on the revelation mediated by the prophet Mohammed, the
content of the revelation being ritual and social laws. Therefore, what is decisive for
the follower of Islam is not Mohammed but a consecrated order which determines the
daily life of people. Tillich doubts that the manifestation of the divine in the juristic
realm is the divine's ultimate manifestation. He points out the inadequacy of this
manifestation when speaking of "legalistic ways of self-salvation". While recognizing
that in the legalistic forms of faith revelatory experience is taken with unconditional
seriousness, even expressed in the rigorous observance of civil laws, Tillich identifies
the distortion happening when the claim is made that the state of estrangement is
93Tillich, PE, p.230.
94See Tillich, TC, p.37
95Tillich, STl, p. 141.
96Tillich, DF, p.65.
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overcome in the "serious obedience to the commanding law".97 The Confucian
religion rests on "conventional" rules propagated by Confucius, these commands
bearing an unconditional character. The law of the universe is at the root of the laws
of state and society. Although the Confucian system affirms transcendence, its basic
character is secular.98 So ultimate concern here too is not about the divine itself. The
nature of Judaism has already been presented, and we found that justice was given
universality, which was then attributed to God. Judaism thus represents the basic
character of prophetic religion: "There is no pure Spiritual Presence where there is no
humanity and justice."99 Hence Tillich's criticism of the ethical type represented by
Judaism: "The divine law is of ultimate concern in old and new Judaism." 100
Prophetism's strength lies on the one hand in focusing on the given
sacramental system, "the concrete foundation", neither devaluating it nor elevating
oneself above it, in contrast to mysticism. And on the other hand, prophetism's
criticism is intended to bring about concrete change in the particular abused system
on the basis of the divine law. "Prophetism tries to shape reality in the power of the
divine form."101
A criticism might be made against the judging function of religion and
theology that Tillich has pointed out as a phenomenon in both mystical and ethical
religons, more so in the latter. Although judgment or criticism or mutual criticism is
an acceptable exercise within the academic and secular worlds, a judgment in the
name of the infinite is inconceivable and hence is something to be opposed. The
secular public would resist this self-enthronement of religion and theology, and would
97Tillich, STII, p.81.
98Tillich, DF. pp. 65-6. R. Neville has shown that Confucianism affirms transcendence in the
belief that a "loving or lovelike divine source" supports the world and humans. (R. Neville,
Behind theMasks ofGod, New York: State University ofNew York, p. 119)
"Tillich, .ST III, p. 153.
1 "Tillich, DF, p.67.
101Tillich, ST I, pp. 141-142.
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suggest that there is no ground for this. Their approach and method is that of
recognizing several standpoints and frameworks and their relative validity in relation
to the respective reality or area of concern. And as each method is conditioned by the
specific reality it investigates, despite that reality's inter-connection with other
realities, it is absurd to suggest a comprehensive standpoint that would comprehend,
preserve, as well as critique each concrete standpoint. Tillich might seem to be
contradicting this largely accepted approach in the theoretical and practical
disciplines, with his suggestion of an unconditional prophetic criticism of a given finite
reality. But this is not the case, for if we recall what we said under "Religion and
Culture", Tillich is clear that theology works from its own concrete standpoint but
that its primary object is the universal structure of being, which structure is in some
way addressed by the various cultural disciplines and represented by them. The fact of
theology's primary commitment to constantly mediating between its own ultimate
concern and the universal structure of being does not mean that only theology has the
authentic and final understanding of the universal structure. This is clear from Tillich's
suggestion that one has to be a theologian of culture before one does systematic
theology (because culture is one of the sources of systematic theology). So the
judging function of theology is not exercised from any special premise or body of
knowledge unknown to the cultural sciences. Rather, the theologian engages with
culture to find plural and differing accounts of various aspects of reality. This contact
with the various cultural expressions will then reveal their "depth" or "meaning" by
virtue of the presupposition of faith, which means seeing reality not as self-subsistent
but as transparent to its ground. The present or the given reality is affirmed, because
the infinite depth is (paradoxically) affirmed to be present in it, the infinite depth at the
same time judging the present most seriously. Thus "crisis in the theological sense is
as much a matter of faith as grace is."102 The many ways of identifying the "depth"
102Tillich, PE, p.78.
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then helps to judge some of the cultural expressions and to express the universal
structure of being in a concrete way (in a concrete theology). Hence in the character
of the 'ethical', there is a very important source for Tillich's radical pluralism, a
pluralism that not only affirms the plurality of religious forms but of cultural forms
too.
The above three types lead in the direction of a higher type which we shall
now discuss. It is a higher type because it includes all the three typological elements.
The special features of this type are shown by Tillich from the developments and
attempts in the Christian tradition.
5. Religion of the Concrete Spirit
Tillich's religious typology, which we have presented thus far, has a
fundamental, universal type, and two higher types arising out of the fundamental one.
Except in the case of the first type, the sacramental, where the polarity is latent with
only the holy as present being manifest, in the other cases the polarities lead to
concrete forms within each type and point towards a more comprehensive type. This
comprehensive type is called "Religion of the Concrete Spirit" by Tillich, and it is
sought by all the three elements: the sacramental, mystical and the ethical.103 Here
sacramental religion's tendency towards demonization, mysticism's devaluation of the
concrete manifestation of the holy and ethical religion's tendency to become moralistic
and secular are claimed to be overcome. For Tillich the very definition of faith
involves affirming the mystical and the prophetic and transcending both of them,




Although Tillich insists that the predominant element in mystical religion,
namely the mystical, and the predominant element in ethical religion, namely the
ethical, cannot become less important than the other elements in the respective types
of concrete religions, Tillich calls for a transcending of the two types for two reasons.
The one has to do with the very character of polarity or dialectic, whether in thought
or reality, that implies either a higher stage or a grounding fact that precedes the polar
elements. The other reason is that Tillich sees religion in its essential nature as realized
only fragmentarily in history. No concrete religion can claim to have attained to this
perfect character, although without fragmentary actualization of the true character of
religion no concrete religion can be true. The two reasons are related because both of
them presuppose the unity of the sacramental, mystical and ethical as actualized in
combinations of these elements in the history of religions. And there is no Christian
superiority, for Tillich says clearly in relation to this type that Christianity too only
strives to attain it and cannot claim to have actualized this.105
The three elements are present in each of the types. The sacramental has both
the holy as being (the mystical element) and the holy as ought-to-be (the ethical
element), but only the former element is manifest. The mystical has the sacramental as
its basis, and has the ethical as the way of transforming oneself (or losing one's special
qualities) as one moves towards the infinite for identification with it. The ethical has
the sacramental as the basis, and has the mystical as the element of participation in
God such that there is self-affirmation and affirmation of the given finite reality.
Tillich defends the interdependence of these types by pointing out that its basis is the
universal ontological categories of participation and individualization.106
105Tilhch, FR, p.88.
106Tilhch, CTB, p. 157.
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Despite this interdependence, however, there is evidence of Tillich's
preference of the ethical type above the other two types - without in any way
undermining the other two elements. Sacramental religion is bound to the gods of
space and it constantly produces demonizations. Mysticism reacts against this, but its
approach is seen to be weak, for it provides no escape; it "extinguishes time and
space" to attain "salvation beyond time". Mysticism might appear to have overcome
polytheism, but the many names of gods that disappear in the face of the nameless
one return later, as happened "in the later ancient period in Greece, and in later
Buddhism and Hinduism".107 Through his understanding of God as "being which
overcomes non-being within itself' (which we shall discuss in Chapter IV) Tillich
critiques mysticism's understanding of the ultimate: "The radical negation of all forms
of being also removes the demonic basis of all being. Only absolute being, pure
divinity, is disentangled from the demonic. It is clear that in such a conception,
existence is perceived as essentially demonic."108 So he criticizes ascetic mysticism
and mysticism in general for their belief that "absolute being has the quality of
standing beyond the creative forms, and also beyond community and personality",
thereby associating human existence, and along with it all creative forms, with the
demonic. He, however, values Occidental mysticism, whose original type Tillich sees
in Neoplatonism, more positively, because here "existence is not evaluated purely as
decline" as in the Indian type, but as "an overflow of the absolute, superbeing".109
Mysticism's attack on sacramentalism, with the consequent denial of all the
sacramental mediums, does not merit it with significance in regard to receiving the
"centre of history", which happens when the "larger basis of the history of religion"
(sacramental religion) is transformed by the "smaller basis of prophetic criticism".110
107Tillich, TC, pp.34-35.
108Tillich, IH, p. 102.
109Tillich, IH, pp. 102-103.
110Tillich, STIII, p.389.
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It is only prophetic religion with its affirmation of history which can witness to that
self-transcending point in history ("the centre of history" - to be discussed under
"Christ the Criterion"), a point which is also the meaning and aim of history. Since
only prophetic religion focuses on culture, only the Old Testament prophets can set
the conditions ("the maturity was reached; the time was fulfilled") for the central
manifestation and reception of Jesus as the Christ111 within the larger Jewish
consciousness. It alone has the quest for the Christ in terms of its maturity, which is
the ability to receive the central manifestation of the Kingdom of God but also
the greatest power to resist it. For maturity is the result of education by the
law, and in some who take the law with radical seriousness, maturity becomes
despair of the law, with the ensuing quest for that which breaks through the law
as "good news".112
Tillich makes a connection between Judaism and Christianity: that education by law
was necessary to appreciate the coming of the Messiah. Judaism and Christianity are
related as quest and fulfilment, as preparation and reception - two important aspects
of the final revelation. In this understanding, then, the link is so inseparable that
Christianity cannot claim that it surpasses Judaism, because the idea of the Christ
cannot be understood apart from the Old Testament historically and theologically. So
it must be observed that Tillich's use of "fulfilment" in respect of Christianity is in a
relational way, affirming "quest" and "fulfilment" as two sides of a single
phenomenon. This argument then leads us to see Tillich as an objective interpreter of
the history of religion in so far as it concerns the Judaism and Christianity of the Old
Testament and New Testament periods. Tillich sees Christianity alone rising to the
"Religion of Concrete Spirit" without losing its identity as an ethical religion. Thus
although "judgment of idolatry is the function of the prophet and the mystic",113 only
111Tillich, ST III, p.389.
112Tillich, ST III, p . 3 94.
113Tilhch, UC, p.51.
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prophetic religion comes out as the most important religious type in this typological
scheme, with its affirmation of the vertical in a dynamic relation with the horizontal.
The special character of the ethical might also be a concrete appreciation of
the universal through the idea of "God being the source ofjustice for a//", as evident
in Judaism. But despite Judaism's affirmation of justice as a universal principle, it did
not manage to counter the idea of "elected nation". The reason for this is that the
universal that has been reached is not the true universal. The true universal is the holy
itself, and only the holy itself can express the vertical "no" to any attempt to use the
idea of elected nation in the name of the supposed universal.
Tillich recognizes that a Christian theologian will naturally see Christianity as
"the aim toward which the dynamics of faith are driving", the dynamics referring to
the movements of the religious types seeking reunion with each other.114 In fact he
sees in Christianity convergences of the types with varying emphases:
Christianity is the most embracing religious phenomenon.... Adolf
Harnack . once said that he who knows the history of Christianity knows
implicitly the whole history of religion because in the history of Christianity all
religious phenomena have appeared and have been taken in and have been
pushed out again or transformed. It is the greatness of the original church and
the greatness of classical Roman Catholicism that it rightly claims to be the
coincidentia oppositorum, the coincidence of the opposites of all types. This
was possible because each type, if you look critically at it, has already within
itself elements of the counter-type and that, of course, cannot be otherwise.115
Tillich sometimes refers not to Christianity as a whole but to Protestant Christianity
when stating that it is "the point in which the different types converge", although as in
every case it is "open to idolatrous distortions".116 There is a special claim made here
for Christian actualizations of the "Religion of the Concrete Spirit", and Tillich might
want to justify this claim by referring to what he has expressed elsewhere: being more
114Tillich, DF, p.70-71.
115Tilhch, ERQR, pp.25-26. See also Tillich, CEWR, p.82.
116Tillich, DF, p.97.
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firmly historical Christianity addresses more polar tensions than Buddhism, which is
indifferent towards history.117
We might suggest that one of Tillich's important theological concepts, namely,
the Protestant principle, can also be seen to have the polar elements of the mystical
and the prophetic directly and to have the sacramental as the universal type
underlying it. Tillich claims that Christianity alone shows the dynamics of faith in
clearer terms than others, maintaining the infinite distance between God and humans
and at the same time affirming the possibility of overcoming one's estrangement:
From the power of self-criticism and from the courage to face one's own
relativity come the greatness and danger of the Protestant faith Here more than
anywhere else the dynamics of faith become manifest and conscious: the infinite
tension between the absoluteness of its claim and the relativity of its life .118
The "absoluteness" and "relativity" that is contrasted here is the paradox in the claim
of union with God in spite of one's finitude. It is the question: How does one know
the answer from the side of the infinite while one is still within the conditions of
finiteness? The special claim that Tillich makes here is that of Christianity having
grasped the nature of the divine-human relationship properly and identified the
dangers correctly. There is no idea here of Christianity possessing a truth received
directly and exclusively from an absolute supranatural divine, or having a pure
doctrine to offer everyone, or having a special right to mediate an absolute judgment.
We shall discuss this further under "Theological Criticism: Protestant Principle".
In regard to the union of types, Tillich's suggestion of there being not just one
way for the polar elements or polar types to unite in their concrete manifestation is
both affirmative ofpluralism and sensitive to the respective historical situation. The




instance.119 At the same time, the systematic principle is also equally effective. That
is, the element that is predominant in a certain type will usually continue to be
predominant in every subsequent actualization of the union. Thus there will be a
difference between the way the mystical religions see salvation and the way the
prophetic religions see it. The mystical religions see salvation as leaving history and
returning to the Eternal from which one has come, whereas the prophetic religions see
God as fulfilling his promise of leading humankind toward the future.120
When the difference between mystical religion and ethical religion is so great
in regard to a particular religious phenomenon like salvation, in what way is one to
achieve a union of types? Tillich makes an attempt to do this from the side of ethical
religion and mystical religion, pointing out the interdependence of the two elements:
"They are compatible only if the one is an element of the other; two attitudes toward
the ultimate could not exist beside each other if the one were not given with the
other."121 He does this convincingly only in his portrayal of the presence of the
mystical in the ethical. Suggesting that faith in ethical religion involves an "ecstatic
experience" and hence an overcoming of the cleavage between subject and object,
Tillich identifies the mystical in ethical religion. At the same time ethical religion's
emphasis on concreteness leads it to exercising courage and risk. Now speaking from
the side of mystical religion, Tillich states: "There is faith in mystical experience...
This follows from the fact that both faith and mystical experience are states of being
grasped by the Spiritual Presence."122 But he does not show how the ethical element
can be actual in mystical religion which aims at transcending the subject-object
experience. Elsewhere he takes care to state that the mystical does not eliminate the
subject-object scheme, but proposes "to find something above the split in which it is
119See Tillich, CEWR, p.55.
120Tillich, FR, pp .66-67.
121Tillich, ST III, p.257.
122Tillich, ST III, p.257.
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conquered and preserved".123 Although this qualification helps to preserve the
identity of the divine Other and the finite other in one's relationships, it is difficult to
see how Tillich will propose the possibility of cultural creations and cultural diversity
in this higher realm. The claims of Indian scholars that the mystic enters the ordinary
human realm with a higher consciousness to be active in the cultural realm is not
entertained by Tillich, perhaps because such a claim does not conform to the
fundmental mystical notion of participation in the divine. Only where
individualization is affirmed is there the possibility of creation of forms.
It is possible that Tillich's typology is either incapable of helping the mystical
find a way of taking the ethical into it in creative ways or needs to be developed in the
light of further enquiries into Hinduism and Buddhism. However, Tillich's typology is
helpful in offering criticisms to mystical and ethical religions. From the side of the
mystical, one could on the one hand use the principle of 'participation' to show ethical
religion the Eternal's judgment on each temporal form, and on the other hand view its
own religious contents in the light of ethical religion's judgment on mystical religion's
"inward reality", "superconsciousness", "spiritual discipline" for becoming exclusive,
and not taking seriously one's part in the physical, social, moral and cultural realities.
And the prophet can on the one hand use the principle of "separation" to show
mystical religion's spiritual exercises and sense of identification with the ultimate as
lacking in concreteness and hence lacking relevance for the spatio-temporal realm,
and on the other hand examine its own religious contents in the light of mystical
religion's judgment of ethical religion's tendency to lose itself in endless creations of
spiritual forms.
The "Religion of the Concrete Spirit" is a higher type because there is a strong
drive from within mystical religion and ethical religion to be related to each other.
123Tillich,SriII,p.98.
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And since the drive towards the other is always indicative of an integrative process as
against a fleeing from the other which has a disintegrative consequence, "Religion of
the Concrete Spirit" is a higher type. So the higher type proposes that mystical
religion revise itself in the light of the ethical in order to unite with it, and that ethical
religion revise itself in the light of the mystical in order to unite with it. The intention
here of the concrete religious tradition being the starting point of developing a higher
religious form suggests the impossibility of either a common or a final form. The
attaining of higher forms depends on the seriousness of the attempt and the nature of
the situation, religion in Tillich's view requiring reunion with the ground, which
implies the overcoming of estrangement in all spheres. It is for this reason that Tillich
rejects any attempt to "sketch a general line of religious progress in human history".
This is because in the history of religion "each gain in one respect is accompanied by a
loss in another respect".124 The typology presupposes the contingent character of
human life, which according to Tillich is lived out by the working of polar principles
such as the subjective and objective, freedom and destiny, individual and social,
mystical and ethical, etc. In a particular historical expression, the way in which both
the poles are present is unique. Here again we encounter Tillich's pluralism, which
while affirming that there are universally valid religious elements does insist on
working from and revising the special constitution of the religious types from one's
concrete religious tradition.
6. Evaluation of Typology of Religion
An evaluation of Tillich's typology must now be made. First, we shall examine if his
"typology" is consistent with his "concept" of religion, especially in the way the
concept is implied in the religion-culture relation, which has been pointed out as
124Tillich, ST I, p .219.
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fundamental in Tillich's theology. The parallel between Tillich's religion-culture
correlation and his religious typology could be shown in the following way. Religion
identified with culture, where the two are indistinguishable both in reality and
thought, can correspond to the sacramental type. Religion rejecting culture totally in
theory but using selected cultural forms in practice has similarities with the mystical
type. And religionjudging culture with a view to transforming it will obviously show
itself as the basis of the ethical type. If this parallel is valid, then at least an inner
consistency in Tillich could be asserted.
This inner consistency is also evident in the way Tillich presents a quasi-
religion demonstrating the two critical polar elements. He sees humanism as falling
both on the side of the ontological type of faith (mystical religion) as "romantic-
conservative" and the moral type of faith (ethical religion) as the "progressive-
utopian". In the first case the content of ultimate concern is the given in nature and
history, affirming "the holy in the flower as it grows, in the animal as it moves, in man
as he represents a unique individuality, in a special nation, a special culture, a special
social system".125 Here he sees humanism as "an attitude which makes man the
measure of his own spiritual life" and in which "the ultimate concern of man is man".
Humanism is secular in that it sees the finite reality as ultimate, unlike mysticism for
which the ultimate lies beyond finite reality.126 Humanism "is faith, but it hides the
dimension of the ultimate which it presupposes." It can become empty, and when this
happens humanists return to the religious forms from which they originally arose.127
The mutual immanence of the typological elements, either potentially or
actually, suggests an approach that is interested in the particular character of a
religion in a concrete situation. It suggests that every historical religion has within it
125Tillich, DF, p.64.
126Tillich, DF p.62-63.
127Tillich, DF, p .64.
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the critical power to judge itself, although dialogue with other religions may make the
criticism both more concrete and more universal. This is evident in Tillich's positive
valuation of primitive religion, and he does not see primitive religion as absent in or
irrelevant for any period of human history. He remarks that primitive mythology is
extremely profound because it asks and answers the fundamental human question of
what we ourselves are.128 Tillich's idea that the sacramental is present in the higher
religions is valid to lesser or greater extents, especially as they influence rituals, as
they influence the community's attitude towards cosmic forces, and as they foster a
cyclical pattern in many areas of life.129 And Tillich's general criticism of the cyclical
approach, that the new in history is neither envisaged nor recognized, would apply
here too.
This immanence of types would face a threat from exponents of the Indian
tradition, who see a body-spirit distinction and duality as the explanation for a move
from primitive religion to mystical religion. The sacramental-mystical relation that
Tillich holds is in no way comparable to Dasgupta's account of a mainly two-fold
character of religion in the development of religion in India: earlier religions
emphasizing the body, and later religions emphasizing the spirit. The earlier sacrificial
mysticism suggested attainment of merits through observance of the Vedic and
ritualistic injunctions and prohibitions such that blessings of life related to the body
would follow.130 Opposed to this was the Upanishadic aim, which became the source
of all future mysticism. Here the emphasis was on fulfilling the spiritual needs of the
128Tillich, PE, p.86.
190
Thus in present Hindu ritual performances, the cosmic character of life is reflected in
many rituals. Also, the cyclical notion that is present in the sacramental is reflected in the way
one ritual is repeated many times over, the beginning and end ofwhich is unnoticeable,
especially since people join the ritual at any point and stay for just a small part of a ritual or
for a number of full performances.
130S.N. Dasgupta, HinduMysticism, New York: Frederick Ungar Pub. Co., [1927] 1971,
pp.3-57.
Dasgupta, Hindu Mysticism, pp.3-57.
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soul which was the attainment of immortality - not of the personal kind, which
suggests a decayless, diseaseless, deathless existence, nor of the bodily existence kind,
which thinks in terms of sensual joys and sense gratifications. The genuine immortality
was possible through a quest of the highest truth and reality, the Brahman. This
immortality that mysticism sought meant the attainment of a superconscious. The
conflict in the interpretations does not immediately disprove Tillich's typology; nor is
Dasgupta's account dismissed. They are both to be examined in terms of other
phenomena of the same religious complex and also in the light of general theological
criteria like the continuity from one stage of religion to another and how the earlier
form is preserved in the new development. Without going into a full discussion, it
might just help to see the relative merits of the one interpretation against the other.
Whereas Dasgupta's account is a spiritualist interpretation which sees the earlier stage
as one that must be overcome, Tillich's typology preserves the earlier stage as the
universal basis. But the difficulty with the typology is that it is a revelation model
which assumes that the sacramental object functioned as the ultimate concern of the
primal society, hence whether such a revelation approach is valid in the case of Indian
religion demands further enquiry.
The tendency towards mysticism in Indian religion can receive a correction
from Tillich's approach of the mutual immanence of types, particularly in respect of a
theology of religions. Mysticism's general tenet that one has to transcend the
multiplicity of experiences to enter the higher consciousness, which in Indian
traditions is regarded as a static state, is in principle absolutist because it negates all
relativities characterizing the spatio-temporal world. Mysticism would claim that it
has transcended all systems that speak of truths related to the mundane existence.
Now since Tillich does not follow this mystical notion of the human attempting to
reach the divine through rigorous discipline but understands the mystical as affirming
the immediacy between the human and the divine on account of the divine's presence
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in the human, he is not intolerant of relativities. He sees the absolute and the relative
in a dialectical tension, as has been indicated under "Religion and Culture" and will be
discussed further in the next chapter.
Despite the importance of each of the three typological elements for the
essential character of religion, there does seem to be a certain preference for ethical
religion in Tillich, which if true will certainly throw doubts on his pluralism. Although
in terms of the particular value of each element Tillich gives equal importance to
"union" and '"participation" (which are predominant in mysticism) and "separation"
and "individualization" (which are predominant in ethical religion), he does speak
more highly of ethical religion because of its expression of ultimate concern in terms
of historical myths as against the natural myths of the other religious types.
If the earth is seen as the battleground of two divine powers, as in ancient
Persia, this is an historical myth. If the God of creation selects and guides a
nation through history toward an end which transcends all history, this is an
historical myth. If the Christ - a transcendent, divine being - appears in the
fullness of time, lives, dies and is resurrected, this is an historical myth.
Christianity is superior to those religions which are bound to a natural myth.131
Here Tillich accords Christianity superiority because of its interest in history, in
recognizing meaning in history. We shall later see that this interest in history is also
the basis for making a special claim for the final revelation in relation to the Christ,
although final revelation in Tillich is a concept which applies to the central symbol of
a religion.
The sacramental type is basic, and is present in both mystical and prophetic
religions, because it provides the "sacramental-priestly substance", which is the
symbolic power of the sacramental object preserved by the priest, for future
revelatory events, including the final revelation.132 This type, according to Tillich,
131Tillich, DF, p.54.
132Tillich, ST I, pp.139-144.
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cannot prepare for final revelation because of the 'ambiguity' that surrounds it. It has a
tendency toward distortion, which is met in three ways: by the mystical, rational and
prophetic. The mystical calls for union of the human with its divine ground without
the mediation of any finite symbol, and in doing so defeats itself by depriving
revelation of its concreteness. So "its power of preparing for the final revelation is
ambiguous". The rational criticism of the sacramental is seen by Tillich to have been
made by philosophers of all times and by the champions of the mystical and prophetic
traditions. The reason why he does not include the rational as a distinct type in his
typology is perhaps due to reason's versatile ability to associate with different
approaches and illumine them separately as well as indicate connections between
them. Reason has this quality because it participates in the depth of reason. Tillich
affirms reason's role in shaping the reception of revelation and thereby participating
indirectly in the history of revelation.133
The prophetic attack on distorted sacramentalism is for Tillich "decisive" in
the preparatory stage for the reception of final revelation. Prophetic attack being
always the attempt to set right or transform the given distorted system in concrete
terms, Tillich makes a case for Old Testament prophetism, and not any other
prophetism, to be "the direct preparation for final revelation" on the basis of a
concrete preparation.
The universal revelation [of sacramental religion] as such could not have
prepared the final revelation. Since the latter is concrete, only one concrete
development could have been its immediate preparation. And since the final
revelation is the criterion of every revelation, the criterion of finality must have
been envisaged and applied, though fragmentarily and by anticipation.134
This emphasis on the concreteness of tradition allows him to choose the concept of
"elected nation" as the point of departure, from sacramental religion, towards the
133See Tillich, STI, p. 141.
134Tillich, ST I, p. 142 (italics in original).
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concept of final revelation, which he also develops in other ways without referring to
the Old Testament.135 The concrete focus implies that the election idea is relative to
the Jews and the final revelation to Christians, although in both cases the actualization
of the respective events is seen as taking place in the cosmos and hence as having
universal significance. Tillich's analogy between the Old and New Testament ideas are
here given one after another to show this concrete-universal tension.
To be elected includes the permanent threat of rejection and destruction and the
demand to accept destruction in order to save the covenant of election. Election
and destruction are bound together so that no finite being, group, or individual
may consider himself as more than a medium of the mystery of being. If,
however, a group or single individuals endure this tension, their destruction is
their fulfilment. This is the meaning of the prophetic promise which transcends
the prophetic threat.136
The particular (Jewish) nation exists to exemplify the universal justice of God. But
the particular becoming a true vehicle of the universal is affirmed in Jesus as the
Christ.
Neither the Jewish nation as a whole nor the small "remnant" groups to
whom the prophets often referred were able to overcome the identification of
the medium with the content of revelation. The history of Israel shows that no
group can be the bearer of the final revelation, that it cannot perform a complete
self-sacrifice. The breakthrough and the perfect self-surrender must happen in a
personal life, or it cannot happen at all. Christianity claims that it has happened
and that the moment in which it happened is the center of the history of
revelation and indirectly the center of all history .137
What is evident here is not Tillich's positive favour for a nation or revelation or
religion. He is keen to show the importance of the historical for God, and hence God's
135Tillich speaks of the final revelation of the Christ in at least three ways. In terms of his
theory of symbols, Jesus's sacrifice of his finiteness to himself gives the Christ symbol the
status of a symbol that meets all the criteria of a symbol. From the standpoint of his
philosophical anthropology, he suggests that only a human person can perform a "centred
act". And from the standpoint of his ontology, the dynamics of the ontological elements are
more evident in the human person. All three are fulfilled only by the Christ concept.
13^Tillich, iSTI, p. 143.
137Tillich, ST I, p.143.
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manifestation of Godself in a nation's life and later in the life of Jesus the Christ,
through whom the divine presence in all dimensions of being (the personal
participating in various levels of reality) could be affirmed. At the same time the
historical should be stressed in relation to humans so that they do not divinize the
sacramental (demonization) or sacramentalize the divine (relegate God to a sacred
sphere) or seek reunion with God beyond history (mysticism).
It is only the emphasis on the historical that appears to place ethical religion in
a better light. But the ethical's prophetic voice needs the sacramental as its medium(s)
to express itself, and this is possible only by a mystical participation in the divine. The
predominantly secular culture of the modern West does raise a problem here, by the
question whether the prophetic voice of justice is still present if people are no longer
connected with a religious sacramental system or consciously relate themselves to the
divine. We have, under "Religion in Quasi-religions", seen Tillich's response to this in
terms of secular culture itself having received symbols from religion in former periods
which can be used either creatively or demoniacally. Participation in the divine too,
although not manifest obviously, is present, based on Tillich's view that justice or any
act directed at transformation in the human realm is an expression of the holy as
ought-to-be, which cannot be effective without the holy as present - hence the
universal presence of the holy as present.
One final, but serious criticism against any typological approach in religion
will be considered before we conclude with a comparison of Tillich's typology with a
couple of recent typologies. There are two methodologies in the history of religions.
Kitagawa calls one the "historical", whose aim is to deal with concrete religions in
their particularity and uniqueness and to analyze the processes of changes in them.
The other is the "structural", whose concern is the universal features of the concrete
religions, and is thus similar to the typological approach that we have been discussing
in Tillich. So if the typological is only one of the two methods, then is not Tillich's
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approach narrow and does it not need to be complemented by the "historical"? This
can be answered from two sides. The one is from the side of the systematic (or
structural) principle which underlies typology, and which is a basic frame that
comprehends the ways in which religion is expressed: "There is no progressive
development which goes on and on, but there are elements in the experience of the
Holy which are always there, if the Holy is experienced."138 The other is from the
side of the historical. And it needs only to be pointed out that we have already shown
how the types of religions acquire their distinctive general characteristics in the course
of the development of the respective religions - the subordinate typological element in
a particular type always keeping alive an inner dynamic such that a more adequate
religious form would arise. So both the "typological" and the "historical" are seen to
be equally important by Tillich. In fact Tillich has pointed in the direction of what
Kitagawa proposes, namely that enquiries in one kind will require some engagement
with the other kind to be credible. And Tillich is open to the historical for a revision of
his typology to comprehend the history of religions. But the development of
typologies is crucial for him in three ways: first, the types are the key to understanding
the (differently encountered) nature of religion and to defining it as distinct from other
cultural inquiries; second, the types are the key to interpreting the various conflicting
expressions in the history of a particular religion; and third, the convergence of types
is the basis for Tillich to claim the possibility of the "convergence of religions"139 (a
convergence not in any final form, but in terms of the coming together of the
typological elements, because in their essential nature they belong together).
The emphasis on understanding religions in terms of their own historical
development and unique categories does pose to theologians the problem of finding




faces this problem squarely and suggests an "ordering activity" ("Order Out of
Chaos") that looks at experiences in different religions in terms of new categories,
which should be constantly revised when the data of the religions so demand. And
Cobb uses Jack Hutchison's three-fold categorization of religions: cosmic, acosmic
and theistic.140 This compares quite closely with Tillich's three main types. Whereas
Cobb's approach, which sees the nature of God in terms of the complex pattern of the
universe, follows a cosmic model, Tillich's typology is determined by a revelational
model that is characteristic of religion. Cobb defends diversity of experiences and of
interpretation of experiences by arguing that what one is ultimately concerned about is
not ontologically identical with the object of another's ultimate concern. Tillich too, as
we have seen, develops his typology on the basis of his two-fold understanding of the
holy, thereby recognizing a certain relative element in one's ultimate concern itself.
Taking a similar approach to Tillich's mutual immanence of the types, but not
developing from a systematic analysis of the nature of the holy as Tillich does, Cobb
points out that various windows to what is is possible as in the case of Advaita's
acosmism and Ramanuja's theism within Hinduism.
A two-fold typology adopted by Hick is also quite comparable to Tillich's.
Hick sees as pre-axial, those religions which are "centrally (but not solely) concerned
with the preservation of cosmic and social order", and as post-axial, those "centrally
(but not solely) concerned with the quest for salvation or liberation".141 Hick's first
type reflects the primal worldview which sees oneself as part of the whole of
encountered reality known as cosmos. Tillich affirms this through the sacramental
type, but in terms of the revealing character of the divine through the manifold objects
and functions of nature. Hick's second type emphasizes individual consciousness that
14®J.B. Cobb, "Order Out of Chaos" in J. Kellenberger (ed), Inter-religious Models and
Criteria, New York: St. Martin's, 1993, pp.77-82.
141John Hick, An Interpretation ofReligion, p.22.
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uses its freedom to attain its destiny, depending on how destiny is understood:
whether in the world or beyond it. Tillich's mystical and ethical types do take into
account the personal state of humans to transcend themselves to attain their essential
being, but he goes further to correlate the analysis of the human situation with the
two-fold nature of the holy.
To conclude, Tillich's typology is not an attempt on his part to show
Christianity as the only or best religion in its expression of the three typological
elements in perfect or adequate ways. Rather his typology is a useful tool for the
analysis of the religious phenomena ofvarious traditions, and Christianity is used only
as an example to show the possibility of typological elements coming together. The
typology has elaborated the relation between religion and religions, which we also
addressed in the last chapter, in more concrete terms. How religion becomes
demonized or profanized has been seen again, following the same definitions we saw
in Chapter I. The typology witnesses to a pluralism because divine revelation is
affirmed as common to all religions, and difference in the manifestations and
expressions is explained in terms of the predominance of either the holy as present or
the holy as ought-to-be. The fact of the difference between the ontological and the
moral types is true not only between religions but also within a religion142 makes
Tillich's pluralism more radical (affirming the validity ofmany concrete actualizations)
on the one hand, and shows the possibility of the polar types being complementary
rather than confrontational on the other hand.




The object of systematic theology is religion as ultimate concern. But since the
content of religion is found in the various manifestations of ultimate concern, Tillich's
ideas in respect of a "theology of culture" (which for him involved viewing ulimate
concern from its expressions in history and at the same time judging the
manifestations from the standpoint of ultimate concern) were appreciated in Chapter
I. We discussed in Chapter II Tillich's typology of religions, which he developed by a
systematic analysis of the-holy-and-its-manifestation (or the holy as such and the holy
as known) correlation, while at the same time showing that the typology is verifiable
in the actual life of the concrete religions. The dynamics of the three important
elements of religion, namely the sacramental, the mystical and the ethical, revealed
Tillich's typology as a useful analytical tool to interpret particular religious forms, and
to dialogue with the religions.
Now we move on to discuss Tillich's "theology of religions" .1 Brief statements
on the scope of theology of religions as assumed in this study and the use of the terms
"pluralist" and "pluralistic" at this point would be helpful. The theology of religions
' It is more common now to find the designation "theology of religions" rather than the earlier
one, "theology of religion". The older term is used for example by Panikkar, who believes in
the "religious vitality ofmankind" expressing itself in various forms, including secular forms
(R. Panikkar, "The Category of Growth in Comparative Religion: A Critical Self-
Examination", Harvard Theological Review, 66 (1973), p.31). Panikkar's choice, we might
observe, is determined by the "religion manifesting itself in the religions" idea that we see in
Tillich Panikkar states: "The ultimate religious fact does not lie in the realm of doctrine or
even of individual self-consciousness and therefore it can - and well may - be present
everywhere and in every religon. .." (ibid , pi 15) Any one who is sceptical about any
common basis for the religions and hence who pays more attention to the details of concrete
religions will go for the current designation, "theology of religions". In Tillich's case the
expressions are equally important because each corresponds to the respective side of the
religion-religions dialectic. The religion side is essential, for without it there can be no
manifestation. The religions side is important, for that is the mode of our experience and
reflection.
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involves at least three things. First, the broad basis for including various religious
complexes within a single subject matter, "religion", is important, for it is necessary to
distinguish what religion is from what religion addresses or takes on as its medium of
expression. This was done under "The Concept ofReligion". Second, it assumes that
though theology reflects on the different understandings of reality and experiences
with which it is acquainted, its theological categories have limitations in
comprehending the phenomena of other religions fully. This involves the somewhat
paradoxical claim that though theology is a reflective framework defined by a
particular historical religion it can still have relevance for other religions. To what
extent Tillich's theological method and system reflect awareness of such limitations as
well as provide some basis for critically incorporating valuable insights of different
religions in an interreligious context will be discussed in Part C. The third feature of
theology of religions has to do with the question of the mutual relationship between
the religions. This involves exposing the arbitrary way of claiming truth-value for
one's own religion and denying it to other religions. Any claim of mutuality of
religions without the acknowledgment of common criteria also lacks credibility.
Assessing how far the criteria for truth-value are valid in the light of one's own
religious tradition in particular and of other religions in general is an important task of
theology of religions. Whether evaluations of the above criteria should be made from
one's own religion or in the light of insights from various religions is a debated
question in the theology of religions. Hence it is being asked whether one should only
think in terms of a 'Christian theology of religions' or whether one can anticipate a
'universal theology of religions'. These issues will be addressed in this part, Part B.
The two terms "pluralistic" and "pluralist" as used in this study need to be
distinguished one from the other. "Pluralistic" stands for "manifoldness" or "diversity"
that characterizes a particular religious concept or position. It can refer to a concept
that has been shaped by insights from different sources and traditions, or it can refer
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to a theological endeavour that is committed to this task. "Pluralist" or "pluralism"
stands for a definite theology of religions position in contrast to absolutism, relativism
and universalism, although the exponents of the pluralist paradigm see the mutuality
of the religions in more than one way.
In Chapter III we discuss Tillich's criticism of broad approaches which view
the relation between Christianity and other religions in absolutist, relativist or
universalist terms. This will be followed by identifying the important theological
concepts that Tillich uses while discussing Christianity's relationship with other
religions. It will be seen that these concepts are also the main criteria or resources
within a religious tradition that determine the contents of the respective systematic
theologies. So the task is to see if these criteria point towards a pluralism. This will be




Tillich sketched his theology of religions in a rather tentative manner, by
distinguishing his position from two extreme positions. He idenfied himself with a
mediating position, although at times found himself moving between two distinct
approaches within this mediating position. Bringing together Tillich's brief criticisms
of these positions by appreciating their internal demands (as "dictated" by the
particular theologian's premises) and external demands (either trends of the milieu or
partial knowledge of other religions) will introduce us to the problems that he seeks
to overcome in his own theology of religions. This critical survey will show Tillich's
position as falling beyond all the three main approaches, namely "absolutism",
"relativism" and "universalism", although the last of the three is quite an open
approach and which for Tillich includes those classical attempts to bridge the truth of
faith and the truths of reason, to bridge Christianity and other religions, and to bridge
absolutism and relativism.
In this chapter Tillich's critique of approaches, mainly limited to the Christian
ones, will be presented under some classificatory terms that Tillich uses, in relation
both to Christian theological models and to interreligious models. So the sub-sections
deal with the three main approaches that he rejected, namely, 'absolutism', 'relativism'
and 'universalism'. This compares quite closely with the now widely-used classification
in the theology of religions: exclusivism, relativism and inclusivism. The other
approach in the classification2 is pluralism, and since it is being argued in this study as
a position that Tillich subscribes to, it will be dealt with in Chapter IV. Discussing the
arguments against the criticized positions, while appreciating some genuine concerns
behind the formulations of the positions themselves, will prepare for discussion of the
2Seepp.2-3, n.8.
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pluralist character of the central theological concepts of Tillich's theology. The three
positions are not simply negative such that they only help identify the distinctive
character of Tillich's theology of religions, but they have positive aspects in their
claims that are necessary for a pluralist stance.
The three positions show Tillich's dialectical method at work, the same
method that he employs to understand human realities (personal, social and political),
time-space relationships and reality as a whole. Stating that the "present attitude of
Christianity to the world religions is as indefinite as that in most of its history", Tillich
goes on to identify the main theology-of-religions positions of his time:
The extreme contrast between men like Barth and the theologian of missions,
Kraemer, on the one side, and Troeltsch and the philosophical historian,
Toynbee, with his program of a synthesis of the world religions, on the other,
is symbolic for the intrinsic dialectics of the relation of Christianity to the
religions proper.3
He believes that in most of its history Christianity maintained an open, universalist
approach to other religions, and shows this was the case by a very brief historical
sketch.4 But he contradicts himself, when he says: "There was...always a majoritiy of
theologians and church people who interpreted Christianity in a particularistic and
absolutistic way."5 Neither numbers subscribing to an approach nor the length of time
it has been held will settle the validity of that approach. So it is profitable to focus on
Tillich's attempt to spell out the extreme positions indicated in the dialectic mentioned
above and to point out the third position which includes the important elements of the
two polar positions. Thus absolutism and relativism at opposing poles and
universalism as the position that transcends both will be discussed.
1. Absolutism
3Tillich, CEWR, p.46.
4Tillich, CEWR, pp.27-51 (esp. p.30), p.53.
5Tillich, CEWR, p.44.
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As a theology-of-religions position that he rejects, Tillich's discussion of the absolutist
or "the orthodox-exclusive" model is brief,6 although he brings out various aspects of
this position when addressing different theological issues. While he does see value in
some of the insights of absolutism, he is consistent in disclaiming it as a viable
theology of religions position. He states in his last public lecture that he is against
"reject[ing] all religions other than that of which he is a theologian"7 and against the
rejection of the significance of the history of religions for systematic theology "in the
name of a new or of an old absolutism".8 Our presentation of Tillich's critical
evaluation of absolutism might be done in terms of his reason-revelation dialectic, for
absolutism is nothing but an affirmation of one side, or an aspect of one side, of the
dialectic.
The main features of the now familiar "theology from above" and their
philosophical sources have been identified by Tillich in different connections. And in
regard to the question of Christianity's relationship to the different religions, his
reference to two otherwise opposed thinkers as representing absolutism might be
interesting. He sees the 'absoluteness' idea in Hegel and Barth, and points out that
both suggest those religions as "dead" which have been transcended by Christianity.9
Hegel, starting from a rational basis, sees Christianity as the highest and final form of
the movement of the World-Spirit making the earlier forms redundant or dead, while
Barth starting from a revelational approach sees 'the revelation of God in Christ (not
Christianity in general) alone as "revelation", all other faiths being regarded
"religions", which are nothing more than "futile human attempt[s] to reach God".10
The absolutism of both thinkers arises from using the ultimate as the sole criterion of
truth and interpretation of reality, although the manifestation and operations of the
6Tillich, FR, p.83; Tillich, CEWR, p.44-46.
7Tillich, FR, p.80




ultimate are differently understood. The closeness ofHegel and Barth in the absolutist
claim that they make for Christianity should not blind us to the fact that the two
thinkers stand as representatives for one of the sides of the reason-revelation dialectic.
So whereas Hegel's claim is that Christianity is the most rational religion, Barth's
claim is that revelation is present only in Christianity.
The flaw with Hegel's "one-directed dialectics", for Tillich, is that it is a
dialectic which takes no further account of "what is dialectically left behind".11 This is
not to say that the old is lost, for elsewhere Tillich commends Hegel for his attempt to
draw the old into the new by negating and preserving (aufgehoben) the old.12
Religion, for Hegel, has undergone a three-stage development in history. It has
evolved from the first stage of the religion of nature (Chinese religion being the
example), passed through the second stage of the religion of individual spirituality
(Indian religion), and finally reached the stage of absolute religion (Christianity).
It is the Christian religion which is the perfect religion, the religion which
represents the Being of Spirit in a realized form... In it., the infinite Spirit and
the finite spirit are inseparably connected, it is their absolute identity which
constitutes this religion and is its substance or content.13
Tillich presents two ways by which Hegel comes to affirm the absoluteness of
Christianity: first, by a philosophical interpretation of the history of religions by
employing the "evolutionary-progressivistic scheme",14 and second by his claim that
everything is rational, the rational structure having been actualized in the self-
realization of the divine.15 The self-realization of the Spirit in turn meant the
actualization of reason in humans and the universe. "There cannot be a Divine Reason
'1 Tillich, CEWR, p.56. Tillich notes Hegel's "optimistic tendency" in raising affirmation
above the unity of affirmation and negation. (Tillich, PTTB, p .47)
12Tillich, ST III, p.366.
i n 1
G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Vol.11, Kegan Paul, Trench,
Trubner, 1895, p.330. Quoted in Lloyd Geering, Faiths New Age: A Perspective on
Contemporary Religious Change, London: Collins,1980, p. 107.
14Tillich, ST III, p.358.
15Tillich, ST II, p.24. Hence Hegel is seen as deifying reason. (Tillich, ST I, p.82.)
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and a human, there cannot be a Divine Spirit and a human, which are absolutely
different. Human reason ... is the divine in man...."16
Tillich criticizes both the progressivistic idea of Hegel and the latter's attempt
at deifying reason. The first of these, the idea of progress in religion, is untenable as
seen from three of Tillich's related analytical concepts. First, the substance-form
correlation, where religion is substance, witnesses to the fact that religion cannot be
evaluated from a ground other than itself, for it is the ground of every meaning. In
other words, religion affirms that being-itself cannot be subject to any valuation.
Second, in Tillich's typology of religion we saw religion present in the sacramental
and the higher types. Though the types have distinctive features, the underlying
character of religion seen in terms of the two-fold nature of the holy, the holy as being
and the holy as ought-to-be, is common. Even in the case of the concrete
embodiments of religion, approximating to one of the ideal types, Tillich has shown
that there is no steady progress. This is the case because religion, in its concrete form,
fails to attend equally to both aspects of the holy. Hence the gain in one direction
means a loss in another. And third, as we shall see later (Chapter IV under "Christ
the Criterion"), the concept of the "centre" of history resists the idea of the meaning
of history being given at the end of history, all the earlier stages being regarded
merely as developing stages. For Tillich the meaning of history is at the centre and
thereby has the power to judge and direct history.
Hegel's deifying of reason violates Tillich's theological view that knowledge is
historical and hence cannot express absolute truth. The knowing individual cannot
become identical with the universal knowing subject. This fact had been overlooked
by the Medieval theologians, who did not deify reason as Hegel did but redeemed it
16G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Vol.1, Kegan Paul, Trench,
Trubner, 1895, p.33. Quoted in Lloyd Geering, Faith's New Age, p. 103.
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through revelation and claimed for it the ability to have knowledge of God and reality
from an absolute standpoint, possible only for the Christian:
The knowledge of nature is open to the non-Christian as well. The
knowledge of super-nature is possible only through revelation. Whoever is
not reached by it, stands quite outside the truth, a heretic or heathen. But
whoever is illuminated by it, finds in this very fact the historical fate which
links him to all others of the same destiny. Revelation eliminates
individualization in thought and gives every single person an absolute
position.17
Such an absolute position was made questionable by Protestantism with its assertion
that super-nature too as it relates to humans is not free from the tensions to which
historical thinking is subject - the sphere of knowledge too reflects the human
"consciousness of standing in separation from the Unconditioned". This should also
be one of the reasons for the ambiguity of theology, a fate that theology shares with
all other enterprises of the human mind.18
But, Tillich only questions the possibility of the absolute position within the
realm of knowledge. The 'absolute position' idea in a special sense is essential at the
point where knowledge is related to the Unconditioned, and hence "the expression of
a basic metaphysical attitude". The statement or truth that is uttered at this point is
free from relativity or ambiguity, and can only be about the true character of the
relationship between the Unconditioned and the conditioned. "It is the judgment that
constitutes truth as truth."
The absolute standpoint is therefore a position which can never be taken;
rather it is the guard which protects the Unconditioned, averting the
encroachment of a conditioned point of view on the sphere of the
Unconditioned.19
Tillich's further descriptions of this absolute standpoint as that which is "an indication
and defense at the same time" of the Unconditioned, shows the absolute position in
relation to knowledge as the counterpart of the Protestant principle in relation to
17Tillich, IH, p. 133. See ibid., pp. 129-175.
18Tillich, 5TII, p. 16.
19Tillich,///,p,171.
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theology. A consequence of this absolute position is that it affirms a "beliefful
relativism", which is a relativism that overcomes relativism. That is, a theory that
acknowledges the element of fate (limitations) in being and relativity in knowledge in
virtue of the fact of knowledge involving decision (which makes knowledge
historically conditioned) cannot accord itself the status of final truth. The absolute or
guardian standpoint would check such a claim.20 In other words, the observation of
the relativity of statements about reality cannot be made into an all-embracing theory
about the nature of knowledge, for knowledge falls within the Unconditioned,
although in the human existential state knowledge does not express fully its logos
structure. Tillich's criticism is that, in addition to relativism's self-contradiction in
making an absolute statement about the "knowledge of knowledge" (logos or rational
structure of reality which is present in everyday knowledge) from an observation
about the relativity of all knowledge, the absolute standpoint does and must resist in
the name ofbeing-itself.
The absolute standpoint is not absolutistic as in Hegel, for Hegel in his hybris
knows the outcome of the Absolute Spirit's self-manifestion in all reality, including its
coming to self-consciousness in humans - the negative not being a continuous threat
to the positive.21 Whereas for Hegel finite reality is in the last analysis only the sphere
in which the Absolute Spirit actualizes itself, for Tillich the logos structure is present
in humans, society and history in all their variety. The affirmation of this structure is
possible because it is affirmed at the most fundamental level, that is, in being-itself.
God is not the infinite opposed to the finite as in Hegel. The negative character of "/«-
finite" suggests "the dynamic and free self-transcendence of finite being". "Infinity",
here, "is a directing concept, not a constituting concept. It directs the mind to




infinite being."22 So God is not on one side of a relation or polarity but is the
structure that upholds all relations and dynamics.
Being-itself is not infinity; it is that which lies beyond the polarity of finitude and
infinite self-transcendence. Being-itself manifests itself to finite being in the
infinite drive of the finite beyond itself. But being-itself cannot be identified with
infinity, that is, with the negation of finitude. It precedes the finite, and it
precedes the infinite negation of the finite.23
Therefore, the logos, or the rational, structure is meaningful, and the absolute
standpoint is essential for judging the nature of the finite. This point is crucial for
theology and theological criticism.
But this absolute standpoint cannot be identified with any given tradition.
Tillich points out that an "absolutism of tradition" was claimed by "orthodox and
clerical ecclesiasticism" when it sought "to maintain itself in all its ancient forms with
reference to the eternal" in the face of secularism's threat.24 He criticizes this form of
absolutism because it absolutizes the "static element" of reason by ignoring the
"dynamic element"25 Thus the church can sometimes regard itself as "something
absolute which does not have to die but which maintains an exclusive structure and
validity" 26 And Tillich points out how fanaticism could be characteristic of those who
seek wider knowledge but are not prepared to see themselves in a new or different
light (the dynamic element of reason). Coming as they are "from the security of tightly
bounded thinking and belief', despite their reaching the "frontier of other thinking and
belief', their realization of "what they themselves are like in the mirror of the other",
and their experience of the potential to rise above their present understanding, they
"fall back on old certainties" and
22Tillich, ST I, p.190.
23Tillich, STI, p.191.
24Tillich, RS, pp. 158-159.
25Tillich, ST I, pp.86-87.
26Tillich, UC, p.136.
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affirm them fanatically with the aim of eliminating the frontiers which they
cannot cross over, ofbringing all spiritual possibilities into subjection to their
own, of dissolving them in their own identity.27
Tillich is equally critical of the "absolutism of revolution", which is the
dynamic element's reaction against the static element in actual reason. But once a
revolution attains victory, it establishes itself as the unchangeable truth. It fails to see
the relativity of its truth. Tillich finds Protestant orthodox absolutism guilty ofmaking
an absolute norm of the theological stand it took while revolting, and commends
Schleiermacher for recognizing this mistake and declaring, "the Reformation
continues" 28 Though Tillich's criticism of certain revolutionary movements including
that of Protestantism is valid, he wrongly calls the crystallizing of a revolutionary
slogan "absolutism of revolution". He fails to see that even a revolution can become a
living tradition beside the tradition it opposes (Protestantism for instance) and that
only in some rare cases a revolution replaces the prevailing tradition (Communism in
the former Russia, and Islam replacing Eastern Christianity in the seventh century).29
Tillich blunders here by identifying the dynamic element of reason with a particular
movement rather than with reason's ability to question its present boundaries. So we
argue that even if a slogan of revolution has manifested itself in a particular context
only for a short time, it should be considered "absolutism of tradition". In fact Tillich
himself elsewhere acknowledges that Protestantism became more orthodox than
Catholicism within fifty years of its existence.30 What "absolutism of revolution"
actually should refer to is the tendency to revolt against any given form or system, a
tendency which is valid and positive if not raised to absoluteness.
27Tillich, FR, p.54. Tillich points out that the term 'fanatic' has changed from its original
meaning of one who is "divinely inspired" to one who is "demoniacally inspired".(ibid)
28Tillich, ,STI, p.87 and p.87n.8.
29See Tillich, CEWR, pp. 18,37,
30Tillich, UC, p.65.
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Absolutism of tradition and absolutism of revolution are instances of narrow
uses of reason for self-preservation of tradition against change or for bringing in a
new social or political order. Absolutism of both kinds are unsympathetic and
insensitive to either tradition or revolution. Often rational criteria or cultural forms are
used to claim absoluteness or superiority for one's tradition. Tillich notes that "great
religions" other than Christianity, in contrast to the "primitive" ones, also sometimes
claim absoluteness for themselves on the basis of their cultural maturity and
sophistication.31 Though these absolutist claims do not appear to be made on
religious grounds (namely, in the name of revelation), Tillich's religion-culture
correlation, which sees cultural maturation and theological maturation mutually
influencing each other, can detect Advaita Vedanta's typical absolutist theology of
religions. Advaita preaches that all human constructs of ultimate reality disappear
when one attains the highest level of consciouness, which is also the state of identity
with Brahman. This is evident in Radhakrishnan's claim: "The worshippers of the
Absolute are the highest in rank, second to them are the worshippers of the personal
God, then would follow the "worshippers of incarnation like Rama, Krishna, Buddha"
and after these the still lower forms.32 The basis of Radhakrishnan's claim for
ad\>aita's superiority is his view that personality is a limiting concept for the
ultimate.33 What Radhakrishnan fails to recognize here is that even advaita!s
conception of the Absolute is a human construct. We shall see later that Tillich's
concept of "God beyond God" seeks to identify the common character of the different
conceptions of the ultimate.
We have above considered the absolutisms based on absolutizations of reason.
When we came to the absolutist theology of religions of the Ad\>aitic religio-
•^Tillich, ST III, p.358.
"3? S. Radhakrishnan, The Hindu View ofLife, New York: Allen & Unwin and Macmillan,
1927, p.32.
S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, New York: Allen & Unwin and Macmillan, 1929,
Vol.1, p.97.
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philosophical tradition, we already touched the religious side very strongly though not
in terms of revelation. Now we move on to discuss Tillich's rejection of absolutisms
based on revelation.
Two ways in which Tillich sees revelation absolutized, leading to an absolutist
theology of religions, might be identified. Both of these, which will be seen to be
related, may be found in Tillich's criticisms of Barth. The absolutization of revelation
in one way is expressed in the context of Barth confronting the liberalism and the
progressivism of the time and Nazism. And Tillich regards Barth as the main force in
the European Protestant resistance to Hitler.34 Barth's theological orthodoxy, which
in the given political situation had revolutionary and strategic power to unite
Christians against Hitler, was powerful because of the clear-cut way in which Barth
presented God's revelation and salvation as totally opposed to human achievements
and self-salvation and opposed to human means to various superiorities (cultural,
racial). To challenge secularism and fascism, an absolutism of a "supernatural" kind
seems to be needed to attack absolutisms of a finite kind. Did Tillich think that Barth
practised one form of idolatry to fight another form of idolatry, that he used a new
parochial ideology to counter the dangerous parochial propaganda of Nazism? Tillich
would certainly not see the Barthian approach and Nazism as idolatry of the same
order. Barth's criticism was certainly an expression of divine judgment on the
situation. But this vertical judgment becomes idolatry at the point a particular form of
religion is raised to ultimacy. It is idolatry when an exclusive claim is made for a
religion, that it alone is the witness to the divine by divine right and authority. So,
though Barth's absolutism had the critical power to lead Protestantism out of its
"sectarian seclusion" and to challenge secularism at a crucial time, it lacked creative
power to cooperate with worthwhile cultural movements when the crisis was over, as
34Tillich, UC, p . 63.
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Tillich points out.35 The idolatry of Nazism in contrast has no divine basis; it turns a
finite into the ultimate.
The second form of Barth's absolutism is expressed in his opposition to the
concept "religion" and in his rejection of all approaches to the divine except the
Christian. According to Barth, Christianity is not really religion; rather it is a witness
to God's own act of revealing Godself in Christ. Again, his absolutization of
revelation is evident, and is the basis of his claim that it could be said apriori that
Hinduism is unbelief, even before meeting a single Hindu.36 Tillich's charge against
this approach, like that against fundamentalism, is that it overlooks the part played by
the receptive side in the revelatory situation and consequently identifies "one
individual and conditioned form of receiving the divine with the divine itself'.37 While
Tillich considers Barth failing to distinguish the revealing and receiving aspects in the
revelatory situation, Barth's basic theological affirmation lies in stating God's absolute
power to make Godself known and to effect the reception of the revelation in the
believer, as the believer approaches in faith. Barth would not distinguish between
revelation and reception because that would give the believer a part in the
understanding of the revelation, which part according to him can only be a distortion
of the revelation. But this undermining of the reception side, in Tillich's view, is the
source of "mechanistic-supranatural theories of revelation and inspiration". These
theories must be rejected because on the one hand God is permitted to interfere with
natural processes to reveal Godself, thereby destroying both reason and the structure
of being.
A supranaturalistic theology which employs patterns derived from the
structure of possession and sorcery for the sake of describing the nature of
35Tilhch, PE, p.207.
36Cited in Colin Grant, "The Threat and Prospect in Religious Pluralism", The Ecumenical
Review, 41 (1989), p.50.
37Tillich, BRSUR, p.4.
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revelation in terms of the destruction of the subjective as well as of objective
reason is certainly intolerable.38
On the other hand such an understanding of revelation does not take account of "the
dynamics of the history of revelation", which recognizes revelation in concrete terms:
first, the universal phenomenon of universal revelation, as we saw in sacramental
religion; then as the "reception" of this revelation in its distorted form and its
"rejection" by mystical religion, in the case of the ethical religion of the Old Testament
there was the exercise of "reception, rejection and tranformation" in relation to
universal revelation; and finally comes final revelation, which though is the criterion of
every revelation needs the earlier forms as preliminary revelation.39
In Tillich's understanding of revelation, therefore, reason has an important
role. This is why Spiritual creativity cannot be restricted to the biblical passages,
because those same passages bear the cultural creativity of people of earlier
contexts.40 Literal acceptance of earlier formulations, which is theological literalism,
and advancing of those formulations without reference to present experience are
opposed to a proper revelation-reason correlation, even though certain concepts or
symbols like God, revelation and salvation have been common to most periods of
history. The absolutism of revelation is evident in the claim that the Bible is a
document of revelation and hence has authority. Tillich shows the dangers of biblical
literalism in respect of a worthwhile systematic theology.41 The role reason or
conceptualization plays in the use of biblical images or symbols (especially, the
Christological symbols) is overlooked by biblical literalism.42 Once the bible is
accorded authority, it reinforces the absolutization of the revelation in Christ, and
38Tillich, .ST I, p. 117.
39Tillich, ST I, pp.139-143.
40Tillich, ST III, pp.209-210. Keith Ward protests against the role of reason when he
questions the idea that "once one believes God has really revealed something, one is bound to
believe it on simple authority". (Keith Ward, Divine Action, Collins, 1990, p.230)
4'Robert W. Schrader, The Nature ofTheological Argument: A Study ofPaid Tillich,
Missoula (Montana): Scholars Press, 1975, pp.23-8.
42Tillich, ST II, p. 139.
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consequently claims revelation as applicable only to Jesus Christ. (Tillich rejects this
"exclusive Christocentrism"43) It is in terms of this revelation-combined-with-
authority approach that Christian exclusivists reject all other religions and their claims
to truth and salvation. Tillich's response to them is not in terms of an empiricist
argument that other religions too can make (or do make) claims of revelation and of
the revelation(s) documented in their Scriptures. This kind of argument would only
expose the contradiction in claiming the revelation in one's own tradition valid but
denying validity to revelation in other religions. Adopting a systematic approach,
Tillich focuses on the character of the holy itselfwhich is that of revealing itself by
being present in every reality and experience. Hence revelation is universal, and
applies to both the concrete religious realm and the secular realm.
It is the failure to see the mutual relationship between reason and revelation
that an absolutism based on one of them arises. Tillich criticizes dialectical theology
for not being truly dialectical - which has been echoed recently by Kung.44 Barth's
two-fold failure lies in using his "No" against liberal Christianity and strangling its
relative, scientific criticism, and in not saying a "No" to his own orthodox "form of
doctrine",45 The criticism of Tillich that would apply to Barth in this respect might
particularly concern Christology. The concreteness of the Christ is sacrificed if the
expressions relating to the final revelation are taken literally. For Tillich, "none of
these expressions of the experience of the final revelation is final and absolute in itself.
They are all conditioned, relative, open to change and additions."46 This would then
mean that no theoretical or practical aspects of the picture of the Christ is valid in
itself or has direct absolute consequence for us.
The final revelation does not give us absolute ethics, absolute doctrines, or
an absolute ideal of personal or communal life. It gives us examples which
43Tillich, ST III, p.5.
44Kung, Theologyfor the ThirdMillennium, p.233.
45Tillich, PE, p.208.
46Tillich, ST I, p . 151
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point to that which is absolute; but the examples are not absolute in
themselves.47
We might add to this that Barth's over-emphasis on God's act, especially in revealing
Godself, led him to narrow God's agency of revelation to the Christian religion: "The
divine fact of the name of Jesus Christ confirms what no other fact does or can
confirm: the creation and election of this religion to be the one and only true
religion ,"48
The question might be raised whether the significant similarities between
Tillich and Barth, especially in respect of their descriptions of God and revelation,
would justify Tillich's criticism of Barth. For instance, Barth's categorization of God
as "Sovereign" and "Absolute" and Tillich's categorization of the same as "the
Unconditional" and "Absolute" are almost identical. Also, Tillich's claim that God
gives and reveals Godself which humans have to first receive before they can make
any worthwhile affirmation or do any worthy act is not much different from Barth's
statement that God offers (salvation) and humans only receive it. Both men reject
ways of self-salvation. But the difference between them, and which is crucial, is in
Barth's narrowing of revelation to Christ alone in contrast to Tillich's openness in
acknowledging an element offaith both in mystical striving for union with the infinite
and in "personal encounter with the personal God". "Faith", for Tillich, "is the state of
being grasped by the power of being-itself',49 and hence is present in various
47Tillich, iSTI, p. 151. See also p. 152.
4^Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. 1/2, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1956, p.356. (Italics
added) It might be noted that Barth uses 'religion' as a designation for the Christian tradition
and community, departing from his opposition to the concept of 'religion', which was also
echoed by Kraemer: religions are "in their ultimate and essential meaning and significance,
erroneous". (H. Kreamer, Why Christianity ofAll Religions?, Lutterworth, 1962, p.95,n.l)
However, Barth would want to insist that what the community is constituted by and what the
community should bear witness to is radically different from the bases on which other
religious traditions rest. That is, revelation itself "singles out the Church as the locus of true
religion". A genuine response to this revelation is at the same time the reception of the "grace
ofGod, which, of course, differentiates our religion, the Christian, from all others as the true
religion".(Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Vol. 1/2, pp.298,327)
49Tillich, CTB, p. 167.
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revelatory situations, central to the respective religions. In other words, whereas
Barth concentrated God's action in Christ with a view to drawing all religious and
secular loyalties to Christ, Tillich recognized God's revelation as a universal
phenomenon and demanded every form of religion to be in continuous correlation
with its revelatory event in order to be genuine. So instead of denying revelation in
religions other than Christianity, he saw the distortion in the revelation-reception
correlation as the cause of the corruption of religion: "Falsa religio is not identical
with special historical religions but with the self-saving attempts in every religion,
even in Christianity."50
We have seen that the failure to see revelation as expressed through symbols
leads to an absolutization of one particular conception of God and of God's
relationship with the world. This is, for Tillich, idolatry because no symbol can
express the divine fully. Faiths other than Christianity which fall under any of one of
the mystical, prophetic or sacramental types are seen by Tillich to be guilty of
absolutism too: "Every type of faith has the tendency to elevate its concrete symbols
to absolute validity."51 Idolatry of this kind, where the reception side of revelation is
overlooked, makes Tillich see little difference between orthodoxy and
fundamentalism.52 And Tillich's indictment of fundamentalism must be pointed out
here, showing that it is an absolutism that denies reason any part in revelation:
Fundamentalism has demonic traits. It destroys the humble honesty of the
search for truth, it splits the conscience of its thoughtful adherents, and it
makes them fanatical because they are forced to suppress elements of truth
ofwhich they are dimly aware.53
It is the fundamentalist attitude that Tillich attacks when a religious group totally
rejects another group's religion due to the former group's fundamental assertions
50Tillich, ST II, p.86.
51Tillich, DF, p.97.
52See Tillich, BRSUR, p.4.
53Tillich, iSTI, p.3.
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(usually claimed to be revealed) being contradicted by the latter group's beliefs. We
might refer to Jesudasan who gives a good example for this by suggesting that early
Christian exclusivism was a result of the reactionary response to Jewish exclusivism.54
The example of Islam's encounter with Christianity following the former's emergence
in the seventh century is given by Tillich to show the exclusivism on both sides - a
defense always having the effect of narrowing down.55 Tillich points out that even if
the fundamentalist possesses the "civil right" of affirming views special to the group
and rejecting views of other groups such a rejection cannot be theologically
justified.56 Tillich's attempt in this connection is to point to an open, universalist
approach in the periods leading to the making of early Christianity, and thereby to
show the 'unpopularity' of the exclusivist approach. A proper theological argument
against exclusivism, however, should be one which derives from Tillich's idea that
each religion is born out of its respective revelatory situation. Each genuine religion in
which the revelation-religion (which is the same as revelation-reception) correlation is
true demands that it be taken seriously and not rejected outrightly.
A final question here in this section is, whether Tillich's absolutisms of reason
and of revelation can include the complex nature of the fundamentalisms of the
Islamic nature and of the Hindu-Muslim confrontations in the Indian context?
Whereas Christian fundamentalisms stress one or more of the following, Christ as the
only revelation, the inerrancy of the Bible and conservatism in doctrine and sometimes
family and social values of sorts - all of which are usually defended on the basis of a
decisive revelation, the fundamentalisms in the Islamic world and in India are
considered to be responses or reactions to historical factors. Rajashekar points out
that in the case of Islam today, exclusiveness is a way of claiming identity after




centuries of colonial subjugation.57 Islamic identity is worked towards by emphasizing
the importance of the umma (the world-wide Islamic community), and initiating
cultural revolutions to bring about equality and justice and other human values.58 We
can point out here that although the reason for the exclusiveness is different from an
affirmation of revelation, when the the Muslim fundamentalists are questioned about
their basis for claiming that their version of justice or other values - unopen to any
change - are the right ones, they are bound to answer that revelation is their basis.
The recent Indian situation is entirely different in that religions have been politicized,
and with a mistaken understanding that every religion has its own specific culture
(although in reality India does share a common cultural heritage and experience)
communalism is on the rise. And Samartha fears that such communalism is not far
from the demand for a nation-state based on religious identity.59 Tillich's analysis that
applies to this situation is the danger of demonization in religion, namely that of
absolutizing a particular culture as constituting religion, rather than recognizing the
dynamic character of the religion-culture correlation. Thus Tillich's theological
concepts can to a large extent be regarded as adequate for analyzing various
absolutisms.
Tillich's criticisms of absolutisms based on reason or revelation have been
critically examined so as to make clear Tillich's explicit and implicit disfavour with an
absolutist theology of religions. His most succinct statement on this shows the
concrete character of the revelatory situation, which provides the concrete, particular
symbols for the corresponding theology to develop into a theological system. It would
be arrogance to make one such revelatory situation and the theology based on it the
basis of the many others: "The victory of one religion would impose a particular
57J.P. Rajashekar, "Islamic Fundamentalism: Reviewing a Stereotype", p.69.
58J P Rajashekar, "Islamic Fundamentalism: Reviewing a Stereotype", pp.65,67-70.
59S. J. Samartha, One Christ -Many Religions: Towards a Revised Christology, Maryknoll,
New York: Orbis Books, 1991, pp.50-57.
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religious answer on all other particular answers."60 Now we move on to discuss the
other extreme theology of religions position that Tillich rejects but whose reactions to
absolutism he takes seriously.
ii. Relativism
The idea that polar elements are related in a dialectic, which is central not only
to Tillich's religious typology but also to his inquiry into the structure of reality, is
found in his identification of positions in the theology of religions. He sees absolutism
and relativism as polar positions, the former claiming a certain definiteness in respect
of the nature of the reality in question and the latter rejecting such a claim on the basis
that the nature of a particular reality varies with the facts available about it any given
point. Thus, for instance, a static ethical absolutism that is incapable of adapting to
changing situations leads necessarily to "the rise of ethical libertinism and
relativism" 61 Relativism is a protest against absolutism, when absolutism fails to face
new situations or faces it with an unchangeable answer. Absolutism, for its part,
criticizes relativism when the latter makes a norm of varied conceptions of reality and
applies them even to the fundamental structure of reality, thereby in effect questioning
the very fact of that structure (which for Tillich is the ontological structure with
being-itself as the ground) This dialectical relation between absolutism and relativism
must be looked into more closely to appreciate Tillich's criticism of the relativist
theology of religions.
The tension between relativism and absolutism is seen by Tillich in the very
character of faith itself. Faith demands that we seek to become what we essentially
are by reaching for the ultimate, despite our finitude which limits such an attempt.
60Tillich, CEWR, p.96. cf. Samartha: "Exclusiveness regards universality as the extension of
its own particularity and seeks to conquer other faiths. (Samartha, "The Cross and the
Rainbow" in John Hick and Paul Knitter (eds ), The Myth of Christian Uniquenes, London:
SCM, 1988, p.79.
61Tillich, PE, p. 156.
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Out of this tension the problem of faith and tolerance arises. A tolerance
bound to relativism, to an attitude in which nothing ultimate is asked for, is
negative and without content. It is doomed to swing toward its own
opposite, an intolerant absolutism. Faith must unite the tolerance based on its
relativity with the certainty based on the ultimacy of its concern.62
Here it is plain that Tillich does see relative elements in human life and thought as
arising from human finitude but at the same time criticizes relativisms which explain
human life purely in terms of the preliminary concerns and not in terms of the ultimate
concern of humans. For Tillich the relativist theory based on preliminary concerns is
not possible given his understanding that ultimate concern is universal and some
preliminary concern becomes a person's ultimate concern.
Tillich's criticism of relativism may also be seen in terms of his general
criticism of empirical philosophy. Individual things are seen as standing alongside
each other, with "no immediate approach to" and "no direct participation in other
individuals and in the universal power of being". Although there is a view of "reality
as a whole" in empirical philosophy, the relationship of one part of reality with
another is more a matter of the actual interactions between the two rather than any
influence by the power of being that is common to them. In terms of Tillich's
ontological analysis this philosophy is built on the principle of "individualization"
alone without the principle of "participation".63 This idea is also expressed in the
more general transcendence-immanence language: "...positivism does not see the
problem of self-transcendence. It restricts itself to the immanence, not because of the
unapproachable mystery of the transcendent, but because of its unwillingness to
trespass the limits of the empirically given."64
One consequence of a denial of participation or transcendence, which is
significant for the theology of religions, is a denial of "common ground" among
62Tillich, DF, p.57. See also ibid., p.56.
63Tillich, BRSUR, pp. 17-18.
64Tillich, PE, p. 77.
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cultures for understanding experience or reality. Tillich criticizes "much naive
relativism in popular thought" and ethical relativism in particular, which argue for the
absence of "common ground", and points out that their error lies in the comparison of
parts of one culture with corresponding parts of another. Such a comparison is
untenable, especially since the appearance of "the insight that a living reality like
culture is a structural unity, a Gestalt, and not a mechanical composite". Tillich's
suggestion is that a study of cultures as wholes will lead to the recognition of a
"common fundamental principle" behind the differently expressed ethical or other
demands in the various cultures.65 Such a principle is evident in the basic human
predicament of the separation of one's existential being from one's essential being.
In all the varieties of cultures and religions and, consequently, of ethical
systems, some basic norms appear. They are rooted in man's essential nature
and ultimately in the structure of being itself.66
The differences in the demands and norms proposed by each culture to overcome the
existential estrangement are due to each culture's attempts relative to the existing
social, psychological and political conditions. Tillich thus sees a union of the absolute
and relative elements, the former suggesting the universal validity of the basic norms
and the latter the fact of their varied manifestation in the concrete situation.67
The structure of being underlying the realities experienced and expressed
differently is an idea that will be strongly criticized by epistemologies of empiricists
and relativists. If reality is defined, as it is by Page, as "some particular form that
understanding happens to take" and if the particular forms are conditioned on the one
hand by the concepts shared by the group and on the other hand by "inadequate
formation" or "inappropriate application",68 then only the relative element is present.





Ruth Page, Ambiguity and the Presence ofGod, London: SCM, 1985, pp.52-62 (esp.
P 61).
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There is no unity or truth from which one has fallen such that one has now to return
to, or move towards, it. Also there is no "absolute justification" for any choice one
makes.69 This criticism of the absolute reality, truth or standpoint does not affect
Tillich's ontological approach because he shares a two-fold concern with the relativist
approach and in fact has a different understanding of the absolute element of reality.
Tillich, too, believes that the ultimate or being-itself cannot be an unrelated absolute
being whose nature or function can be known apart from the concrete forms, which
according to him are judged with "yes" and "no" by the ultimate itself (as we saw
under "Religion and Culture"). The second point of agreement is a consequence of the
first. Ambiguity surrounds both the forms themselves and the understanding of the
forms. Tillich's consistent understanding of the ultimate as having both being and non-
being makes the ultimate dynamic, not a fixed being or reality. So there is no
definiteness about its working or its appearance. Consequently, there can be no
absolute knowledge about it. However, Tillich makes one absolute statement about
the ultimate: that being always overcomes non-being in the ultimate and hence the
ultimate is the source of the power to be for all other beings. As the ultimate is
immanent in all beings, beings and forms are immanent in each other. This suggests
mutual correction and appreciation of the complementarity of forms, which together
lead to the creation of new forms. The presence of the ultimate and the creation of
new forms are consistent with the two basic qualities of the holy, namely the holy as
being and the holy as ought-to-be. Tillich's approach is arguably more adequate,
because whereas relativists by and large see reality and meaning as dependent on the
creative act of the individual or group, Tillich's proposal allows one to participate in
the forms and be related to all other forms through the ultimate that is immanent in
them and at the same time to create new forms.
69Ruth Page, Ambiguity and the Presence ofGod,pp. 58-59.
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Nevertheless, a relativism of the above kind is helpful in identifying the
"theory-ladenness" or more precisely the "interest-ladenness" of Tillich's ontology.
The fundamental ontological structure constituted by self and world and the
ontological elements such as individualization and participation are intended to serve
as the basis for developing a theological system. If one articulates the concepts of the
Christian faith, which is only one of many faiths, what is the guarantee that such
concepts can be true for expressions of religion in other traditions? Tillich is aware of
this problem, that one's presuppositions determine one's system, and hence admits the
relative character of his system:
Ontology and theology establish a relatively but not absolutely static a priori,
overcoming the alternatives of absolutism and relativism which threaten to
destroy both of them.70
This understanding of Tillich's position regarding relativism should help us
appreciate his criticisms against a relativist theology of religions, which criticisms are
usually in the form of short statements without any argument. He refers to historical
expressions of relativism, and the validity of relativist objections in certain contexts
and their self-defeating character in other contexts. Tillich's remarks in respect of
Troeltsch's contribution is significant in this connection. He recognizes Troeltsch as
an important figure who at the beginning of this century pointed out that historical
studies of the religions required that one look at the material and sources of a
particular religion from its own criteria of truth. No criteria of truth or hermeneutical
tools were to be taken from outwith it. Troeltsch's relativism was seen as developing
in the light of the dominant positivism of the time which demanded "acceptance of the
empirically given without a superior criterion".71 Tillich points out that Troeltsch
abandoned his claim of Christian superiority ("Christianity as the most adequate
realization of that concept" of religion) after recognizing that such a claim was only
70Tillich, <STI, p. 167.
71Tillich, CEWR, p.44.
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possible because the criterion used to compare the religions was in the first instance
derived from the Christian-humanist tradition. Troeltsch also stated that an
interpretation of history is not governed by any universal aim 72 And with regard to
the theological question of the universal significance of Christ, he stated boldly that
Christ is the sole criterion for the experience and knowledge of God for Christians
only:73
A study of the non-Christian religions convinced me more and more that
their naive claims to absolute validity are also genuinely such. I found
Buddhism and Brahminism especially to be really humane and spiritual
religions, capable of appealing in precisely the same way to the inner
certitude and devotion of their followers....74
The relativist idea of affirming the truth of one religion in its own right is put
succinctly by Foerster:
It is easy for a religious relativist (like myself) to accept without hesitation
the validity, and hence the (relative!) truth, of any other religious faith
(because it doesn't conflict with mine).75
Tillich has no quarrel with relativism for affirming that all historical religious
complexes are valid in their own right, because in his view each religion has its own
revelatory situation and unique cultural forms which determine the expression of the
respective revelation. In so far as the revelation is true in a tradition, for which there
can be no proof outside the revelatory correlation (for example, Tillich points out that
a Protestant cannot verify if there is revelation for a Catholic through Mary76), that
tradition is true. That is, divine manifestation is universal. Whether or not Foerster
would take this as the basis of affirming the validity of the various religions, he joins
Tillich in the validation. But whereas Foerster would see no common ground between
72Tillich, CEWR, p.43.
73Ernst Troeltsch, "The Place of Christianity Among the World Religions", in Baron R.
Hugel (ed.), Christian Thought: Its History and Applications, New York: Meridian Books,
1957, p.26.
4Ernst Troeltsch, "The Place ofChristianity Among the World Religions", p.52.
75John Foerster, "Paul Tillich and Inter-religious Dialogue", Modern Theology, 7:1 (October
1990), p.2.
See Tillich, ST I, p. 128.
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the religions to find conflict or similarity (perhaps due to factors such as differences in
historical experiences or struggles and differences in the conceptions of self, world
and the ultimate), Tillich has the Protestant principle (which will be discussed in the
next chapter) to judge the various religious forms in each tradition after taking into
account interpretations given by the followers of the respective traditions. The same
point is made by Tillich in connection with his statement about the manifestations of
the Kingdom of God in history. The Christ as the "centre of history" in its position as
"both criterion and source of the saving power in history" judges all manifestations.
And Tillich states that in this idea of the "centre of history" there is the implicit
criticism of relativism.77
The source of this Christological criticism of relativism may be found in
Tillich's idea of the absolute substance expressing itself in many cultural forms.78
Absolute substance is not something unrelated to experiential realities; nor does it
arbitrarily choose and express itself in forms. If absolute substance is affirmed
violating the Tillichian principles which we have discussed under "Religion and
Culture", then a relativist criticism against it will be valid. The criticism may be either
that only a formal possibility of an absolute substance is asserted or that something
concrete has been elevated to universality. But both these are already answered by
Tillich's positive premise that the absolute is present in every concrete reality, which is
the basis for Tillich's claim that in the depth of every living religion there is
recognition of the meaning and spiritual significance of other religions and
worldviews.79 This premise stated in negative terms will answer the second relativist
criticism more directly: the absolute is never presented in an absolute manifestation.
77Tillich, ST III, p.389. The idea of the "centre ofhistory" will be discussed under 'Christ the
Criterion'.
70°An example in ethical terms is the unconditional command (of love) breaking through all
concrete commands. (Tillich, PE, p. 155)
79Tillich, CEWR, p.97. This point will be elaborated in Chapter VI under "A Dialogical
Approach".
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This should also be true in the case of the Christ, although Tillich's statements about
the Christ appear to be otherwise. (Tillich's consistency in this regard will be one of
the main concerns in the two Christological sections of the next chapter.) So in
principle one of the concrete manifestations cannot elevate itself to an absolute status
- because to do so would be heteronomy.
A positive valuation of relativism is made by Tillich only in so far as it resists
absolutism, which is incapable of adapting itself to a radically changed historical
situation. But relativism goes to the other extreme of asserting "change itself as the
ultimate principle".80 Although this observation is made in relation to ethics, it would
apply to religion regarded as a cultural entity. Relativism's emphasis on the changing
conditions would lead to religion being considered merely "an effect of changing
psychological and sociological conditions" and not "a necessary aspect of man's
spiritual life".81 Hence relativism would simply endorse each relative form in the name
of change. Not a full affirmation but a qualified affirmation of the relative form would
be in order because the absolute is immanent in every form. Unlike absolutism, which
restricts the absolute to particular forms, relativism is open and implicitly affirms,
according to Tillich, the presence of the absolute in all forms. But relativism does not
have a criterion to separate the more true from the less true qualitatively, although a
quantitative differentiation is possible. The principles that relativism adopts to judge
the relative forms
do not represent principles comprehensive enough to embrace all periods and
creative enough to bring new embodiments of themselves. They are not
eternal enough to be ultimate principles and not temporal enough to fit a
changing world.82
8®Tillich, PE, p.154; see also ibid., pp.153,155.
8' See Tillich, TC, p.3. (Italics added)
8^Tillich, PE, p . 154. The same criticism "that there is no way of distinguishing the more from
the less true" in relativism has been made even recently (Edward J. Hughes, Wilfred Cantwell
Smith: A Theologyfor the World, London: S.C.M., 1986, p. 168).
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Is not Tillich's criticism too strong here, failing to see more qualified forms of
relativism? Rupp points out that no "unqualified cultural or religious relativism" is
possible in the face of mutual influences brought about by history which is moving
towards a "single world culture".83 As a consequence of concrete religious
interactions and through developing more complex conceptual models, relativists too
make positive contributions to discussions in the theology of religions. Tillich cannot
take this effort lightly for it falls in line with his claim of the absolute's immanence in
many forms, which suggests the possibility of the development of higher forms.
The one important difference, however, between the relativist approach and
Tillich's in this respect is that whereas relativism proposes development of more
adequate forms in a relative-relative correlation, Tillich stresses the fundamental
character of a universal-relative correlation and its presence in every relative-relative
encounter. The process Tillich suggests finally leads to a new actualization of the
universal-relative relation. But the question is, why should Tillich object to relativism's
suggestion of a relative-relative approach which aims to resist the hierarchy and hence
the tyranny of an absolute? Tillich's likely fear is that this relativist approach would
result either in the subjective conquering the other or in the surrender of the subjective
to the other. The absolute or the unconditional, which is not "reached under logical or
methodological guarantees" but reached in a daring act of faith, an act that penetrates
to the transcendent ground of one's being, is the only solution.
But what is "really real" among all the things and events that offer
themselves as reality? That which resists me so that I cannot pretend its not-
being. The really real is what limits me. There are two powers in the whole
of our experience which do not admit any attempt to remove them, the
unconditional and "the other" i.e., the other human being. They are united in
George Rupp, "Religious Pluralism in the theology of an Emerging World Culture",
Harvard Theological Review, 66 (1973), p.208. There are other inadequate forms of
relativism, such as the Indian example of the blind men and their encounter with parts of the
elephant, suggesting that each one's view of truth is conditioned by his experience, and the
idea that ultimately none of the loyalties to the respective religions is valid (W.C. Smith, Faith
ofOtherMen, p. 13).
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their resistance against me, in their manifestation as the really real. The
unconditional could be an illusion if it did not appear through the
unconditional demand of the other person to acknowledge him as a person.
And, conversely, "the other," if he did not demand an unconditional
acknowledgment of his personal dignity, could be used as a tool for my
purposes; as a consequence he would lose his power of resistance and his
ultimate reality. The unity of the personal and the unconditional, or of the
ethical and the religious, is the manifestation of the really real, for it resists
absolutely any attempt to be dissolved into subjectivity.... Protestant
formative power must grasp reality in its unconditional and irresistible
seriousness and must not build on a place before or beyond the really real.84
It is precisely the resistance of relativism to any idea of a universal structure of
being that makes Tillich suspicious of relativism as a candidate for a viable theology
of religions. Without the idea of the unconditional, any attempt to regard some
statements of other religions as true and others false is unacceptable, because religion
demands the unconditional.85 In Tillich's view, preliminary concerns that fail to
recognize the unconditional lose themselves. In the same way concrete religions can
lose themselves or be rejected if the element of ultimacy is lacking. And yet, Tillich
consistently claimed that those who work from the side of culture or the secular are in
some way directed by the religious substance that their creations bear. This means
that Tillich must recognize the contribution of relativists to the theology of religions.
Our suggestion is that Tillich can accept them under the umbrella of a "relativist
universalism" (which we shall discuss in the next section). In addition, the relativists'
claim of finding or developing complex or inclusive models does suggest a mutual
immanence of models in the case of religions rather than the alongsidedness of
models.
As extreme models absolutism and relativism, with their emphasis either on
religious substance or on form and with their tendencies towards demonization and
profanization respectively, cannot stand as viable theology-of-religions positions.





Due to the dialectical tension that exists between the two extreme positions discussed
above, it is possible to anticipate a third in which the concerns of the two polar
positions would be met. This position is designated "universalism",86 despite its
similarity with the now current "inclusivism", because the former is the one used by
Tillich. Two distinct forms of universalism can be identified in Tillich's sketchy
historical analysis of the Christian attitude towards other religions. We may call the
first, which acknowledges revelation and salvation as universal and offered through
various religions but in only one religion their offer is definitive, absolutist
universalism. The second, which professes that what is universally valid in religion is
relative to each particular expression, is here designated relativist universalim. After
appreciating the merits of each type, we shall suggest that Tillich's type of pluralism,
which may be called "dialectical pluralism", is informed by these two types.
Absolutist universalism is here suggested as an approach which believes in an
absolute principle which is universally valid or a divine absolute which is the universal
reference point for life and truth. Usually it is claimed that this truth is more
adequately experienced and expressed in one's own religion than in those of others.
The promise to Abraham, "In thee all nations of the earth shall be blessed", exhibits
such a universal idea but gives a special place to the descendants of Abraham.87 In
Chapter II we saw that Tillich grants a special place to religion reaching a special
stage historically (at least in the history of Israel) in the Jewish prophets' elevating of
justice to a principle that was valid for and common to both the Jews and the
86Hans Kung sees universalism as a position between "exclusive particularism" and
"relativistic indifferentism" similar to the classification here (Hans Kung, "The Freedom of
Religions" in Owen C. Thomas (ed), Attitudes Towards Other Religions, London: SCM,
1969, p.216).
87Tillich, UC, p. 112.
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neighbouring nations. This meant on the one hand that "Jahweh has superior power
because he is the God of justice", and on the other hand that Jahweh's covenant with
the people of Israel now had a special criterion, namely justice. Thus the universal
element in the understanding of God is reached, and in the light of this element Tillich
corrects the misunderstanding that "exclusive monotheism" is particularistic:
The exclusive monotheism of the prophetic religion is not due to the
absoluteness of one particular god as against others, but it is the universal
validity of justice which produces the exclusive monotheism of the God of
justice. This, of course, implies that justice is a principle which transcends every
particular religion and makes the exclusiveness of any particular religion
conditional.88
Tillich shows that the universal principle of justice is transformed by Jesus into the
still wider universal concept ofagape, "which is the substance of every moral law", in
the picture of the ultimate judgment in which the Christ welcomes people who have
acted righteously from all nations.89
Christianity inherited the universal principle of justice from Judaism, it also
drew inspiration from a certain universality witnessed to by the Romans and from a
universal concept of Greek philosophy. Tillich suggests "universalism" as the special
situation into which Christianity was born, and hence an inheritor of that spirit. The
Roman Empire had broken down national religions and cultures and even histories so
as to give rise to the idea of "world history".90 Through "the most universal of all
concepts" used by the Greeks, namely the logos doctrine, early Christianity affirmed
the Greek principle of universal divine self-manifestation, and at the same time made a
distinction between other revelations as "preparatory" and the Christ-revelation as
"the central appearance".91 Believing that the early Church's method consisted of a
dialectic of universal revelation and the concrete Christ-revelation, Tillich suggests
88Tillich, CEWR, pp.31-2.
89Tillich, CEWR, p.32.
90P. Tillich, A History of Christian Thought, Carl E. Braaten (ed ), London: SCM, 1968,
p.2.
Tillich, CEWR, pp.33-4; see also ibid., pp.35-7.
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that early Christianity had a stronger universalism than the universalisms of later
centuries:92 "Christian universalism was not syncretistic; it did not mix, but rather
subjected whatever it received to an ultimate criterion."93 We shall see under "Christ
the Criterion" in the next chapter that Tillich's own approach is not much different
from the early Church's. This would mean that Tillich's approach is after all an
"absolutist universalism" just as the early Church's. The claim of this study, however,
is that Tillich's approach is pluralist, because the theological criteria which underlie his
theology and his theological method witness to a pluralism.
Tillich's interpretation of the early Church's universalism seems to be more an
ideal picture than historically true. He sees the concrete aspect of the Christ and the
universal aspect of divine manifestation equally emphasized in early Christianity, such
that it can stand as his preferred model. The concreteness of the Christ is stressed
showing how the quests of other religions converge in the central manifestation of the
Christ, but at the same time maintaining the universal claim: "All that is true anywhere
in the world belongs to us, the Christians".94 The early Church's universalism was
radical in that it saw the logos present in new revelatory experiences after its
manifestation in Jesus under the guidance of the Spirit. The concrete and universal
aspects enabled Christianity to be creative by understanding its experience in the light
of insights from other religions and philosophies and at the same time to be
communicating effectively to the public in terms of concepts that they were familiar
with. And Arnold Toynbee suggests that Christianity emerged as the triumphant
92Tilhch, UC, pp. 107-108.
93Tillich, CEWR, pp.36-7.
94Tillich, CEWR, p.35; see also ibid., p.34. He states: "This astonishing universalism,
however, was always balanced by a criterion which was never questioned, either by the
orthodox or by the heretical groups: The image of Jesus as the Christ, as documented in the
New, and prepared for in the Old Testament". (Tillich, CEWR, p.36) (italics added). See also
Tillich, UC, p.95.
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religion among the other religions of the Roman Empire precisely by absorbing what
was valuable in those religions.95
One point that Tillich fails to note with regard to the universalism of the early
Church is that in the period following the appearance of the logos in Jesus the Christ,
revelation and salvation were seen as possible only in terms of the Christ-related
function of the Spirit. "Every new manifestation of the Spiritual Presence stands under
the criterion of his manifestation in Jesus as the Christ."96 Also, the early Church's
universalism does not show itself open enough to explicitly acknowledge the lasting
value of other religions. The other religions are regarded to be significant only in so
far as they pointed or point to the logos's manifestation as the Christ. In the light of
this, it might be said that the early Church had given more prominence to the concrete
aspect of the Christ than to the universal aspect. Hence the early Church's universalist
stance as against a pluralist one. And because Tillich praises this approach of the early
Church without qualification or criticism, he fails to express his pluralist stance.
The picture of the early Church is more varied than Tillich's presentation in the
light of Maurice Wiles's observations. Wiles refers to negative attitudes in the early
Christianity towards other forms of religion and life (even if the intent of the New
Testament writers were not so), and also points out that Christian history has been
syncretistic and Christian doctrine borrowed from the Hellenistic philosophico-
religious tradition to the extent that the difference between orthodoxy and heresy was
only the difference between different ways of bringing together the Christian and the
Platonic elements.97 This suggests that in addition to the predominance of the
concrete criterion and of the universalist tendency, there were also mediate positions
in the early Church, which sometimes distorted the one or the other. The concrete
95Arnold Toynbee, Christianity among the Religions of the World, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1958, p.110.
96Tillich, ST III, p. 158.
Q7
Maurice Wiles, Christian Theology and Inter-religious Dialogue, London: SCM, 1992,
pp.7-17.
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aspect of Christianity, as we saw earlier, became more determinative of the Christian
attitude towards other religions (especially Islam) and heretical groups in later
periods. The concreteness of the church as (one) bearer of the truth was confused
with the truth itself. This can be seen as the source of the doctrine, "extra ecclesiam
nulla salus". The recent suggestion that "the church" in the above doctrine refers to
the mystical body of Christ and not to the church as an institution in order to claim
that the view is inclusive rather than exclusive, has been countered by Wiles, who
points out that Cyprian originally used it as a warning against baptism given by
heretical groups, as part of his admonition against schisms in the church.98
Unlike this kind of universalism, where one particular tradition rises above the
others by claiming to be the ultimate's definitive mode of expression, the next kind of
universalism, which we shall now discuss, takes the concrete character of a religion or
a cultural standpoint seriously and affirms that each in its own special way expresses
the ultimate.
Relativist universalism may be used to represent the position that Tillich
testifies as transcending "early Christian universalism, but without falling into
relativism".99 The concrete religion or standpoint is affirmed in stronger terms: hence
the relativist element. It is nevertheless a universalism because the ultimate is affirmed
as expressing itself in all religions but in different ways. What is important in relativist
QQ
Maurice Wiles, Christian Theology and Inter-religious Dialogue, p. 11. Origen is
identified as having formulated the doctrine in the first instance, although Cyprian applied it
first (Knitter, No Other Name, p. 121). Hans Kung laments that though the Catholic Church
no longer adheres to the dogma "outside the Church there is no Salvation", which had been
affirmed in the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) and in the Council of Florence (1442), it had
"never been corrected openly" (stated by Kung as late as 1990/91). (Hans Kung,
"Dialogability and Steadfastness: On Two Complementary Virtues" in Werner Jeanrond &
Jeniffer Rike (ed ), op. cit., p.242.) We must pomt out that though Kung opposes an
absolutism based on the Church, he himself subscribes to a form of particularistic
universalism in accepting the contemporary Catholic distinction between the Christian
("ordinary") way of salvation and the other ("extraordinary") ways of salvation (Hans Kung,
Theologyfor the ThirdMillennium: An Ecumenical View, translated by Peter Heinegg, New
York: Doubleday, 1988, p.232).
"Tillich, CEWR,yA\.
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universalism, as will be seen, is that experience and understanding within the concrete
religion are regarded as the interpretative tools most useful for inquiry into the
expressions of the ultimate as witnessed to in the respective traditions.
The breakthrough in Christian history from an absolutist universalism towards
a relativist universalism is seen by Tillich to have taken place in Nicolas Cusanus.
Referring to Cusanus's De Pace Fidei (The Peace between the Different Forms of
Faith), Tillich quotes the divine logos's statement in the context of a colloquy taking
place with representatives of different religions present:
There is only one religion, only one cult of all who are living according to the
principles of Reason (the Logos-Reason), which underlies the different rites...
The cult of the gods everywhere witnesses to Divinity.... so in the heaven of
(Logos-) Reason the concord of the religions was established.100
Here the different religions are validated as true from a higher principle, namely
Reason, which becomes the principle for judging the religions in the various
expressions. This Reason criterion became influential in Erasmus and Zwingli, the
latter "acknowledg[ing] the work of the Divine Spirit beyond the boundaries of the
Christian Church". And the "leaders of the Enlightenment, Locke, Hume, and Kant,
measured Christianity by its reasonableness and judged all other religions by the same
criterion. They wanted to remain Christians, but on a universalist, all-inclusive
basis".101 These Enlightenment thinkers, however, have claimed that the ultimate
principle has been present in Christianity in a superior way.102
What Tillich describes under "humanist relativism",103 we argue, makes better
sense as relativist universalism. The former designation portrays Christianity as "no
'°°Tillich, CEWR, pp.40-41. cf. Guru Nanak's statements made about 40 years after
Cusanus, with his (Nanak's) literary knowledge of Sanskrit, Arabic and Persian texts: "There
is no Hindu, there is no Muslim" and also, "There is only One Being Who is the Creator and
the uncaused Cause of all. . .God is one" (Stanley Wolpert, India, Berkeley & Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1991, p .105).
101Tillich, CEWR, p.41.
102Tillich, CEWR, p.42.
103Tillich, CEWR, p.42; see also ibid., pp.43-44.
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more than the exemplar of the species religion", although some who take this
approach claim superiority for their own traditions or approaches. Here Christianity is
not considered to be different from other religions qualitatively. Hence the
justification for it to be a relativism in Tillich's view. And it is a humanist form of
relativism because the criteria used to compare the religions are the moral demand
(Kant), reason (Hegel), mysticism (Fichte), feeling of absolute dependence
(Schleiermacher), and a combination of the mystical and ethical (Schelling). The
moral, the rational, etc. being "forms" through which the absolute manifests itself,
Tillich claims that any comparison based on any one of them (or even all of them
together even if this is possible) must be relativist. The designation "relativism" may
be appropriate if this approach is seen against the absolutist kind, which emphasizes
the absolute's concrete manifestation but having universal significance because the
absolute produces universal consequences. It may also be appropriate because it
satisfies the general relativist priniciple that any standpoint from which reality,
including religious reality, is looked at is conditioned, relative.
Contrary to this, we argue that Tillich should have called the approach of
these philosophers relativist universalism in order to be consistent with his own
understanding of religion. His conception of religion, along with his conception of art
and philosophy, is such that the complexity that is evident in each of them is indicative
of a certain wholeness of reality that does not allow a simple verification or
falsification.104 The religious reality is expressive in certain forms and latent in others.
And in the negative cases, it is demonized in some forms and profanized in others. It
is only in a concrete context that the revealing power of a particular form in
expressing the ultimate can be determined. So forms such as moral or rational
expressions are relative, and when used as criteria in relation to religion are relativist.
However, what is presupposed in the use of these criteria is that similar or different
104Tillich, CEWR, p.30.
expressions of reason, moral imperatives, etc. are present in the various religions. This
presupposition of the universal validity of a criterion justifies the claim that the
philosophers named above profess a universalism, but of a relativist kind. This is
supported by Tillich's view that religion "as the self-transcendence of life in the
dimension of spirit" is primarily not an independent function but is a quality of
morality and culture (reason being one of the cultural functions), that is as the depth
ofmorality and culture .105
The assumption of this approach is that the criterion used as the ultimate
principle is itself constituted by prior understandings relative to the culture, as Tillich
himself points out. These relativist universalists, except for Hume, cannot be
considered alongside pure relativists who do not recognize any relation between
concrete religion and religion in a universal sense, between concrete meaning and
universal meaning. The relativist universalists either state or imply that the meaning or
truth experienced in one religion is present in other religions too, but in different
ways. Those who operate from a concrete philosophical standpoint might not
consider an experience within a religious tradition or an interaction with other
religions important for their inquiry. This is a limitation that threatens this approach.
This two-fold character ofuniversalism cannot be too rigid, for a position that
falls mainly on one side can appreciate features of the other side. Its advantage over
the inclusivist paradigm in the exclusivist-inclusivist-pluralist scheme is that it gives
more scope for differentiating positions and for providing a good analytical tool in the
concrete-universal dialectic. It also helps to appreciate overlapping positions such as
Hegel's, which we saw falling within the absolutist and the relativist-universalist
positions. In a similar way, it is also useful to appreciate Indian approaches such as
Gandhi's. An absolutist element in Gandhi was observed earlier. At the same time we
have to take into account and represent Gandhi's claim to be a scmatam Hindu - a
105Tillich, ST III, p. 102.
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universalist Hindu - on the basis of his practising a Hinduism that embraced what he
found to be of value in the world religions and on the basis of addressing the sanie
God common to all in his prayer.106 A more dialectical attempt, like that of J.A T.
Robinson might fulfil the important concerns of absolutist universalism and relativist
universalism. On the one hand Robinson affirms the need to express the character of
God through the understanding of his own tradition, "God is Christ-like" or
borrowing Chakkarai's designation "the Christhood of God", after the manner of an
absolutist universalist, and on the other hand, he states that the truth of God is not
confined to the Christ as a relativist universalist. However, one can note that his claim
that "God is best defined by Christ" does limit his taking seriously the demands of the
relativist side, although he is open to dialogue which should clarify, complete and
correct his conviction.107 Tillich also attempts to mediate the thrusts of the two
approaches, working originally in terms of the dialectic of his Christian faith and the
larger definition of religion as ultimate concern, and being informed by the insights of
those who work from each of the two forms of universalism. This will be pursued in
the next two chapters. But we shall close this chapter with an evaluation of the way
Tillich sees the role of cultural developments within a religion in determining that
religion's view of other religions.
Tillich's presentation of the universalist model overcomes the tendencies in the
usual "fulfilment model" to claim superiority for Christianity either on the basis of
grace expressed in Christ fulfilling the law of the Old Testament or on the basis of the
perfection of the Christ that is passed on to those who follow him. Thus Nicol
Macnicol (having appreciated the immensely rich ideas of life and even of God in
Indian Theism, 1915) saw Hinduism as 'morally impotent', and suggested a similarity
10£\
Jesudasan, A Gandhian Theology ofLiberation, p. 132.
107J.A.T. Robinson, Truth is Two-Eyed, London: SCM, 1979, p. 129, and p. 129, note 71.
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between the idea of Christ fulfilling the Hebrew law and the idea of Christianity
fulfilling Hinduism:
It [Hinduism] loads man with chains and leaves him helpless in deliverance. It
has its lessons to teach us that can be carried over into Christian faith and can
be linked with the tremendous moral energy that are stored there in the
whole ethical tradition, culminating in the divine Fatherhood that is revealed
in the life of Christ and the ethical passion that is revealed in the death of
Christ.... Christianity has its springs of moral energy that Hinduism plainly
has not.108
Tillich would resist this approach, for he points out that the "state of ultimate concern
admits no more of progress than of obsolescence or regression". It is the role of the
particular individual or community concerned and of the use of cognitive and aesthetic
forms in the reception of revelation that makes claims of progress in historical
religions possible.109 Although "the revelatory and saving manifestation of the
Spiritual Presence is always what it is", there are differences in the concrete religions
depending both on the potentialities present in an encounter with the holy and on
human receptivity conditioned by concerns relevant to the specific historical context.
But Tillich finds such cultural progress in religion not to be decisive for any religion to
claim superiority over others: there can only be "the coexistence of different types
without a universal claim". What is decisive for a universal claim is the revelatory
event which conquers the demonic.
Christianity answers that this has happened on the basis of the prophetic
type of religion in the event of Jesus as the Christ. According to Christianity
this event is not the result of a progressive approximation, nor is it the
actualization of another religious potentiality, but it is the uniting and judging
fulfilment of all potentialities implied in the encounter with the holy.110
'08Nicol Macnicol, "Christianity and Hinduism" in Jerusalem Meeting Report, 1, London:
Oxford University Press, 1928, p.25.
100Tillich, ST III, p .35 8.
110Tillich, .ST III, p.359.
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Tillich makes explicit that the claim that Christ is the final revelation is valid because it
represents a judgment in the vertical direction, despite the fact that the event in which
it is manifested is unique.
It is not Christianity as a religion that is absolute but the event by which Christianity
is created and judged to the same extent as any other religion, both affirmatively and
negatively. This view of the history of religions - derived from the Christian claim
that it is based on the final, victoriously antidemonic revelatory event - is not
horizontal but vertical.111
Tillich's statements concerning the Christ, especially that about the revelatory event of
the Christ being the "criterion of all religions" because "in principle" the Christ has
"broken the demonic for all time",112 do appear to suggest an absolutist tendency, but
we shall discuss them in terms of Tillich's critical phenomenological theory and his
concepts of religious symbol and Protestant principle in the next chapter to appreciate
their proper meaning. Here it suffices to state the two reasons for Tillich's emphasis
on a special event which then becomes unique for a religion, as well as distinguishing
factor between religions. The first is that every manifestation of the holy is concrete,
and the second that prophetic religion affirms concreteness positively by virtue of its
positive attitude towards history. Any affirmation of the Christ is an affirmation of
these two points. This concreteness, as we shall soon see, is the existential side in
revelation and in "Christ the Criterion", the other side is the interpretative side, which
involves the Christian theologian's expression of the Christ in universal terms. The
separation of the two sides, despite the need to prove such a possibility, suggests that
there is no absolutism - absolutism, which claims that that all revelations apart from
Christ are excluded from divine revelation in principle.
A striking statement113 in the concluding part of CEWR shows that Tillich's
theology of religions position, though not developed systematically, goes beyond the
11 ^illich, ST III, p.360.
112Tillich, ST III, p.360.
113Tillich, CEWR, pp.96-97.
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positions we have discussed in this chapter. Now we will move on to probe his
systematic theology and his theological method to draw out his general attitude to the
theological and philosophical ideas of systems which are other than Christian. This




So far Tillich's general and formal way of characterizing the nature of religion, of the
holy, of the revelatory situation and of each religion's concrete symbol were
appreciated. From formal and abstracted conceptions and descriptions of the religious
reality, we now move to discuss these formal criteria as found in a concrete religion,
which in Tillich's case is Christianity. Universal religious criteria cannot be set up such
that from then on they can have an independent criteriological function of their own.
A pluralism that is affirmed on the basis of such independent criteria may cease to
have much value in the event of the criteria becoming far removed from the actual
developments a concrete religion is undergoing. We shall now examine the criteria
identified by Tillich and see if they are common for both his systematic theology and
his theology of religions. With the exceptions of EROR, CEWR, and to some extent
UC, there are no texts where Tillich addresses the theology of religions directly. And
Tillich does not spell out and discuss the criteria for his theology of religions position
in these in any systematic way. So we identify the central concepts of his systematic
theology, which will also be seen to have significant implications for his theology of
religions, and examine the mutual importance and consequences of the concepts for
systematic theology and the theology of religions.
First, revelation will be discussed as a criterion that is common to both
enquiries. Whether Tillich regards the revelation in Christ as the only revelation or
whether he grants equal significance to each revelatory situation will be discussed.
This will then lead to appreciating Tillich's understanding of God, who as being-itself
is the one who manifests Godself. To what extent Tillich's conception of God takes
account of the various concepts of the holy in the history of religion will be an
important consideration in order that God may be claimed as the ground of religion
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itself. This claim will then validate the plural expressions of God relative to the
concrete cultural and historical context. This aspect of concreteness will lead us to
identifying the third criterion relevant to the theology of religions approach in Tillich.
This criterion is designated as "criterion" by Tillich himself, and also used by him to
suggest the "concrete" experience within the Christian faith. Here the concrete
Christian claim in regard to the revelation in the picture of Jesus as the Christ will be
discussed to see if Tillich's elaborations are free of a Christ-superiority. And finally,
the "Protestant principle" will be discussed in terms of the special functions it shares
with or does for the larger concept of religion, the religious symbol and specially the
symbol of the Christ. This would lead to identifying it as an important criterion for
Tillich's theology of religions.
1. Revelation and Its Reception: "Biblical Religion"
Revelation is an important criterion for both religion and for theology, and
hence it is the first part of Tillich's five-part Systematic Theology. It is of prime
importance in any reflection of the nature of religion because revelation claims a
transcendence of the subject-object structure, the structure that is the basis of
knowledge encountered in daily living. The subject-object correlation, which is
transcended, is however preserved in revelation. Hence revelation has actually two
parts in it: divine disclosure or revelation and the reception of it by humans. "Biblical",
in the expression "Biblical Religion", refers to the "revelation" which was received by
the Jews and later by Christians (who did not negate the revelation received by the
Jews, although they saw all revelation fulfilled in Jesus). And "religion" refers to the
reception of that revelation. Together revelation and reception constitute a single
religious and theological process.1 We shall see here how through this "highly
1 "Biblical Religion" rather than "Christian Religion" is preferred in the title of his book
Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality perhaps because the former is
inclusive of both the revelation of the Old Testament and the revelation of the New
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dialectical concept"2 of biblical religion Tillich overcomes absolutisms based either on
revelation or religion and relativisms based on religion.
Tillich's statement "that every religion is based on revelation and that every
revelation expresses itself in a religion"3 expresses a formal theological principle
common to all religions, including Christianity. Religion as a receiving function makes
any claim of "revealed religion" impossible. Hence an absolutist approach is rejected.
The correlation between what is revealed and its reception is important, for on the
hand the ultimate's presence in every revelation is affirmed, and on the other hand the
historical and cultural factors influencing every receiving religious group (or a special
individual) is taken into account. The basis or context of both revelation and reception
is the revelatory situation, in which the receiving party participates. This is what
makes Tillich's understanding of revelation existential, in contrast to a nonexistential
concept of revelation which suggests acceptance of a set of propositions about a past
revelation,4 sometimes claimed to be "communicated in an extraordinary way" in the
original instance.5 The acceptance of the supposedly revealed propositions is for
Tillich either "an autonomous use of the intellect" or "a heteronomous subjection of
the will", both ofwhich are antithetical to a revelatory situation, because a revelatory
situation is one in which the medium of revelation becomes transparent to its divine
ground and manifests "the mystery of being for the cognitive function of human
reason"6 Tillich makes a crucial point about the way the cognitive element is related
Testament. A further reason could be found in Tillich's general view that Christian doctrines
over the centuries have become more and more narrow following more and more precise
definitions. Tillich's interest is to see revelation in its historical and wider influence, rather
than in the rational interpretations of faith, which are relative to the respective periods. Hence
he chooses the earlier witnesses to revelation, the "Biblical".
2Tilhch, BRSUR, p.5.
3Tillich, ST III, p.lll.
4Tillich, ST I, p. 127. "There are no revealed doctrines, but there are revelatory events and
situations which can be described in doctrinal terms." (ibid., p. 125)
5Tillich, ST I, p. 129,n.6.
6Tillich, ST I, p. 129.
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to revelation. He rejects the idea of God's revelation being contained in certain
propositions. He also rejects the claim of natural theology to discover truths about
God from the side of the finite based on the doctrine of analogia entis. But he
believes that analogia entis can be used in the sense of "religious symbol", that is,
"using material taken from finite reality in order to give content to the cognitive
function in revelation" 7
The role of the revelation-reception correlation specific to each concrete
religion is an affirmation of the unique character of each religion. Pluralism is affirmed
by the fact of all religions being characterized by the revelation-reception correlation
and by the fact of the uniqueness of the various religions being explained through the
correlation. Tillich also acknowledges the fullness of the divine participation in
revelation to make the disclosure side of revelation unambiguous. But, according to
Tillich, the reception side, which shares in the existential conditions of humans and
hence in its ambiguities, leads to inadequate and distorted experience of and
expressions of the revelation.
In so far as religion is based on revelation it is unambiguous; in so far as it
receives revelation it is ambiguous. This is true of all religions, even those
which their followers call revealed religion.8
Although this statement accounts for the plurality of the religions on the basis of the
differences in the reception aspect determined by history, culture and the receiving
individual's vocation on behalf of her/his group, there seems to be a gulf between
revelation and religion, which is even more evident in a statement Tillich makes
elsewhere:
As religion, every religion is relative, for every religion objectifies the
Unconditional. As revelation, however, every religion can be absolute, for
revelation is the breakthrough of the Unconditional in its unconditionality.
7Tillich, .STI, p . 131.
8Tillich, ST III, p.lll.
152
Every religion is absolute to the degree that it is revelation, i.e., insofar as the
Unconditional manifests itself within it as something unconditional, in
contrast to everything relative that belongs to it as religion.9
The gulf between revelation and religion is not unbridgeable from the side of
revelation, for Tillich's consistent insistence is that the absolute is present in the
relative, the universal in the particular.
The mark of the Spiritual Presence is not lacking at any place or time. The
divine spirit or God, present to man's spirit, breaks into all history in
revelatory experiences which have both a saving and transforming
character.10
But there is a Christian theological reason for the limitations from the side of religion
as indicated earlier: Revelation is "received in a distorted form" because it "is received
under the conditions of man's estranged character".11 Tillich regards Kierkegaard's
distinction between religiousness A and religiousness B crucial for the concept of
revelation. Religiousness A basically affirms the presence of the divine in the finite,
with Socrates as the model of revelation, revealing the truth that is already in us. In
contrast to this immanentist idea, religiousness B emphasizes the separation between
the divine and the human and hence the truth of "the principle of a revelatory
communication from outside, which is both revelatory and saving or transforming".
For Tillich both emphases are important, and so he sees them in a dialectic,12 without
subjecting the one to the other.
Here we come to apoint that is common to Tillich's religious typology and his
systematic theology. The fact that the 'immanence' idea and the 'transcendence' idea
are two sides of the same coin is evident in Tillich's typology of religion: sacramental
religion affirming the immanent approach and the mystical and ethical religions
^Tillich, What is Religion, pp. 145-146.
10Tillich, .STm, p. 149.
11Tillich, FR, p.81.
12Tillich, Perspectives, p. 180.
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representing the transcendent approach. Sacramental religion is universal because it
affirms the presence of the divine in the sacramental object, which in turn points to the
fact of divine presence in every being and every reality. The mystical and the ethical
religions have the sacramental element in them, but exercise a purifying function to
show that the divine transcends all finite forms when sacramental religion has allowed
the finite forms to claim ultimacy for themselves. The immanence-transcendence
dialectic is present in Tillich's systematic theology as the relation between revelation
and religion or between the larger and narrower concepts of religion as the quotation
which is to follow shows. The experience of religion through symbols and forms need
to be continuously critiqued in the power of transcendence.
Religion as a historical reality uses cultural creations both in theoria and
praxis. It uses some and rejects others, and in doing so it establishes a realm
of religious culture which lies alongside the other cultural creations. But
religion as the self-transcendence of life in all realms claims a superiority over
them which is justified in so far as religion points to that which transcends all
of them, but the claim to superiority becomes demonic when religion as a
social and personal reality makes this claim for itself and the finite forms by
which it points to the infinite.13
The superiority of the larger concept of religion, which is identical with revelation,
that is reflected here is for Tillich applicable to all religions, and hence expresses his
pluralist stance. Although transcendence is accorded superiority here, we must refer to
Tillich's religious typology for his holding together of immanence and transcendence
in proper tension. His interest in the typology is not so much that of classifying
religions into types as that of showing the mutual immanence of the three elements on
the one hand. At the same time concrete acts ofmystical and prophetic transcendence
should overcome the concrete distortions of sacramental religion. The prophets and
the philosophers have their critical role against "the priestly guardians of the holy".14
13Tillich, ST III, pill
14Tillich, FR, p.47.
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The transcendence aspect of revelation is given special treatment by Tillich in
terms of the seemingly contradicting concepts of "mystery" and "revelation". Here the
contrast between the claims of ethical and mystical religions is evident, although he
does not indicate this.15 Mystery belongs to the very nature of the ultimate because
the ultimate is that dimension of reality which precedes the subject-object structure.
"Whatever is essentially mysterious cannot lose its mysteriousness even when it is
revealed." This is an endorsement of the claim of mysticism. At the same time he
makes the claim of revelation credible by stating: "Something more is known of the
mystery after it has become manifest in revelation." Thus Tillich's religious typology is
implicit here, and it is not difficult to show that unless mystical religion and prophetic
religion accept in some way both the mystery and the manifestation aspects, there are
the dangers of the former becoming demonic by its emphasis of the negative side of
mystery and denial of the positive side ofmystery which leads to "actual revelation",16
and of the latter becoming profane.
The reception side of revelation, which we pointed out as accounting for
diversity, is significant because it recognizes the human and historical elements in
revelation. Tillich's analysis of revelation through the personal model as against the
earlier forms of understanding revelation from the side of God overpowering the
individual as in sorcery, which overpowers physically, or in magic, which affects
psychically, or in suggestive talk, which influences emotionally, is evidence of his
taking the total human person seriously. God as person revealing to humans as
persons is a special approach: "Revelation through the word respects man's freedom
and his personal self-relatedness. Man is asked to listen, but he is left free to
'5Tillich, ST I, pp.108-111. There is a quick reference to the mystic when he identifies the
"abysmal element in the ground of being" with "the negative side of the mystery": "Without the
"dark night of the soul," the mystic cannot experience the mystery of the ground." (ibid.,
155
decline."17 Failure on Barth's part to recognize the mutual relationship between the
human and the divine - Barth fearing that any human element in revelation would
make God partly dependent on humans - was for Tillich a failure to appreciate the
reception side of revelation.
But although God in his abysmal nature is in no way dependent on man, God
in his self-manifestation to man is dependent on the way man receives his
manifestation.18
That various processes of revision and reconception of God take place in the
revelatory situation is evident in this statement. This is clearer still in what he goes on
to say:
The divine-human relation, and therefore God as well as man within this
relation, changes with the stages of the history of revelation and with the
stages of every personal development. There is a mutual interdependence
between "God for us" and "we for God."19
The human element in the reception has already led to appreciating the
historical element in the reception. But the important question is whether his
understanding of the history of religions allows religions to be seen in their own right
and not as part of a Christian interpretation. Tillich states his intention very clearly:
"As human reception, biblical religion belongs to the whole of the history of
religion."20 He gives no special status to Christianity in principle. The revelation that
Christianity received is not unrelated to the history of religion. This can be shown by
referring to Tillich's idea that symbols are not a product of any history, for they belong
to specific histories and enter into the revelatory situation of the religious group
influenced by the respective symbol(s). Thus the symbol of "the annointed one"
(Chnstos in Greek) or 'the Messiah' existed in Judaism and in Egypt before its
17Tillich, BRSUR, p.32.
18Tillich, ST I, p.61.
19Tillich, ST I, p.61
20Tillich, BRSUR, p.21.
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distinctive use in Christianity.21 It is in Peter's confession of Jesus as the Christ, with
the other disciples of Jesus following suit, that the symbol "the Christ" becomes
normative for Christianity. The Christ symbol is thus related to the historical facts of
the life and message of Jesus and the reality of the religious experience of the disciples
which they expressed in terms of the Jewish idea of the Messiah.22 The reception
aspect of revelation being concrete, Christianity was, at its inception, more than
influenced by Judaism. For Tillich, as we shall see shortly and in greater detail under
"Christ the Criterion", the Christ represents the vertical judgment on religion and
culture. But in historical existence such a divine judgment or revelation has its
reception or concrete side. Hence what is meant to reform Judaism (or to reach the
"end of religion") leads to a new religion:
So the only thing we can say is that we agree with the New Testament
message that the Christ is the end, namely the end of religion. On the other
hand, we cannot deny that out of this end of religion a new religion arose,
which is the Christian religion.2-1
The original Christian revelation therefore was prepared for by Judaism. Without such
preparation through the revelatory experiences in Judaism, the Christian revelation
could not have been received.24 There is no need to read the idea of Christianity
surpassing Judaism into this account. For what is important here is the formal
principle, valid for all religions, that the divine is present, in all historical religions but
at the same time drives them beyond themselves. Hence it can be said that Judaism
itself is continuously striving to transcend itself. This is evident in the fact of
revelation and the reception of it being ongoing, which is also testified by Tillich's
21Tillich, UC, pp. 133-134.




typology of religion. In criticisms directed against sacramental traditions, there is a
"quest for new revelatory constellations".25
The fact of history and historical events being significant due to the reception
side of revelation should not lead to any authenticating of a particular history or of
particular historical events on the basis of any supranatural agency. The transcendent
character of revelation prevents the ultimate from entering history and creating a new
course and presents the ultimate as the answer to the human quest for being and
meaning.
Revelation is the manifestation of the depth of reason and the ground of
being. It points to the mystery of existence and to our ultimate concern. It is
independent of what science and history say about the conditions in which it
appears; and it cannot make science and history dependent on itself.26
Tillich admits historical and scientific analyses in so far as they help in identifying the
superstitious and demonic elements in religion, but regards them as incapable of
judging the revelatory situation.
It is by failing to appreciate the reception side of revelation in Tillich that Keith
Ward calls Tillich a "theologian of inner experience", presents Tillich's idea of the
revelatory event as "a sort of human experience", "a matter of infinite passion" and an
experience of "primacy of relationship with God",27 and points out that there is a lack
of "an interactive relationship between God and a particular community" in revelation.
25Tillich, ST I, p. 141.
26Tillich, ST I, p. 117.
27K. Ward, Religion and Revelation, p.231. For Tillich, although revelation usually grasps
the group through an individual, it is significant only in relation to the group. (See Tillich, ST
I, pp. 111,147) Ward might also want to refer to Tillich's proposal of" courage as the
individual's way of overcoming the various forms of anxieties. (Tillich, CTB, p. 152) But
Ward is wrong because for Tillich theology is also very much concerned with relating love,
power and justice as they appear in a particular context to the essential relationship between
the three concerns. (Tillich, LPJ, pp.107-110)
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But actually what Ward goes on to claim as the constituents of a revelatory process,
which we quote, are all present with some qualifications in Tillich's understanding.
All aspects - objective Divine action and personal liberation (the aspect of
empowerment), human experience of encounter and of union (the aspect of
experience), reflective and imaginative interpretation (the aspect of
propositional belief) - are involved in the revelatory process.28
Ward's criticism of Tilhch might be partly right if he has in mind Tillich's ontological
understanding of the ultimate and its implications for the divine-human encounter. But
we must point out that Tillich's use of the individual for analytical purposes, as in the
discussion that follows, should not be lead to the overlooking of the great importance
Tilhch accords to the community in connection with the reception element in
revelation. Tillich accounts for God from within a basic disposition of the individual:
"Man is immediately aware of something unconditional which is the prius of the
separation and interaction of subject and object, theoretically as well as
practically,"29 The immediate awareness suggests a transcendence of the subject-
object relation; there cannot be "the observed presence of one reality to another
reality". Intuition is excluded from the awareness of God because God does not
appear as a "Gestalt" or structure or vision (Thomas Aquinas) to be intuited but as an
element, a power and a demand. And knowledge is rejected by Tillich because its
separation of subject and object implies that the divine-human relation is "an isolated
theoretical act". The precise statement of the awareness of God points to the close
connection between revelation and salvation, which we shall now briefly consider.
The traditional understanding of revelation as having salvation as its content,
which content being potentially effective but only actual when the recepient
appropriates it, is challenged by Tillich. For him although revelation and salvation are
28K. Ward, Religion arid Revelation, pp.231-232. We have referred already to all that
revelation involves for Tillich: transformation (empowerment), participation in the divine
(experience), and doctrines relative to each revelatory situation (propositional belief).
Tillich, TC, p.23 (italics in original).
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distinct, they are present in the same act. "Revelation can be received only in the
presence of salvation, and salvation can occur only within a correlation of
revelation. "30 The overcoming of self-estrangement, which is the actual condition of
all humans, is recognized by all cultures, according to Tillich. But it is Christianity
alone, which through its understanding of self-estrangement as "both curse and grace
at the same time", has "a profound - the profoundest - feeling of self-estrangement
among the great religions".31 On the basis of this adequate analysis of the human
situation, Christianity also suggests the best way of dealing with self-estrangement,
namely, that of overcoming it in reconciliation, in contrast to self-negation, which is
advocated by the Indian religions.
Both his ontology and his theology demand a final victory for revelation such
that the symbol of ultimate revelation becomes identical with ultimate salvation, the
attainment of "complete transparency of everything for the divine to shine through".32
In suggesting this state, Tillich only states that the Christian message points to this
possibility and does not claim that Christianity is the way to it. Since ontology by
definition sees the ground of being, every being separated from it must also be
reunited with it.
Fulfilment is universal. A limited fulfilment of separated individuals would
not be fulfilment at all, not even for these individuals, for no person is
separated from other persons and from the whole of reality in such a way that
he could be saved apart from the salvation of everyone and everything.33
From the above account it is possible to suggest that Tillich's understanding of
revelation is formal, and has a universal basis, that is, it represents the views of
Christianity, the prophetic religions and the mystical religions regarding the mode of
30Tillich, ST I, p. 144.
31Paul Tillich, "Estrangement and Reconciliation in Modern Thought" in Gert Hummel (ed.),
Paul Tillich, Main Works 6: Theological Writings, Berlin/New York: De Gruyter -
Evangelisches Verlagswerk GmhH, 1992, p.258.
32Tillich, ST I, p. 147.
33Tillich, ST I, p. 147.
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receiving or experiencing truth. First, there is commonness in searching for ultimate
meaning and in its reception:
Revelation answers questions which have been asked and always will be
asked because they are "we ourselves." Being human means asking the
questions of one's own being and living under the impact of the answers
given to this question. And, conversely, being human means receiving
answers to the question of one's own being and asking questions under the
impact of the answers.34
The fact of this experience taking place in all cultures suggests that biblical religion is
one form among many similar forms. Second, the revelation-reception correlation,
which applies to all religions, affirms that one's preparation would determine her/his
response to revelation. Thus even the Christian way will be diverse (for example, the
case of Paul addressing Christianized Jews who were legalistic and Christianized
pagans who were libertinarian), and no one form can in principle be above the
other(s).35 We saw Tillich reject any idea of a "pure revelation" as received without
corruption by one religion and not by other religions, because no religion can escape
the revelatory situation. Third, we have seen that typology of religion and the mystery
and revelation elements in the concept of revelation validate each other.
Tillich's understanding of revelation witnesses to his pluralism. His approach
has helped to affirm the history of religion adequately. But it is a critical pluralism (or
dialectical pluralism, with affirmation and criticism, as we shall see later) in that which
divine immanence hi every revelation is acknowledged, the inadequacies and
distortions that arise due to the reception element are subjected to criticism. Thus this
affirmation of the universality and uniqueness of the revelations and criticism of the
reception of each revelation together constitute an important criterion of Tillich's
pluralism.
34Tillich, ST I, p.62.
35Tillich, CEWR, p.33.
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The revelatory situation, which we have just discussed, has pointed out that
God is active in the revelatory situation, manifesting Godself to humans. With regard
to knowledge of this revelation, God occupies the object side of the subject-object
relation. But in Tillich's understanding, this "object" reference to God should not be
done apart from seeing God as the very basis or ground of the subject-object structure
itself. God is being-itself and not one of the encountered beings. Hence we discuss
God as the ground of religion itself, not just of theistic religions alone.
2. The Ground of Religion36: God
Implied and briefly addressed in discussing Tillich's broad, inclusive understanding of
religion (Chapter I) and of "biblical religion" (section 1 above) was his understanding
of God. The nature of God, the holy as present and the holy as ought-to-be, was
directly addressed in the discussion of his religious typology. Now we must discuss his
understanding of God in terms of his ontological framework, which Tillich believes is
useful to express in universal terms the concrete understanding of God in Christianity.
Whether this universal frame is useful to affirm and appreciate the many concrete
conceptions of God or the holy will be discussed.
Tillich clearly states that the God-concept is common to both theology and the
history of religions, and that it is also fundamental hi each discipline. From the
theological side, he says: "the idea of God is the foundation and the center of every
theological thought".37 Speaking on behalf of the history of religions, he says: the
"idea of God" is "the basic element in the history of religion, simultaneously
determining it and being determined by it".38 To show that God is fundamental in
spite of the diversity and ambiguities in the conception of God, Tillich coined the
36"Religion" is used here not in the sense of the receiving of revelation but as representing the
revelation-religion dynamic.
37Tillich, ST II, p.5.
38Tillich, 571, p.218.
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phrase, "God above the God of theism". The "God of theism" which is limited by
human conceptions39 actually points to God as Being-itself, according to Tillich. But
how is one to be sure that it is to this Being-itself that every concrete conception
refers?
This is argued by Tillich by pointing out that the language employed by any
culture for the ultimate is symbolic language. The fact of the ultimate being universal
and transcending every particular on the one hand, and being always present in and
appealing to the individual or community through concrete concerns demanding
transformation on the other hand, makes it impossible for God to be described purely
in transcendent terms or purely in particular terms. A purely transcendent God would
fail to create any human response, and a purely particular God cannot be the ultimate.
Hence there is a need for a special language, which is provided by symbols. So God
"is the subject of all the symbolic statements in which I express my ultimate
concern."411 And as ultimate concern is universal - one being seriously concerned from
within a sacred or secular context - God is the basis of religion.
If God is understood as that which concerns man ultimately, early Buddhism
has a concept of God just as certainly as does Vedanta Hinduism. And if God
is understood as that which concerns man ultimately, moral or logical
concepts of God are seen to be valid in so far as they express an ultimate
concern.41
We have so far noted again and again Tillich's attempt to include various concepts of
the ultimate under the overall concept of ultimate concern. But now we must justify
how at least some of the various contents of ultimate concern are included in Tillich's
understanding of God. This is required for our purpose of determining Tillich's
pluralism, for a stronger case for pluralism can be made by showing the coherence of
39Tillich, UC, p.51. Cf. Maurice Wiles: Though God is absolute, assertions about the nature
of God cannot be absolute. Absolute assertions are idolatrous. (M. Wiles, Christian Theology
and Inter-religious Dialogue, London: SCM/Philadelphia: Trinity, 1992, p.35)
40Tillich, UP, p. 109.
41Tillich, ST I, p.220.
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the various conceptions of the ultimate. How far Tillich's understanding of God
provides such a coherence will now be discussed.
The fundamental distinction in Tillich's concept of God which is the key to the
many conceptions of God are the two-fold elements of concreteness and ultimacy in
the doctrine of God. This is common to the systematic-theological study of
Christianity and of the various religions. Most doctrines emphasize one or the other of
the elements, and so are only partially valid. The two elements are implied in Tillich's
definition of religion as ultimate concern: "whatever concerns a man ultimately
becomes god for him, and conversely, it means that a man can be concerned ultimately
only about that which is god for him".42 This definition shows the inseparability of the
two elements of concreteness and ultimacy. But under the conditions of human
existence, one of them can become predominant.
This relation oscillates between the concreteness of a give-and-take attitude,
in which the divine beings easily become objects and tools for human
purposes, and the absoluteness of a total surrender on the side of man....The
Catholic system of relativities represents the concrete element most fully,
while Protestant radicalism predominantly emphasizes the absolute
element.43
This differing emphases in the nature of the divine within the Christian tradition as
observed above is also true of the religions of humankind.44
This tension is found in the concrete descriptions of the gods in human and
superhuman terms and as confined to time and space on the one hand, and in the
ultimacy-emphasizing descriptions of the gods as immortals, as omnipresent and as
omniscient on the other hand.45 Tillich sees these two-fold elements even in magical
religion: the concrete element is expressed in the intended effect on humans or nature,
and the element of ultimacy is expressed in the claim of participation in the higher
power. From a philosophical approach, since the question of God is basically related
to the human question about being and meaning, it demands answers in both concrete
42Tillich, 571, p.211.




terms and in universal terms. When one is in threat in a concrete situation, s/he sees it
in the light of the universal threat to her/his being. And the answer that satisfies is one
which is relevant to the concrete situation but which at the same time expresses its
basis in the universal. This means that God's part in this existential experience of
humans must be understood in both concrete and universal terms.
The term "being" means the whole of human reality, the structure, the
meaning, and the aim of existence. All this is threatened; it can be lost or
saved. Man is ultimately concerned about his being and meaning. "To be or
not to be" in this sense is a matter of ultimate, unconditional, total, and
infinite concern. Man is infinitely concerned about the infinity to which he
belongs, from which he is separated, and for which he is longing.46
The concrete aspect of God as found in Christian theology and the religions
can be explained in terms of some significant factors.
We have referred to Tillich saying that anything can become a medium of
revelation in a revelatory situation. But for Tillich among the symbols for the ultimate
that so arise, the understanding of God based on something that is human (or as we
shall see later the human person as a whole) is more adequate. Tillich finds universal
principles in humans (but variously valued by the cultures) that can be used in respect
of God:
Man symbolizes that which is his ultimate concern in terms taken from his
own being. From the subjective side of the polarities he takes - or more
exactly, receives - the material with which he symbolizes the divine life. He
sees the divine life as personal, dynamic, and free. He cannot see it in any
other way, for God is man's ultimate concern, and therefore he stands in
analogy to that which man himself is.47
Perhaps the Christian insight that humans are made in the image of God lies behind
Tilhch's suggestion that the human in all its complexity is the key to an understanding
of God. This point is evident also in the second part of Tillich's system which, entitled
"Being and God", represents the fundamental principle that undergirds Tillich's
46Tillich, ST I, p. 14.
47Tillich, ST I, p.243.
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method of correlation: the question implied in being finds its answer in God.48 So if
God is the answer to the question of humans as a special kind of being, then an
adequate doctrine of God should satisfy a proper understanding of the human, and
conversely a proper understanding of the human cannot be developed independent of
an understanding of God.
The universal element in God distinguishes God from every being. Tillich
rejects the idea of God as the highest being, for it implies that God is a being among
other beings. This is simply "wrong" and is "bad theology".49 For Tillich, God or
being-itself is not a
reality, alongside or above other things: that would only be a thing of a
higher order which would again fall under the No. On the contrary, it is
precisely through things that that reality is thrust upon us which is at one and
the same time the No and the Yes to every thing. It is not a being, nor is it
the substance or totality of beings; it is - to use a mystical formula - that
which is above all things which at the same time is the absolute Nothing and
the absolute Something.50
This description of God suggests that God is fundamentally not available in a subject-
object relation as other objects are. Elsewhere Tillich points out religious reactions
against such objectification. Prophetic religion denies the possibility of seeing God, for
prophetism regards sight as most active in objectification. Mysticism seeks to resist
the objectifying tendency by insisting on an ecstatic union between the human and the
divine.51
This unique position that God has in Tillich's ontology saves God from being
exposed to any doubt about God's existence - speaking about "existence" in relation
to God being absurd. Although God is real, God is not encountered directly but only
through forms. The enquiring human being is already in a state of encounter with the
48Tillich, ST I, p. 163.
49Tillich, CTB, p. 184; also ibid., p. 178.
50Tillich, PTTB, pp.40-41.
51Tillich, ST I, p. 172.
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divine, for the divine is present in every reality, every form. In such a case, theology's
task is that of identifying one's or a society's encounter with the divine and
understanding the way that encounter is mediated through the various cultural acts.
The divine is already in the equation, and hence "is not a problem but a
presupposition. Its 'givenness' is more certain than that of anything else."52 Thus
humans and God, who form the two sides of the knowing (and experiential)
correlation, have an a priori status. This resists any attempt to raise the question of
the existence of either the human sell'55 or God. Nevertheless, the concept of ultimate
concern is important even in a secular culture because it is integral to human
existence. Pointing to the Enlightenment, Tillich suggests both the victory of cult and
myth in that instance and the importance of cult and myth for "the revelatory
experience on which every religion is based". As this experience needs self-expression
to be ongoing, mythical and ritual elements have a role. And he shows that in actual
fact they are present in even the most secularized forms of every religion or quasi-
religion.
The many different experiences of the holy between religions and even within a
religion are thus reduced to two main emphases. The one form understands ultimate
reality as transcending everything finite, and the other form understands it as the
creative ground of everything finite. The ultimate "is beyond what can be grasped by
senses or words or thought, and it is at the same time the creative ground, present in
everything."55 This distinction which Tillich makes while discussing religious art and
architecture, we might observe, corresponds to prophetic religion and sacramental
52Tillich, PE, p.43.
CO
Tillich suggests that the self is already in a state of self-relatedness, having a world and
belsonging to a world; "it is an original phenomenon which logically precedes all questions of
exitence".(Tillich, ST I, p. 169)
5^Tillich, CEWR, p.93. In the case of totalitarian movements, myths were created out of
ordinary concepts, events, and persons, and rituals were based on ordinary performances.
(ibid.)
55Tillich, PTMW 2, p.370.
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religion respectively. Tillich does not refer to his religious typology here but identifies
the former with Judaism, Christianity and Islam and the latter with Indian culture. We
might note that Tillich is consistent here in his identification of the prophetic religions.
But the sacramental-mystical synthesis he makes demands explanation. This synthesis
holds in so far as the particular nature of the holy that is predominant in both is
concerned. The holy as being is predominant in both, emphasizing the participation
element in the divine-human encounter. However, the mystical also transcends the
sacramental to criticize the idolatrous tendency in the sacramental. This distinction is
particularly important in appreciating the distinct character of Western and Indian
mysticisms. The mysticism of the West, following the Greek pattern, sees the mystical
as fullness of being without destroying the existing sacramental form. Indian
mysticism as mysticism seeks to transcend all forms - although in actual Indian life the
demand for concreteness results in a preserving of the gods and the sacramental
objects. In Indian mysticism, therefore, there is always a tension between a situation of
split consciousness with a conflict of the mystical and the sacramental and a situation
of a certain sacramental-mystical synthesis.
Tillich recognizes the difficulty in bringing together the separate conceptions
of God based predominantly on one of the elements, the transcendent or the creative
ground element. "The holy cannot encounter us in less than personal form." At the
same time the holy cannot be identified with a finite reality or a human or divine
person, thereby making God a reality beside others. Tillich finds the Christian
understanding fulfilling the first but failing in respect of the second. In the case of the
mystical religions of the East, the second is fulfilled as identification with the absolute
but not satisfying the first, which emphasizes 'distance' and a dynamic relationship
between the divine and the human.--'6 Tillich is opposed to any easy solution. So he
rejects the idea of a fusion of the Christian and Buddhist idea of God, although they
56Tillich, ERQR, pp.48-49.
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share certain common elements. Nor does he approve of a common denominator
which would lead to depriving the concrete symbols of their concreteness.57
The concept of God for Tillich must be universal. The two criteria of ultimacy
and concreteness, are in conflict in the various religious forms, which range
from primitive prayer to the most elaborate theological system. It is the key to
understanding the dynamics of the history of religion, and it is the basic
problem of every doctrine of God, from the earliest priestly wisdom to the
most refined discussions of the trinitarian dogma.58
The conflict is found in the hindu distinction between the ultimate Brahma power and
the concrete god Brahman.59
In more than one way Tillich follows Hegel in showing that theism is neither
sufficient to define religion nor a superior form of religion. For Tillich, the theistic idea
of Judaism, the belief in "one sovereign God", is not complete without reference to
the prophetic tradition (beginning with Amos) of Israel, where justice was introduced
as the universal principle which judged both Israel and the other nations. Exclusive
monotheism is not an assertion of one particular god against others, but affirmation of
God who is God of justice. This "implies that justice is a principle which transcends
every particular religion and makes the exclusiveness of any particular religion
conditional".60 According to Tillich, "this principle of conditional exclusiveness" can
"guide our further inquiry into the attitude of Christianity to the world religions".61
Gilkey would agree with Tillich that there is no common philosophical
standpoint beyond the religions. But he would argue against Tillich about the
possibility of universal meaning arrived at from a particular tradition.62 The latter
57Tilkch, CEWR, p.67.
58Tillich, ST I, p.21 1.
59Tillich, ST I, pp.213-4.
60Tillich, CEWR, pp.31-32.
61Tillich, CEWR, p.32.
62Langdon Gilkey, "Plurality and Its Theological Implications" in John Hick & Paul Knitter
(ed.), The Myth of Christian Uniqueness: Toward a Pluralistic Theology of Religions,
London: SCM, 1987), p.41. Tillich's position in regard to the former will be seen in his
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point of Gilkey suggests that in the realm of knowledge, no idea or framework can
have access to universal truth. But when he expresses the ontological basis of praxis,
he states that "the absolute [is] relatively present in the relative".63 (This ontological
statement is not different from Tillich's.) Gilkey points out the difficulty in affirming
the absolute through the particular, but acknowledges the universal's presence in the
particular in a relative way. From a Tillichian approach it might be suggested that the
way from the particular to the universal is possible by identifying the structural
character of the absolute, such as the holy as present and the holy as being. Tillich is
consistent in giving the universal its place in the epistemological and ontological
schemes, for both of them imply the common "universal (logos) structure of reality".
Tillich appreciates the concerns of those who deny any common ground as
well as those who affirm it. Those who deny any common ground see the need to
emphasize difference as the way to discover both the unity of religion as well as the
wider scope of religion. Thus Mark Kline Taylor states:
There is no "ground" to provide a norm for communication across cultural
boundaries that is independent of that communicative encounter. There is,
however, a shifting terrain for intercultural communication that is significantly
more than the relativist abyss some fear to be the consequence of denying
common ground.64
The idea of common ground in respect of religion has become problematic because of
the emphasis on cultural, linguistic and cultic elements. Colin Grant even says that the
idea of common essence makes the variations uninteresting.63 What is missed here is
concept of the Protestant principle, which as we shall see is a criticism against any particular
or overall concept in the name of the Absolute. There seems to be a jump from epistemology
to ontology, which demands explanation. This will be done in Chapter V. Tillich's latter
statement - that about reacliing universal meaning from the concept of one religion - is a
problem Tillich addresses in his 'Critical phenomenology, which will be discussed in the next
section.
63Langdon Gilkey, "Plurality and Its Theological Implications", p.47.
64Mark K. Taylor, "In Praise of Shaky Ground: The Liminal Christ and Cultural Pluralism",
Theology Today, Vol.XLIII, No. 1 (Apr 1986), p.40.
63Colin Grant, "The Threat an Prospect in Religious Pluralism", The Ecumenical Review, 41
(1989), p.51.
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the point Tillich makes repeatedly, namely that religion is its own ground. And in
addition, Grant's criticism cannot affect Tillich because the latter does not see the
common ground independent of the cultural forms. For Tillich, as we have seen,
religion is the substance and meaning of culture.
Through his definition of God as being-itself, Tillich even shows a common
ground between negative theology and affirmative theology. He points out the
problems with affirmative theology based on being alone and negative theology if
negative theology rejects being in God. When negative theology affirms nonbeing in
relation to God, it "means "not being anything special," being beyond every concrete
predicate. This nonbeing embraces everything; it means being everything; it is being-
itself."66 This is an affirmation of the transcendence of God, but there is a hesitation
to affirm that being-itself cannot be apart from being. Affirmative theology, on the
other hand, is right in its belief in God as being, God as living. But denying the
presence of nonbeing in God will mean admitting a negative principle apart from God
to account for the evil and sin in the world. Since this goes against the idea of God
being ultimate, affirmative theology has to posit a dialectical negativity in God
Godself.67
Thus God as ground of religion implies that there is common ground
between the concrete religions. In terms of the concept of ultimate concern, in
terms of the idea of the holy of his religious typology and in terms of his
ontological understanding of God Tillich has argued for the fact of God as the
common ground of religions. And we state again that this is basic to his pluralism,
for without the affirmation of such a ground - which affirmation is also an
affirmation of the universal structure of reality - the concrete is so particularized to
be meaningful for comparisons.
66Tillich, ST I, p. 188.
67Tillich, STl, pp.188-189.
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The transition from our discussion of "God" to "the Christ" is a transition
from addressing the ultimate reality as the question implied in and the answer to
human existence generally to focussing on how each religion through symbol, myth
and cult offers concrete answers to the various existential questions in the name of
the ultimate. The fundamental problem of religious pluralism which we identified as
the tension between the larger and narrower definitions of religion is now to be
discussed more concretely, with reference to Christianity. The tension is between
God as the ultimate ground of theology and the Christ as the central and
foundational symbol of the Christian faith. The nature of the relation between the
two concepts, between God and the Christ, is important, for it will show on the
one hand how valid a particular religion is (genuine, profanized or demonized), and
on the other hand whether there is a openness to other concrete religions (if the
relation is dialectical) and a superiority (if the foundational symbol dominates the
God symbol).
3. The Central Symbol of a Religion: Christ the Criterion
The concept of Christ-criterion plays an important role in Tillich's discussion of
Christianity's relation to other religions. It was originally formulated within his
theological system directed by an apologetic intent, that of presenting Christ as the
symbol of the overcoming of the gap between the essential being and existential being
of humans. And as apologetic means not simply an indifferent account of faith but an
interpretation of the biblical message in response to the particular culture's way of
asking (about) the meaning of life, Christology too is required to be interpreted anew
with every significant historical change. Such interpretation is necessary despite the
fact that Christology, as the foundation of his system, has a definite content.
Here, in terms of three Christological considerations we shall give further and
more definitive support to the claim that Tillich is a pluralist. The first of these is
172
'critical phenomenology', which is a method that identifies a subjective element in the
phenomenological investigation of religion in addition to the purely objective
approach of pure phenomenology. It will be seen that this phenomenological theory
throws light on the special ways in which Tillich uses "criterion" and "final revelation".
The two elements that form critical phenomenology will then be the basis for
analyzing two aspects of the Christ, namely the concrete element, which expresses
Christ as the foundation of Christianity, and the universal element which expresses the
Christ as the centre of history.
Critical Phenomenology
The way in which 'criterion' is used in respect of Christ is perhaps best
expressed in connection with Tillich's statement of his 'critical phenomenological'
theory, which he spells out as an introduction to his discussion of "Revelation", the
first symbol or theological answer, in his five-part (or five-symbol) Systematic
Theology. "Critical phenomenology" is Tillich's tool for determining the "basic
concepts" of his system.68 As such it is proposed as a method developed from pure
phenomenology69 and presented as the approach that brings together "an existential-
critical element" and "an intuitive-descriptive element". The former element serves as
the criterion for the selection of the example; arbitrary choice of an example is
inadmissible, for that would mean commiting the mistake of pure phenomenology,
which is the approach of taking any typical example and claiming to find the universal
meaning through it. The existential choice, in contrast to arbitrary choice, involves a
decision in favour of a "revelation which has been received and which is considered
final". The consequence of this decision, namely that it will become critical of all other
68Tillich, ST I, pp. 106-108.
69Pure phenomenology believes that universal meaning can be attained through phenomena.
Tillich objects to this in every realm including the religious realm, but suggests its possibility
in the realm of logical meanings. (Tillich, ST I, pp. 106-107)
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revelations, is also constitutive of the existential-critical element. Through the
existential-critical element Tillich is assuming the importance of the practising aspect
of one's religion as well as the almost inevitable critical attitude to religious
expressions outwith it. Also through this element is affirmed the fact that the
experiential aspect of religion determines the choice of the example.
The intuitive-descriptive element is the "technique" which brings out what is
universally valid from the chosen example. This second moment of the
phenomenological task, as Tillich points out, works out the universal meaning of an
example (final revelation), which is the meaning present in all examples (revelation).
Therefore the Christian "final revelation" does not refer to a bare historical fact as the
content of revelation, for that would mean that revelation in other religions is either
impossible or only anticipatory or partial. Rather it affirms an understanding of
revelation that is the basis of every revelation.
The meaning of revelation is derived from the "classical" example, but the
idea derived in this way is valid of every revelation, however imperfect and
distorted the revelatory event actually may be. Each example of revelation is
judged in terms of this phenomenological concept, and this concept can be
employed as a criterion because it expresses the essential nature of every
revelation.7^
The "imperfect" character of the revelatory event, as we have seen earlier, is due to
the universal condition of humans in their existential (estranged) state.
The claim that final revelation refers to that meaning which is present, in all
revelations through a critical phenomenological theory might still suggest arrogance
and the presupposition that the validity of other religions should mean that they
possess the meaning of final revelation, despite Tillich's demand that an investigation
of other religions is necessary to show that this is the case. More pointedly, the
criticism directed against Tillich is that the concept of final revelation is not open to
70Tillich, ST I, p. 108.
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challenge from the side of the different religions based on their concepts. Two points
should be made to make a Tillichian response to this charge. First, on the basis of
Tillich's view that the universal is present in the particular, as discussed earlier, it can
be argued that any risk of faith in affirming 'final revelation' in a particular tradition is
justified because the universal is immanent in the other traditions too. It is only a
matter of identifying it in other traditions with less or more difficulty. Second, though
Tillich does not give examples from other religions to justify his claim at this point, we
might suggest that his typology of religion, which is often implicit in his theological
constructions, does provide some basis for the universality of final revelation. All the
three types - the sacramental, mystical and ethical - are based on the concept of divine
self-manifestation. In the sacramental the manifestation of the divine is purely
concrete, restricted in terms of space, time and group. In the mystical the
manifestation is regarded as attaining the universal itself in terms of identity with it,
denying or overcoming every concrete manifestation. In the ethical the concrete
manifestations are constantly criticized in the name of the universal, and more
adequate concrete manifestations are affirmed in the name of the universal. But
because ethical rehgion is more 'worldly', human and social in emphasis it tends to
picture the ultimate in terms of justice, order, and other values. All the three types
being inadequate in themselves, we have seen Tillich developing a final type in his
typology of rehgion, namely, 'Rehgion of the Concrete Spirit'. This type according to
him includes ah that is present in the other types but transcends them. In respect of
our present concern with 'final revelation', sacramental rehgion's varied affirmations of
the divine presence in special objects and in ah encountered reahty is basic. And
mystical rehgion's focus on the "absolutely universal" and ethical rehgion's demand for
reahzations that are "absolutely concrete" are in a dialectic. We can see the basic
element and the dialectic present in the 'final revelation', which he describes as
"absolutely universal" and "absolutely concrete".
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It is the failure to appreciate the two moments, existential-critical and intuitive-
descriptive, of the phenomenological task that has led to unwarranted criticisms of
Tillich. D.A.T. Thomas goes to the extent of saying that Tillich falls on the side of
Barth and Kraemer - despite Tillich's criticism of them - in claiming the relation of
Christ to the religions as one of judgment. According to him the two parties say the
same thing, Tillich employing the "phenomenological method" and the Neo-orthodox
champions the "theological method".71 Thomas, here, fails to take account of the
special features of Tillich's critical phenomenology. Also contributory to his negative
evaluation of Tillich on this point is his proposal that there is a 'formal judgment' and
'normative judgment' of the religions in Tillich. The former is a natural one which is
one religion judging another - and hence Chrisitianity judging other religions -
following the same tendency of "natural self-affirmation" as found in the realm of
knowledge.72 The latter, namely, "normative judgment" has a serious implication
because it leads Thomas to see 'final revelation' together with two other "interlocking
criteria" (Protestant Principle and the New Being) as imposing on other religions:
These three criteria operate irrespective of group, whether religious or
secular. They operate virtually in total independence of the groups upon
which the criteria are brought to bear. They are outside and exercise
judgment both in the sense that they are critical, i.e. evaluate critically the
group upon which the criteria are brought to bear, and in the sense of
exercising power against the group, power to change as a result of the
exercise of critical evaluation. They are a power from without which works
within the depths of the groups.72
71D.A.T. Thomas, Paul Tillich and the World Religions, p. 166. Had Thomas appreciated
the existential-critical element of Tillich's phenomenology, he would not have remarked that in
Tillich there is a "Christ triumphalism" if not a "Christian triumphalism".(ihid., p.238)
72D.A.T. Thomas, Paul Tillich and the World Religions, p.246. Thomas sees this remark of
Tillich (Tillich, CEWR, p.28) as one which stands without any qualification in regard to the
relation between the religions. We must point out here that Tillich shows in the ensuing
discussion that in the case of Christianity's encounter with the religions, not everything held
by the other religion can be legitimately negated. Rather "a dialectical union of rejection and
acceptance in the relation between the two groups" is suggested (Tillich, CEWR, p.29) -
which we shall discuss later.
77D.A.T. Thomas, Paul Tillich and the World Religions, p.246-247.
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The terms, "in total independence of', "outside", "from without", which Thomas uses
for the three concepts is a gross misunderstanding of how Tillich sees the power
symbolized by them manifests itself. This power, principle, is not from outwith but is
in every being and in every religion. We have already shown that for Tillich
transcendence is inconceivable without immanence. If the divine is not already present
in them, the divine is not the ultimate in metaphysical terms and not the unconditional
in existential terms. Thomas sees these concepts in terms of transcendence alone. He
pictures the divine power coming from outwith and working "within the depths of the
groups". But the divine itself is the depth. The divine does not come from outside to
take abode in the heart of humans or a religious group from time to time, as Thomas
imagines. Rather it is the depth that constitutes every reality, and from which every
reality derives power to transform itself.
With regard to Tillich's theology of religions, then, critical phenomenology's
first element, the existential-critical, expresses a pluralist thrust without any ambiguity
by its affirmation of the fact and necessity of one's particular religion. There is no
suggestion of an a priori superiority of one particular religion's experience and truth
over another's. But it appears that through the second element, the intuitive-
descriptive, Tillich has made the case for the Christ example's superiority by showing
the final revelation's universal significance: as "an example in which absolute
concreteness and absolute universality are united."74 In other words, although in
theory Tillich's two functions of critical phenomenology are complementary and
suggest a scheme that does not allow superiority to one religion over others, in
practice the nature of the claim that is made in the second function suggests a
Christian superiority. Whether there is an inconsistency between method and the
content of Tillich's Christology becomes the crucial issue here.
74Tillich, ST I, p. 107.
We shall discuss this problem in two stages, using the two functions as the
basis of understanding Tillich's Christology, as they offer the possibility of capturing
the essence of Tillich's Christology as it concerns the Christian on the one hand, and
the possibility of interpreting as accurately as possible the implications of Christology
in respect of other religions. The existential-critical function is the methodological
principle behind our discussion of "The Christ, the Foundation of Christianity", and
the intuitive-descriptive behind "The Christ, the the Centre of History".
The Christ, the Foundation of Christianity
The existential-critical criterion of critical phenomenology refers to the concrete basis
of one's faith. The content of the Christian's ultimate concern is the Christ, who is
affirmed as the foundation of the Christian faith because as New Being he "conquers
existential estrangement and thereby makes faith possible". In this content of ultimate
concern two things are involved: the one is the experience of transformation, and the
other is the picture of the New Being which is the basis of this transformation.75 The
experiential aspect of overcoming estrangement, which can progressively lead one to
see one's reunion with ultimate reality and with all beings (including those who
express their faith in different ways), and the reflective aspect (doing theology), which
interprets the meaning of the picture of the New Being in universal terms, together
enter into the statements about the significance of the Christian faith in relation to
other religions. We argue that the inevitable mutuality of these two aspects make
some of Tillich statements appear un-pluralist. But given the background of the
Christ-event leading one to experience greater union and partnership with other
beings, the discussion below will suggest such statements should be taken in an
inclusive (not indicating inclusivism) sense.
75Tillich, ST II, p. 114.
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The New Being "is the restorative principle of the whole of this [Tillich's]
theological system"76 because the question-answer method of correlation finds a
concrete historical bridging of the question-answer correlation in Jesus as the
Christ. In the Christ essential being is not just potential, and the overcoming of
estrangement under the conditions of existence not just fragmentary. It is total,
complete actualization in history.77 All the other divine answers to the questions
implied in human existence demand the concrete manifestation in the Christ. "God"
and God's "Revelation" (including the final revelation) are answers to the questions
of "being" and "reason". The concreteness of these questions and answers are
expressed in terms of the Christ. Similarly, "Spirit" and "Kingdom of God" are the
answers to the questions of "life" and "history". And they need Christ as the central
manifestation of unambiguous life and the meaning of history. Thus the Christ is
both the concrete and universal symbol for Christian theology.
It is the attempt to speak at once in concrete and universal terms that the
ontological framework is adopted by Tillich. Through it, the New Being can be
expressed as a symbol for a particular tradition but also as expressing its value
beyond it. In fact he states that "[t]he coming of Christ is not the foundation of a
new religion but the transformation of the old state of things. Consequently, the
church is not a religious community but the anticipatory representation of a new
reality, the New Being as community."78 The New Being is universally present, for
the very quest for the New Being presupposes that it is already present.79 Tillich
sees two main types of quests for the New Being. The first is the quest in
polytheism and mysticism, both expecting the New Being in a non-historical way.
The New Being is either seen in divine incarnations, oracles, etc., or in the
76Tillich, ST II, p. 119.
77Tillich, ST 11,119.
78Tillich, ST 111,258.
79Tillich, ST II, p.80.
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transcending of the existential sphere altogether. In the second type, the New
Being is expected in history, in the transformation of history. "The transformation
occurs in and through a historical process which is unique, unrepeatable,
irreversible."80 And as we shall soon see, Tillich's idea of the New Being as the
"centre of history" is the most adequate manifestation of the New Being as
compared to the New Being actualized "in a slow progress, in definite qualitative
degrees ... or at its end when history is elevated to eternity".81
A religion that expects historical fulfilment will attach greater significance
to personal qualities and social realities. This was true of Judaism, and Tillich
shows that Christianity adopted a personal symbol as its central symbol. The
Christian witness is "that in one personal life essential manhood has appeared
under the conditions of existence without being conquered by them".82 Being
personal and historical means sharing in human finitude, and the Christ shares in
this. The Christ shares everything of the human predicament and is directed by
God, even in his explicit function as the New Being:
God's directing creativity in the case of man works through his freedom.
Man's destiny is determined by the divine creativity, but through man's self-
determination, that is, through his finite freedom. In this respect the "history
of salvation" and the "history of the Savior" are ultimately determined in the
same way as history is generally and as the history of every individual man.82
The human, historical character of the Christ is expressed in so clear terms so as to
guard it against any idea of the Christ "as a third reality between God and man",
the idea of the Christ as half-god and half-man.84 The language Tillich uses to
80Tillich, ST II, p.88
81Tillich, ST II, p.88.
82Tillich, ST II, p.94.
83Tillich, ST II, p. 130.
84Tillich, ST II, p.93.
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express the work of the Christ through the term 'represent' shows that the Christ
does not share the same ontological nature as God. The Christ
represents God to man. He does not represent man to God but shows what
God wants man to be. He represents to those who live under the conditions
of existence what man essentially is and therefore ought to be under these
conditions.86
Tillich's seeing the Christ as fully human is most explicit in Tillich's option of a
"low Christology", which according to him is truly the high Christology because
"God is near to the lowest as well as to the highest".86 A Supranaturalist
Christology is thus rejected because it presents Christ as God Godself coming into
the world in the (human) form that God has chosen but fails to show the universal
presence of the divine in the human. So a Christology of an absolutist theology of
religions such as Barth's breaks down in the face of a Christian premise.
A Christology that Liberal theology embraces, namely, one which does not
claim any identity of the Christ's being with God's being but sees Christ's
uniqueness in the examplary character of his life and actions is equally rejected by
Tillich, Because the Christ has to be understood in his "being"-character.
Jesus as the Christ is the bearer of the New Being in the totality of his being,
not in any special expressions of it. It is his being that makes him the Christ
because his being has the quality of the New Being beyond the split of
essential and existential being. From this it follows that neither his words,
deeds, or sufferings nor what is called his "inner life" make him the Christ.
They are all expressions of the New Being, which is the quality of his being,
and this, his being, precedes and transcends all its expressions.87
86Tillich, ST II, p.93 (italics added). In his use of "represent", Tillich anticipates, for instance,
the distinction Ogden makes later between Christ as "representative of" and as "constitutive
of' God's salvation, as we shall see in the last chapter under "Towards a Dialectical
Pluralism".
86Tillich, ST II, p. 147.
87Tillich, ST II, p. 121. The Christ cannot be the final revelation "if he is put into the sphere of
personal achievement" only. (Tillich, ST I, p. 137)
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A functional Christology of the sort that claims significance for Jesus simply in
terms of Jesus' extraordinary actions is inadequate because it either denies or hides
the source of the Christ's New Being. Each individual trait of Jesus is significant
only in so far as it is open for the receiving of the New Being.88 Tillich's preference
for what we might call a symbolic Christology, based on his idea that theology is
possible only through symbols, emerges here. Symbolic Christology, as we shall
see now, seeks to show the ontological concept of God expressed adequately
through the Christ-symbol as answer to the questions implied in human experience
in the particular personal, social, political and any criticial historical conditions. A
consequence of this acceptance of the Christ as answer by a community is that it is
suggested as an answer beyond the theological circle because the beyond is
included in the theological or Christological vision. This vision or affirmation is
that the New Being is latent everywhere. The way in which this is affirmed will
mean an affirmation or denial of pluralism.
Ontology is significant in respect of Christology because it provides the
basis for "a religious statement of existential-symbolic character". Ontology
represents the universal character in reality as a whole, in God, in humans and in
their world and experience. The focus of ontology, in religious terms, is
identification of the nature of life in its tensions and the possibility of overcoming
the tensions. This is implied in the concept of God, but is expressed concretely in
terms of the Christ, the picture that is constitutive of revelation for Christians. The
Christ is the picture of the power of overcoming tensions as actual in the finite
human, Jesus.
Jesus, like every man, is finite freedom, Without that, he would not be equal
with mankind and could not be the Christ. God alone is above freedom and
88Tillich, ST\, p. 151.
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destiny. In him alone the tensions of this and all other polarities are eternally
conquered; in Jesus they are actual.89
The Christ-symbol is the best symbol to represent the appearance of the New
Being because only a personal symbol, which has the potentialities of being
completely actual in it, can express the human situation and the possibility of
transforming it adequately. Only humans are developed selves interacting with the
world. Only humans have the power of self-transcendence which includes the
power of reason; hence they have the capability of finding universal structures to
understand and interpret their world and experience. In theologically significant
terms, it is only the human person who is constantly aware of the tensions in
her/him and seeks ways to deal with them. So only in that existence where the
estranged character of existence is evident can existence be conquered.90 Hence
the superior character of the personal symbol.
Also, because human beings participate in the social, political and cultural
spheres with much or less power of bringing changes in them, and are aware of and
address the problems in them, Tillich would see the personal symbol as more
comprehensive than any social, political, institutional or legal symbol. Similarly
recognizing that humans belong to the physical, biological and psychological
realms and interact with them at the same time, he points out that everything that
happens to humans has effects in the universe. Tillich does not raise the question
whether the cosmic elements, separately or together, provide more comprehensive
symbols than the personal, because he has already chosen that the personal symbol
is the best and is keen to include the cosmic elements in the personal so that he
could speak of universal salvation in Christ which includes humans and the
cosmos.91 The choice of the personal symbol cannot be said to be unreasonable,
89Tillich, ST II, p. 127.
90Tillich, ST II, p. 120.
91See Tillich, ST II, pp.120-121.
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given the aim of and method of theology, the aim being the understanding of
human estrangement from and reunion with the ground of being, and the method
involving the human as the starting-point.
We might point out that TiUich's claim for a personal symbol is one that
falls partly on the side of the second or interpretative function of Tillich's
phenomenology. Tillich clearly states that the claim of finality made for the Christ
should be taken seriously by the theologian simply because it is the Christian claim:
"final revelation .. means the decisive, fulfilling, unsurpassable revelation, that
which is the criterion of all the others. This is the Christian claim, and this is the
basis of a Christian theology."92 But this does not mean that an arbitrary claim
made by a religion should be taken seriously. In the case under consideration, there
is no arbitrariness because on the one hand, it states the reality of the community's
experience of the Christ, and on the other hand, the experience serves as the
criterion (phenomenology's first function) to criticize and validate experiences and
symbols within Christianity. Tillich states: "Historically and systematically,
everything else in Christianity is a corroboration of the simple assertion that Jesus
is the Christ. "93This is the case because Christ is the fundamental paradox:
The appearance of the New Being under the conditions of existence, yet
judging and conquering them, is the paradox of the Christian message. This is
the only paradox and the source of all paradoxical statements in
Christianity.94
The soteriological fact of overcoming estrangement and the consequent acts of
faith and love, which are the marks of being united with the divine source, is even
pointed out by Tillich as a way of verifying revelation:
They [the biblical words] constitute the ultimate touchstone for what can and
cannot become the Word of God for someone. Nothing is the Word of God if
92Tillich, ST I, p. 133.
93Tillich, ST II, p.92.
94Tillich, ST II, p.92.
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it contradicts the faith and love which are the work of the Spirit and which
constitute the New Being as it is manifest in Jesus as the Christ.
Our attempt to interpret Tillich on the basis of his critical phenomenology is
supported by Tillich's own attempt in his last volume of ST when he distinguishes
between the formal and material concepts of faith.96 The formal definition is the
same as that which he gives for religion as "ultimate concern"; this definition, as we
have seen, applies to all religions. The material definition of faith arises from within
a religion, Christianity in this case, and hence expresses faith in Christological
terms: "faith is the state of being grasped by the New Being as it is manifest in
Jesus as the Christ". Tillich recognizes that the material definition can and has led
to making the Christian definition as the fulfilling point, towards which all other
religions are striving. He finds this claim unwarranted, acknowledging the Spritual
Presence's presence in other domains:
Faith as the state of being opened by the Spiritual Presence to the
transcendent unity of unambiguous life is a description which is universally
valid despite its particular, Christian background.97
A consideration of Tillich's distinction between the latent and manifest
Spiritual Community should conclude this discussion on the Christ's foundational
character for Christianity. The Spiritual Community "is determined by the
appearance of Jesus as the Christ" but is "not identical with the Christian
churches".98 This "Spiritual Community contains an indefinite variety of
9-'Tillich, ST III, p. 133. Similar to Tillich, Gandhi, seeing Truth as both experiential and
transcendent, suggests a dialectic between the transcendent and the existentially salvific:
Now when we want to find out whether a thing is good or bad, I do not go to a
particular book but I look at the total effect of Hinduism. In Hinduism we have got
an admirable foot rule to measure every Shastra and every rule of conduct, and that
is Truth. Whatever falls from the 'truth' should be rejected, no matter where it comes
from. (M.K.Gandhi, What is Hinduism? Quoted in K.P. Palta, "Hinduism and
Marxism: Continuities", Clarence O. McMullen (ed.), Marxism and the Religions of
India: Spirit and Matter, Delhi: I.S.P.C.K., 1979, p. 11.)
96Tillich, ST III, pp. 138-9.
97Tillich, ST III, p. 139.
98Tilllich, ST III, p. 162.
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expressions of faith and does not exclude any of them. It is open in all directions
because it is based on the central manifestation of the Spiritual presence."99 After
this affirmation of the universal presence of the ultimate in human beings and in all
forms and reality as a whole, Tillich distinguishes between the latent Spiritual
Community, which has the Spiritual Presence's impact upon it but lacks the
ultimate principle of resistance to profanization and demonization, and the manifest
Spiritual Community, which has the principle of resistance and applies it self-
critically. There is certainly a claim of superiority in this particular interpretation of
the Christ, which is identical with the Protestant principle. Since the full
significance of this distinction can only be appreciated in the light of the Protestant
principle, our evaluation of the distinction will be kept on hold until the next
section.
Now we shall proceed to discuss the universal element in Tillich's Christology.
Christ, the Centre of History
Two main ways may be identified in Tillich's presentation of the concept Christ
as the centre of history. Centre is related to all historical realities on the historical
frame just as the ground of being is related to all beings on the ontological frame. This
is Tillich speaking about the self-transcending character of history. This is one use of
centre in which history is affirmed, and a historical interpretation of history is
suggested as possible. The other use is in connection with the traditional Christian
idea of final revelation. Tillich sees final revelation as the centre that divides
preparatory revelation from receiving revelation. This certainly has special significance
for Christian theology, according to Tillich. But the way Tillich interprets its
significance for those outside the Christian circle will be crucial to ascertaining his
pluralism.
"Tillich, ST III, p. 165.
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TiUich argues in different ways for the importance of the idea of history. As we
shall see, first, from the ontological standpoint, he needs to show that the historical
frame is a distinct frame but based on the universal structure of being (which is
marked by the subject-object structure, and which includes various polarities through
which being and meaning reveal themselves). Ontology must, at the same time, take
account of the historical process to determine the nature of history and to revise any
inadequacy in the conception of the universal structure of being. Second, as ontology
affirms the historical, the kind of interpretation of history that is significant - certainly
not the record of past events or an accounting based on social, economic and political
forces alone - to ontology is the meaning of history itself. It raises the question as to
which of the understandings of history is adequate, whether history as circular, or as
progress, or understood in Utopian terms, or understood in terms of a meaning-
directedness which is represented by 'centre of history'.
At one point Tillich comes close to stating this two-fold purpose with regard
to the concept of the centre of history: that the centre is "a point where its [history's]
meaning becomes visible and in the light of which an interpretation of history becomes
possible".100 The two are related in that ontology provides a theoretical frame for that
interpretation of history which expresses ultimate meaning. Here Tillich's attempt to
proclaim hope and meaning to humans in anxiety is clear. But does this intent lead him
to identify Christ with history itself and with meaning itself such that the attempts of
other religions to interpret their respective worlds and histories as meaningful are
excluded? We shall now see if this is a consequence of Tillich's elaborations of the
concept of centre.
It is not difficult to see Tillich's idea of "ground" or "depth" in relation to
being, reason, or existence, evident in the term "centre" in relation to history. As
100Tillich, PE, p.254.
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history is horizontal, it can only recognize a point on the same plane. Hence the term
"centre" is appropriate. History is also being, for Tillich, and so it should
conform to the general ontological pattern of the ground of being being present in
every being on the one hand, and the ground of being being the source of the constant
overcoming of the tension between being and nonbeing on the other hand. The first
point about presence is expressed by Tillich in terms of the relationship between the
"great kairos" to the relative kairoi, which is a matter of vision but requiring
observation and analysis of the historical situation where the Spirit is claimed to be
present.
The relation of the one kairos to the kairoi is the relation of the criterion to
that which stands under the criterion and the relation of the source of power
to that which is nourished by the source of power.101
Tillich's approach of seeing the manifestations of the Spirit from a central principle
and structure, and not as disparate happenings, which are then open to distortion and
error, is obvious (although the distortion can happen in the "great kairos" as well).102
He also recognizes the paradox in the affirmation of something particular as universal,
but points out that it is said from the perspective of the Christian circle or the
existential-critical criterion: "Kairos in its unique and universal sense is, for Christian
faith, the appearing of Jesus as the Christ."103 Elsewhere, in a free response given in a
seminar, Tillich points out both the revelatory character and the critical character of
the centre of history, again limiting his statement to his "Christian commitment",
concrete standpoint.
Can there be in the development of history a preferred moment, a moment of
unique character, in which the world situation manifests itself? Now it is my
Christian conviction that there can be, for I see in the image of the Christ in
the New Testament a revelatory and a critical power, which may have been
approached elsewhere, but which always remains the ultimate criterion. For
101Tillich, ST III, p.395.
102Tillich, ST III, p.396.
103Tillich, PE, p.46.
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this reason I have called Jesus as the Christ the center of history. I mean that
here, at one decisive point, the relationship between God and finite man was
not interrupted. I would say that we have something in these two elements
that has appeared for the first time in its full measure. Therefore Jesus was
considered to be more than the prophets. The prophetic spirit never revealed
itself this way. They saw; they expected; but they did not express in
themselves what we find in the biblical picture of the Christ.104
Tillich is free of any exclusivist tendency here in two ways: his stating that Christ is
the centre of history from the Christian viewpoint, and his presenting of the Christ
not simply as an event, but as standing for a content, namely, in him there is no
interruption between God and humans.
This last point suggests Tillich's attempt to relate the historical event of the
Christ to express the ontological phenomenon of the Christ's participation in God as
the answer to human estrangement. Thus the focus is not so much on the event but
what it points to. This point underlies Tillich's statement of the Christ as a qualitative
centre:
The event "Jesus as the Christ" is unique but not isolated; it is dependent on past
and future, as they are dependent on it. It is the qualitative centre in a process
which proceeds from an indefinite future which we call, symbolically, the
beginning and the end of history.105
From this special point of In the concept of centre, the Christ is claimed as the
fulfilment of both the historical and the non-historical expectations of the New Being.
The universalism that late Judaism attained presented Christianity the conceptual tools
for this interpretation: the Messiah being "elevated to cosmic significance", the law as
having "eternal validity", and the divine Wisdom inspired by God as a "principle of
creation and salvation".10^ In addition to this horizontal emphasis, Christianity also
104Tillich, UC, p. 139.
105Tillich, STlll, p. 156.
10°Tillich, ST II, p.89. We might observe that Tillich is focusing more on the universal
principles but less on the concrete functions of the Messiah and for whose's sake, on the
contents of the law, and on the question of what sort of salvation and to which nation. Would
the concrete historical facts go against the universalist attitude that Tillich suggests? Perhaps
189
took into it the vertical dimension through the Greek doctrine of the Logos. Paul's
Christ-mysticism and the doctrine of the Spirit contain the vertical element. Both
dimensions are included in the idea of the Christ as centre, and they are important
because on the one hand expectation and fulfilment are actual on the horizontal plane,
and on the other hand the content of fulfilment is nothing other than the fullness of the
Unconditional becoming visible.
This inclusive historical-nonhistorical constitution of the "centre of history"
provides an important basis for appreciating Tillich's Christology. It is obviously
opposed to a narrow Supranaturalist interpretation, which sees Christ as negating all
history except the Christ-event, or a relativist approach, which can compare different
expressions of meaning in history but which has no criterion to judge itself and to
interact with other religions.
The idea of Christ as the centre of history can also be seen as demanded by the
very nature of the theological enterprise. To be a theologian, for Tillich, requires
taking all the contents of the Christian faith as one's ultimate concern as well as
participating in the Christian community on the one hand, and taking account of the
way the universal logos is experienced and interpreted in the wider community's
concrete situation seriously on the other hand. This means that any theological
affirmation of the Christ has to be stated in universal terms. So Christ is not simply
Lord of the Church, he is rather the "centre of history".
But this demand for expression in universal terms is done by Tillich from his
concrete Christian standpoint, as we have seen. And Tillich expresses this
commitment to concreteness in respect of the Christological doctrine of final
revelation, even at the risk of undermining the significance of other revelations. We
Tillich sees the early Christian writers picking up just the sense about the wider reality which
the Jews attained in order to express the universality of the Christ.
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shall now examine Tillich's interpretation of this doctrine, not from the point of view
of its correspondence to other interpretations of it bnt from the concern to the light it
can throw on assessing his theology of religions.
Final revelation itself is not restricted to the Christ, for Tillich. Christ, as the
foundation for the Christian faith, is the final revelation for the Christian. For the
Hindu, mystical experience is the final revelation. In the case of a humanist, though
there is no final revelation, the claim of moral autonomy and the guiding influence of
the picture of the synoptic Jesus have some correspondence to the concept of final
revelation. In other words, what is concrete but regarded as ultimate or as having
ultimate significance is final revelation.107 Tillich's usual attempt to present a concept
as a formal concept is evident here too. Macquarrie fails to see this and makes an
outright criticism of Tillich simply on the basis of speaking in terms of "preparatory
revelation" and "final revelation"10^ However, both Tillich's attempt at developing
formal theological concepts lfom the important concepts of his Christian standpoint
and Macquarrie's pragmatic concern ("practical considerations" being the heading
under which he criticizes Tillich) of acknowledging the special value of a revelation
for the community concerned should be taken seriously. So the question, what exactly
is important in the concept of final revelation, arises.
For Tillich, final revelation refers to concrete revelation in history, or
"actual" revelation.
From the point of view of the theological circle, actual revelation is
necessarily final revelation, for the person who is grasped by a revelatory
107Tillich, ST I, p.132. Also: "For the followers of a world religon, the event of their
foundation is the centre of history. This is true not only of Christianity and Judaism but also of
Mohammedanism, Buddhism, Zoroastianism and Manichaeism" (Tillich, ST III, p. 392)
10^J. Macquarrie, "Christianity and Other Faiths", Union Seminary Quarterly Review, XX:1,
p.43.
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experience believes it to be the truth concerning the mystery of being and his
relation to it.109
What is actual and concrete can have significance for a particular group only. Thus
Tillich points out that final revelation in relation to the Christ is a "Christian claim",
thus consistently applying the existential-critical criterion (of Critical phenomenology)
to Christology. And he seeks to draw out the criteria for the claim of final revelation
in respect of the Christ, from the actual revelation itself. He suggests a "double test of
finality", namely "uninterrupted unity with the ground of his being and the continuous
sacrifice of himself as Jesus to himself as the Christ".110 Jesus maintains complete
union with God by his continuous experience and acknowledgement of participating in
God and by surrendering himself completely to God, which surrender actually is
possible only by participating in God. Thus Jesus's very being becomes revelatory in
that it points to God. The acknowledgement of his finiteness and his dependence on
God for his true being are revelatory for that is ultimately significant as salvific truth.
The revelation is at once salvation. This is one thread in the claim of "finality".
The second element in the claim of finality has to do with Jesus's sacrifice of
himself as a medium of revelation along with every finite picture of him including that
of his messianic significance in order that he might be transparent to the divine
mystery. Thus "[t]he decisive trait in his picture is the continuous self-surrender of
Jesus who is Jesus to Jesus who is the Christ."111 This element of self-surrender will
also appear as self-negation in our discussion of Tillich's concept of the Protestant
principle, which offers a broader scope for the consideration of this point.
Both the elements that have to do with Jesus's finality have so far been seen
from within the perspective of the existential-critical criterion. In this regard there is
109Tillich, ST I, p. 132.
110Tillich, STl, p. 137.
111Tillich, ST I, p. 134.
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no Christian superiority. This trend carries through in his elaboration of the
constitution of final revelation in terms of the objective ("miracle") event and the
subjective ("ecstatic") reception by the individual or community concerned.112 It is
when Tillich moves on to perform the intuitive-descriptive phenomenological task that
the universal claim causes concern. This task is within the remit of doing theology for
him, for without it the Christ-event would remain a matter of past history and have no
existential significance. So the following universal claims are part of the doctrine of
final revelation subject to the "double test of finality".
The final revelation, the revelation in Jesus as the Christ, is universally
valid, because it includes the criterion of every revelation and is the finis or
telos (intrinsic aim) of all of them. The final revelation is the criterion of every
revelation which precedes or follows. It is the criterion of every religion and
of every culture, not only of the culture and religon in and through which it
has appeared.11-1
As an existential statement, the above makes perfect sense, and can be said to be free
of absolutism, because similar claims are admissible in the case of other religions,
provided that they too affirm dialectically the concrete symbols of their respective
traditions. But Tillich does not allow this possibility.
He takes on a critical approach towards other religions by showing the
inadequacies of the central events on which they are based. Judaism has an element of
universality in its understanding of history through prophetic self-criticism, but the
particularism of its own history is not broken. Judaism can have no centre because it
only has "prophetic and apocalyptic expectations", which point to the end of history
rather than to any possibility of "inner-historical fulfilment". Islam has not broken the
law and its emphasis on educational maturity (thereby making revelation and its
reception inconsequential) on the one hand, and on the other hand cannot provide a
112Tillich, ST l, pp. 136-137.
113Tillich, ST I, p. 137.
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centre because the appearance of the prophet Muhammad "does not constitute an
event in which history receives a meaning which is university valid". Buddhism fails
from the very start because illumination can happen at any time, and there is no
historical movement that prepares for the reception of the Buddha so that that point
can have universal significance.114 And Tillich concludes that only the Christ-event
can claim to be the universal centre of history, but admits that this is done in daring of
faith and in a rational interpretation of this faith:
The appearance of Jesus as the Christ is the historical event in which history
becomes aware of itself and its meaning. There is - even for an empirical and
relativistic approach - no other event of which this could be asserted. But the
actual assertion is and remains a matter of daring faith.115
The two functions of critical phenomenology have been applied in this claim of Christ
as the centre of history. In performing the second task of showing the universal
significance of the Christ, other claims for a universal centre of history have been
criticized in daring faith. Because the claim is one of daring faith, Tillich should be
open to correction in principle. For Tillich, as we shall see in the next chapter,
dialogue involves serious criticisms of the other's position and reworking of one's own
conceptions on the basis of the criticisms of the other.
We shall now consider briefly Tillich's treatment of the history of revelation
and the place of the final revelation in it. Tillich himself is not sure whether he should
call his understanding of the history of revelation with the Christ as its centre "history
of revelation". So he puts it within quotation marks in the first few instances of using
it, given the facts that it has no connection with the history of religion or with all the
individual revelatory instances. This history of revelation affirms all revelations but
subjects them to a revelatory pattern that consists of three elements: preparatory
revelation, final revelation and receiving revelation. This is not a history in the
114Tillich, ST III, pp.392-393.
115Tillich, ST HI, p.393.
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historical sense of actual events, but in the existential sense of experience within a
revelatory situation. But both religious and cultural history are involved in the
outworking of this existential revelatory pattern.116
The history of revelation is history interpreted in the light of the final
revelation. The event of final revelation establishes itself as the center, aim,
and origin of the revelatory events which occur in the period of preparation
and in the period of reception.117
The preparatory period is described by Tillich largely in terms of his religious
typology. It is characterized by the sacramental object as the medium of revelation and
mysticism and prophetism (rational criticism included here) as critical attempts to
distinguish the revelatory source from the sacramental object. The role of prophetism
is decisive in the history of salvation because it tries to save distorted sacramental
objects without devaluing them. They are purified. Tillich finds the Old Testament
providing the basic form of preparatory revelation, namely, reception, rejection and
transformation. And in concrete, historical terms, it is only the history of Israel, with
its idea of the group as bearer of revelation, can immediately precede the Christ as
the bearer of revelation in a personal life - in which alone a complete self-sacrifice is
possible. With the emergence of final revelation, which in principle was present in
preparatory revelation as its aim, the Church becomes the bearer of final revelation.
The Church's task of continuously receiving this final revelation and interpreting it
suggests an unsurpassability of the final revelation, although this can be claimed only
in a "risk of faith".118
Tillich's use of the concept of centre together with his religious typology in his
development of the concept of final revelation does enable him to preserve one of the
traditional Christological doctrines and use it to affirm the meaning of history.
116Tillich, ST I, pp. 137-138.
117Tillich, ST I, p. 138.
118Tillich, ST I, pp. 139-144.
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Although these two-fold apologetic intentions should be appreciated, his use of the
"centre" concept and religious typology in his interpretation of the final revelation and
the history of salvation is a construction that lacks objectivity in the sense seeing each
religion in its own right and in terms of its own history and self-understanding.
Tillich's idea of objectivity is different, for he sees each revelatory situation as an
objective event, which bears all the elements of the structure of the history of
revelation. This seems to be his basic premise, and on its basis he grants validity to
revelation in every religion. The self-transcending character of history and the final
revelation are identified: "an event which is prepared by history and is received in
history, but [which] cannot be derived from history".119 One implication of this is that
revelatory power is granted to all revelations. But he sees the full critical power only
in the Christ as the final revelation. The critical power, or rather the self-critical
power, that Tillich claims for the final revelation, however, is not something that is
totally inherent that no external influence is needed. He in fact states that "the final
revelation needs the corrective of mysticism in order to transcend its own finite
symbols."120 On the basis of this critical power, which Tillich stresses in the final
revelation, we might say in Tillich's favour that he is approaching a formal concept of
revelation, although developed lfom the Christian. This might be inferred from a
statement he makes about the universality of revelation.
The revelatory side is not lost if a revelation comes to an end; but its
idolatrous side is destroyed. That which was revelatory in it is preserved as an
element in more embracing and more purified revelations, and everything
revelatory is potentially present in the final revelation, which cannot come to
an end because the bearer of it does not claim anything for himself.121
Thus it is in this light that his Christology raises questions about its full
pluralist witness. As a systematic theologian Tillich feels that he has to enter fully into
119Tillich, ST I, p.219.
120Tillich, ST I, p. 140.
121Tillich, ST I, p. 128.
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the Christian heritage and interpret, after clarification and correction if necessary, the
main dogmas, especially that of Jesus as the Christ, in line with his systematic
principles. While doing this he is fully aware that he is not writing a 'world theology'
and that he is within the Christian theological circle. So he accepts the Christian claim
regarding fulfilment of all religions in Christ as his own statement, and attempts to
express it in terms that will affirm religious elements in all religions, including
Christianity.
4, The Protestant Principle
Just as Tillich developed the Christ criterion from the historical Jesus event, he also
constructed an equally important theological concept, namely the Protestant principle,
from the historical fact of the Protestant revolt in the sixteenth century. As a historical
movement with its particular dogmatic emphases, Protestantism is narrow and it might
appear an unfriendly partner for an open interreligious dialogue. But Tillich suggests
that this
restriction is overcome due to the fact that the Protestant theologian does not
only look at positions other than his own in an evaluating and criticizing way,
but that he also has a principle higher than his own and the others, from
which he looks at both positions, his own as a Protestant theologian and that
of all other religions.122
Thus the Protestant principle has a larger sense, and it is this sense that is crucial for
him when he uses it in relation to the religions. We shall see that Tillich develops the
Protestant principle in terms of his overall theological definitions and theological
method, although one of the two main functions it has is a critical function. As he
points out, the Protestant principle is the "permanent principle, active in all periods"; it
is the principle "implied in the Spirit's fight against the ambiguities of religion".12-1 The
122Tillich, ERQR, p.59.
123Tillich, ST III, p. 197.
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following meaning that Tillich gives to the Protestant principle while discussing the
importance of theological criticism from within the religions might be taken as
definitive: Protestant principle is the power (principium) or beginning (arche) of
"protest of religion against religion within religion in the name of God, something
which happens in all religions".124
This definition of the Protestant principle refers us back to the distinction we
saw between Tillich's larger and narrower concepts of religion. The special light that
the Protestant principle throws on the relation between the two concepts will be
discussed first in this section. Second, the Protestant principle as fulfilling an
important function in relation to religious symbols will concern us, so as to lead to the
third task. This task is that of showing how the symbol of the Christ fulfils the
function of the Protestant principle. The above three senses of the Protestant principle
will be seen to be related and complementary. The significance and "superiority" that
Tillich claims for the Protestant principle in interreligious discussions will finally be
discussed in the light of the above findings.
The larger concept is only present in terms of specific narrower concepts. This
is also expressed differently by Tillich as the ultimate concern being present in various
concrete concerns. It is not difficult for us to suggest that the Protestant principle
derives from Tillich's definition of the ultimate concern itself, "a concern which
qualifies all other concerns as preliminary".125 And since only being-itself is the only
ultimate concern that does not become a preliminary concern, the Protestant principle
has its basis in being-itself and functions in the name of being-itself. In Tillich's
ontology, being-itself possesses the quality of appearing in every being as the power
of being. This means that being-itself does not distinguish between the sacred and
124Tillich, ERQR, p. 15.
125Tillich, CEWR, p.4.
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secular contexts, but is present in both. The same is true in the case of the Protestant
principle, and Tillich points out at the end of his German period the fact of the
Protestant principle being more significantly at work outwith the churches:
Perhaps more men of today have experienced the boundary-situation outside
than inside the churches. The Protestant principle may be proclaimed by
movements that are neither ecclesistical nor secular but belong to both
spheres, by groups and individuals who, with or without Christian and
Protestant symbols, express the true human situation in face of the ultimate
and unconditional. If they do it better and with more authority than the
official churches, then they and not the churches represent Protestantism for
the man of today.126
In a formal way Tillich accepts the critical functions in religion and culture as a
function of the Protestant principle in so far as no religious experience or cultural
form is given ultimacy. The Protestant principle is seen to be at work in both religion
and culture to affirm "the majesty of the divine or holy itself overagainst any particular
form in which it appears".122 This principle is so crucial for Tillich's understanding of
the human in relation to God, that he states bluntly "that God alone counts in the
relationship of God and man".121* The Protestant principle in fact is so designated
because it "emphasizes the infinite distance between God and man" and demands the
highest courage which accepts the fact that it is the sinful human being who is "the
object of God's unconditional acceptance".129 The distance is however not to be taken
in any absolute sense because "separation" is always in tension with "participation". It
is this conception of the divine-human relationship that makes Tillich appreciate the
significance of Protestantism in the religion-and-culture encounter, and later in the
religion-and-religion encounter.
The relation of Protestantism to the secular realm is the most positive, due to
the Protestant principle that the sacred sphere is not nearer to the Ultimate






grace than the other; both are infinitely distant from and infinitely near to the
Divine.130
Thus the Protestant principle carries through the function of the larger concept of
religion. We shall now consider briefly the way Tillich sees the Protestant principle's
function in the history of religion.
Although the special articulation of the Protestant principle for contemporary
Christianity has been offered more adequately in the Reformation, the basic idea that
constitutes it is claimed by Tillich to be present in all concrete religions - in the
sacramental types and in the mystical and prophetic types. Speaking from within the
Judaeo-Christian tradition, Tillich points out that the Protestant principle had
expressed itself in the prophetic protest in Israel and in the Apostolic witness to Jesus
as the Christ.131 In an earlier lecture series Tillich characterizes faith itself as including
the element of protest ("Faith embraces itself and the doubt about itself.") and points
out that the Protestant element precedes the Reformation, atleast in the case of Old
Testament religion: "It [Faith] is Protestant by nature, whether it appears in Protestant
or in biblical religion."132 So, it is for its theoretical form that the Protestant principle
owes it to a rational or a doctrinal religion or "doctrinal school" in the first
instance;133 the practice of it is universal.
For the Protestant principle to exercise its critical power in a concrete
religion, Tillich must presuppose the presence of the Protestant principle bearing the
character of the holy as present in sacramental religion or in the higher religions. As an
absolute principle that questions every form, the absolute must be present in the
concrete so as to affirm two things: first, that it is not alien to any form, for every






gives the Protestant principle the power to question every relative claiming ultimacy.
"Protestantism denies the security of sacramental systems with inviolable forms,
sacred laws, eternal structures. It questions every claim of absoluteness; it remains
dynamic even if it tries to become conservative."134 The Protestant principle's task is
bound up with judging every religious expression in terms of the "criterion of
ultimacy". The history of religion is therefore judged, "not in terms of rejection but in
terms of a yes and no".135
The criterion contains a Yes - it does not reject any truth of faith in whatever
form it may appear in the history of faith - and it contains a No - it does not
accept any truth of faith as ultimate except the one that no man possesses
it. 136
This would mean that holy objects can be mediums only in a "mediate sense"; they
become idols the moment they are considered "inherently holy".137 Thus the
Protestant principle in relation to the religions proper and the quasi-religions is
criticism of demonization. It is also "the criticism of the magical element in higher
religions".138 It is the critical principle that challenges religious authorities such as
"infallible" decisions of a council, bishop or book.139 It is the task of making sure that
the content of faith is the really ultimate.140 A concrete expression of the Protestant
principle's criticism of a certain religious symbol is the emergence of one or more
movements of criticism.141 So at no point should a symbol or an articulation of it be
given finality: "creedal expressions of the ultimate concern of the community must
include their own criticism".142 Tillich would say this for all religions, including for








141See Tillich, ERQR, p.67.
142Tillich, DF, p.29.
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discussion of the cross symbol might be appreciated better after seeing the significance
that the Protestant principle receives in the light of Tillich's theory of religious
symbols.
Religious symbols within a tradition constitute a language to express the
ultimate concern or the content of the ultimate concern of the particular community.
"Nothing less than symbols and myths can express our ultimate concern."143 It is
important to identify the basic character of the language of religious symbols from the
"different languages" corresponding to "different approaches" to discussing the
different "levels of reality of great difference".144 Tillich states that the suggestion of
religious symbols itself is a protest against the predominance of one form of language,
namely that of the mathematical sciences.145 The use of symbols is a recognition of
the fact that every aspect of reality cannot be represented literally. With regard to the
religious sphere in particular, every symbol has a two-fold function: it opens up the
levels of reality on the one hand, and for the human person to grasp those levels it
opens up the "levels of our interior reality" on the other hand.146 A religious symbol is
concrete147 because it belongs to the cultural context of the particular community.
This concreteness is also the reason for it to possess the power to reveal its own levels
and to open up the levels of the believer's experience and thought. However, symbols
are "not the same as that which they symbolize", but "participate in its meaning and
power".148
The symbol is concrete but becomes the bearer of the holy. So "holy objects
are not holy in and of themselves. They are holy only by negating themselves in







pointing to the divine of which they are the mediums."149 The inevitable fact that the
concrete symbol has to represent the divine, which divine is its very source of being,
the concrete symbol has to negate itself in some way.
The criterion of the truth of faith therefore, is that it implies an element of
sell-negation. That symbol is most adequate which expresses not only the
ultimate but also its own lack of ultimacy.150
It is this truth that the Protestant principle expresses with respect to religious symbols.
It "demonstrate[s] that nothing finite can ever express the ultimate in a literal or even
in a concretely adequate way".151 A critical principle is necessary to suggest that a
symbol should be transparent to the ultimate. Tillich states that such a critical
approach to preserve the mediating character of the symbol is universal, and suggests
that we
understand that a critical principle was and is at work in man's religious
consciousness, namely, that which is really ultimate over against what claims
to be ultimate hut is only preliminary, transitory, finite.152
The understanding of the Protestant principle, which we have seen in
connection with Tillich's symbol theory and which is consistent with the Protestant
principle's function in conjunction with the larger concept of religion, is the key to
Tillich's special claim for the Christ-symbol in general and the cross-symbol in
particular. This claim involves proclaiming Christ as the criterion for the judgment of
Christianity and of all religions. He ends an article on religious language (which is
basically an elaboration of his theory of religious symbols), showing how the cross-
symbol performs the self-negation aspect of symbol thus:
If Christianity claims to have a truth superior to any other truth in its
symbolism, then it is the symbol of the cross in which this is expressed, the
cross of Christ. He who himself embodies the fullness of the divine's presence
sacrifices himself in order not to become an idol, another god beside God, a
149Tillich, ST I, p.216.
150Tillich, DC,97.
151 Tillich, ERQR, p. 15.
152Tillich, DF, p. 10 (italics added).
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god into whom the disciples wanted to make him. And therefore the decisive
story is the story in which he accepts the title "Christ" when Peter offers it to
him. He accepts it under the one condition that he has to go to Jerusalem to
suffer and to die, which means to deny the idolatrous tendency even with
respect to himself. This is at the same time the criterion of all other symbols,
and it is the criterion to which every Christian church should subject itself.153
The cross-symbol, for Tillich, "expresses not only the ultimate but also its own lack of
ultimacy".154 The significance of the cross is a self-negation of the finite Jesus: "Any
acceptance of Jesus as the Christ which is not the acceptance of Jesus the crucified is
a form of idolatry."155 The cross testifies that Jesus resisted the temptation of
accepting the Messiah symbol, which suggested a political revolutionary, in order to
become the Messiah, which stood for one who was in "the most intimate relation to
God" and who was "elected by God".156 Two things can be noted here. First, there is
Jesus's victory in not making the political end the ultimate end or the telos of life.
Second, he seems to suggest the transparency to and participation in God is more
important than the commitment to transforming one's political situation, or the world
at large (although, as we have seen, transformation is religiously significant for
prophetic religions and all other concrete religions).
The point that Tillich makes for the universal significance of the Christ in
terms of the Protestant principle is not different from what we saw in the idea of final
revelation (the Christ meeting the double test of finality). The following statement is
crucial because it is said in relation to the question of the truth-value of a symbol: "A
religious symbol possesses some truth if it adequately expresses the correlation of
revelation in which some person stands. A religious symbol is true if it adequately
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204
probably using the distinction between preliminary concern and ultimate concern to
show the greater truth-value that the latter has over the former. Final revelation is
actual revelation and hence it is the foundation of the religion concerned (Jesus the
Christ in the case of Christianity). The Christ is the ultimate concern of the one who
has accepted this revelation, and hence sees the Christ answer as having universal
significance. And what has universal significance is truth, overagainst a preliminary
concern which has limited significance and hence only possesses truth.
Finally, we must consider what light is thrown by the Protestant principle on
Tillich's theology of religions. The Protestant principle as expressed in the symbol of
the Christ is an affirmation of the symbol-character of the symbol, which means that it
cannot be absolutized. This point is expressed well by Cantwell Smith recently in
terms of the difference between idol and idolatry in his article, "Idolatry" in The Myth
of Christian Uniqueness. Idol, for him, is a symbol of religious truth and is essential
for religious life in a positive way. Contrarily, idolatry is the claim of the absolute
validity of the idol. Tillich sees "a permanent, conflict between the basic meaning and
the actuality of religion",158 the conflict being caused by the concrete symbols of
ultimacy claiming to be ultimate themselves. It is the Protestant principle that shows
the concrete and relative character of the religious symbol in order that a self-
limitation of the symbol is accepted. The religious symbol is both relative to the reality
or truth it expresses; and it is also relative to its cultural context. In this way,
Protestant principle expresses a pluralist stance.
But the judging function of the Protestant principle raises the question of the
basis of judgment. Tillich seems to suggest that the Protestant principle has no basis
apart lfom itself. It is its own criterion. The fact that it is to function discriminately
with yes and no is positive as compared to Barth's absolute no. But how does the
158Tillich, ERQR, p. 14 (italics added).
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Protestant principle offer its yes and no in concrete situations as the concrete itself
takes shape from the preceding situation? How do we from our concrete standpoints
know the Protestant principle's yes and no? The criterion that Tillich offers, as we
shall now see, is not an absolute theological or philosophical standpoint. On the
contrary, the method of starting from one's concrete standpoint and engaging in an
interpretative process of showing the significance of one's own religion in the light of
the symbols or concepts of other religions might be suggested as the critical-creative
approach implied in the Protestant principle.
This critical-creative approach surpasses the idea of mere sell-criticism that
Tillich sometimes highlights in the Protestant principle, as in instances when he uses
the symbol of the cross. More than self-criticism is demanded for a sustainable
pluralism. It has to affirm adequately the validity of the truth of one's own religion, the
validity of the truth proclaimed by other religions and the significance of another's
truth for one as is one's truth for the other. This is the concern of pluralism not
becoming a relativism. For Tillich, the Protestant principle helps in maintaining the
validity of the various living symbols in two ways. First, it preserves the symbols from
being reduced in significance in a process of secularization or profanization. Just as
idolatry or demonization which happens due to absolutization has to be resisted by the
Protestant principle, the same principle has to resist profanization which arises due to
indifference to the absolute.159 Hence the importance of the criticism from the
vertical. Second, the Protestant principle, according to Tillich, has a "decisive word"
to say to the encountering religions, although he makes it clear that the Protestant
principle "is not identical with any particular religion, not even Protestantism".1^ This
might be seen in the fact of his suggestion that the protest that the Protestant principle
159For Tillich, the "ambiguity of religion" threatens every genuine religious act as
profanization and demonization (Tillich, ST III, p. 105).
^6(1Tillich, ERQR, p.3.
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pronounces is concrete and contains both affirmations and negations. "There is no
'absolute' negation and there is no 'absolute' protest - absolute in the literary sense of
"absolved from any involvement."161 Tillich's ontology affirms the presence of the
universal in the particular. Hence the universal both affirms forms and breaks through
forms, as we saw under "Religion and Culture".
But is Tillich justified and is there not an element of absolutism when he begins
to look for "one" symbol which will express ultimacy adequately? "And whether one
of these symbols is adequate or not depends on how near it comes to ultimacy itself."
162 Is ultimacy dependent on the nature or complexity of a symbol, or is it dependent
more on the internal way in which a person within a theological circle is related to the
ultimate? Tillich does not address this directly. However, two relevant answers might
be identified. The first is Tillich's argument that the personal symbol is the best to
express the divine-human encounter, the revelatory situation and the meaning of
salvation as the reunion of estranged being with essential being. This betrays a special
preference for the revelation in Jesus the Christ. Tillich asks: "What, is the most
adequate expression of ultimacy?" And answers: "We ourselves claim, for instance,
that the Christian message, or the event on which Christianity is based, is the purest
form in which ultimacy has appeared."163 As we have noted before, Tillich does
qualify his answer by referring to his own theological circle ("We ourselves"). This
answer is not enough, for it does not give any indication of the ground from which
other religions can claim the possibility a symbol expressing ultimacy. It might be
asked of Tillich: Is ultimacy not intimated by one's participation in the religious
symbol of one's own theological circle, whatever the symbol? A generally accepted
pluralist answer would be an affirmation of ultimacy as a possibility for an individual
161Tillich, PE, p.206.
162Tillich, ERQR, p. 14.
163Tillich, UC, p.22.
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or group on the basis of their respective religious symbols. This general answer can
even lay hold of Tillich's idea of "fragmentary" realization of salvation in history, and
state: Since the salvific experience is fragmentary anyway, it is modest and realistic to
claim only that each person or group experiences different processes of
transformation relative to the symbol and the forces and concerns present in the
concrete situation. Tillich's answer would take account of this point regarding the
fragmentary realization. But in respect of Protestant principle's role in theological
criticism, which includes theological construction, a critical evaluation is essential.
This leads us to the second point, which has reference to Tillich's fundamental
definition of religion as ultimate concern. As we have seen, ultimate concerns are
different for different groups and for individuals in predominantly secular societies.
But some ultimate concerns can be proved by theological criticism to be only
preliminary. Religions can sanctify or sacramentalize such preliminary concerns. The
task of the Protestant principle is to identify the concerns which are not truly ultimate.
Christianity is not exempt from this criticism. For instance, Protestantism must be
aware that its "acceptance of secularism can lead to a slow elimination of the religious
dimension altogether".164 So the Protestant principle "is the principle of putting
oneself under the same judgment under which one puts others."166 In connection with
the Protestant principle Tillich claims that self-critical function is greater in the ethical
type of religion.. And gives the Old Testament example in which Yahweh, who
declares himself the God of justice, emphasizes that justice is universal and makes his
judgment first on Israel and only subsequently on Egypt, Babylon, Assyria or Tyre and
Sidon.166
164Tillich, CEWR, p.48.
166Tillich, ERQR, p.55. Also: Standing "under the cross" means "divine judgement over
man's religious life, and even over Christianity" (Tillich, DF, p.29).
166Tillich, ERQR, p.25.
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This feet that the Protestant principle has the believer's own religion as the
starting point and then interprets one's symbols in universal terms shows a close
similarity between the Protestant principle and Critical phenomenology. Perhaps they
differ in emphasis: the Protestant principle being primarily concerned with the
concrete and the critical; and Critical phenomenology being concerned with the
universal and the constructive. Essentially, both propose
to penetrate into the depth of one's own religion, in devotion, thought and
action. In the depth of every living religion there is a point at which the
religion itself loses its importance, and that to which it points breaks through
its particularity, elevating it to spiritual freedom and with it to a vision of the
spiritual presence in other expressions of the meaning of man's existence.167
The theological task is inadequate if the depth of religion, or the universal character of
religion which expresses the meaning of human existence, is not reached. But this
point of depth is not reached by logical deductions, nor by any leap of faith, nor by
accepting a dogma given by authority. This depth is reached by a concrete
engagement with one's situation in terms of the central symbol(s) of one's faith. It is
the Protestant principle that addresses both the concrete and the universal.
Theology still has no more important task than to express the Protestant
protest radically and penetratingly in its own doctrinal work and in its dealing
with every aspect of contemporary life. It must issue the protest
unconditionally because of the unconditional character of the divine, and it
must express it concretely because of the concrete character of every
historical situation.16**
This character of the Protestant principle gives it an almost permanent place in the
theological task because it is plays a vital role in the theological task: "For a long time
to come - and in some way always - the Protestant protest must have priority."169 For





efficacy but rather is experienced in one's and a community's being open to the
ultimate judgment of the Protestant principle on both the concrete situation and the
securities and distortions of the religio-sacramental sphere: "A particular religion will
be lasting to the degree in which it negates itself as a religion. Thus Christianity will be
a bearer of the religious answer as long as it breaks through its own particularity."170
The paradox of the Protestant principle is perhaps the greatest in the area of
comparative theology, for what is designated narrowly as 'Protestant' is in fact a
principle of universal value.
We conclude by pointing out that the Protestant principle as self-criticism is an
important pluralist norm, which we have seen fulfilled by Tillich, but arguing that
although other religions may not have their central symbols suggesting self-criticism
as it is in the way Tillich interprets the Christ-symbol, it is wrong on Tillich's part to
disregard possible examples, statements and arguments in the literature and religious
self-understanding of the different religions about self-criticism of one's standpoint in
the name of the ultimate. Thus, however inadequate, the point in the Indian story of
the blind men's varying impressions of the elephant is the criticism that must be
directed against each concrete perception. Also self-criticisms have been made in
different periods of a religion's history based on the demands of the historical
situation. However, a Tillichian argument might be made for the special character of
the Christ-symbol on the basis of a unique or "superior" character of a dialectical
approach. On the one hand the Christ reveals God; on the other hand the Christ
points back to the mystery. On the one hand we participate in the Christ as the
answer; on the other hand we are judged by the Christ. In this sense, Christology in
terms of the Protestant principle expresses the basic character of theology, that is, a
dialectical relationship between theological construction and theological criticism,
170Tillich, CEWR, pp.96-97.
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where theological construction is done on the basis of the elements present in the
religious and cultural spheres, and theological criticism is offered in the name of the
ultimate.
We shall now proceed to the next part and chapter to appreciate the dialectical
approach that characterizes Tillich's theological method in more systematic terms.
This will help in seeing the scope of Tillich's method for a pluralistic theology,




THEOLOGICAL METHOD AND RELIGIOUS PLURALISM
Part A dealt with Tillich's broad theological definition of religion, and
identified and discussed common features of the concrete religions which were found
to be differently expressed in those religions. It emerged that the larger definition and
the concrete religious expressions threw light on each other, and hence theology
needed to attend to both sides. A common basis in terms of ultimate concern and the
nature of the holy were identified in Chapters I and II respectively, and the forms of
the expression ofultimate concern and the holy in the same religion and in the various
religions were shown as an open, objective approach to the religions, with no special
standing for Christianity apriori.
In Part B the question of Tillich's theology of religions was approached more
directly by examining his criticisms of absolutism and relativism and by suggesting his
position as transcending absolutist universalism and relativist universalism. To argue
that this position is a form of pluralism, the basic criteria which Tillich used to
understand the nature of religious experience particularly with reference to
Christianity, namely, revelation, the idea of God, the Christ and the Protestant
principle, were discussed. The fact of Tillich's attempt to present these as formal
criteria rather than as special for a supposedly absolute religion was observed. Hence
his pluralism was affirmed.
Now in Part C, we discuss Tillich's method of correlation to show the
pluralist character of affirming other religions and worldviews and the inclusivist
character of critically using other methods of analysis and drawing from other
religions. The basic approach of dialectically working from one's own concrete





Method in connection with a discipline concerns the process by which an
understanding of a particular reality is attained. As the particular reality in question,
including reality as a whole as the object of enquiry, is usually informed by previous
approaches to it and assessments of its nature and value, one is immediately faced
with the fact of a plurality of methods - each method grasping the particular reality
differently or each method throwing light on a special facet of the particular reality.
In regard to the religious reality with which this study is concerned, and given the
fact that for Tillich religion is universal and yet appreciated concretely, the method
that is adequate will be one which is critical. Here critical means that the method
adopted is not proposed as a unique method which is new and independent of all
earlier approaches and which grasps the reality concerned fully or most adequately.
Resisting such attempts at superiority, the critical method determines the limits of the
various methods by correlating the available methods with the special facet of the
reality it illuminates. In this way, the critical method uses most of the methods, but
after removing any claims of exclusiveness. To what extent Tillich's theological
method validates a plurality of methods by showing their mutual significance will
now be examined.
As we shall see, Tillich attaches great importance to method in theology, and
demands an open method. Paul Avis refers to Tillich's warning against imperialistic
methods which have "an innate tendency to 'muscle in' on areas to which they are
unsuited", and suggests that "[tjhelogical method must ... avoid becoming an end in
itself; it must retain the capacity to be self-critical and self-correcting, remaining open
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to new knowledge and fresh insights, open-ended, flexible, versatile".1 Method must
be developed from reality, or rather it "is an element of the reality itself'.2
Reality itself makes demands, and method must follow; reality offers itself in
different ways, and our cognitive intellect must receive it in different ways. An
exclusive method applied to everything closes many ways of approach and
impoverishes our vision of reality.3
In respect of theology, then, Tillich proposed the "method of correlation" as
an attempt to explain "the contents of the Christian faith through existential questions
and theological answers in mutual interdependence"4 His argument for its validity is
the theological fact of the divine-human relation: "The divine-human relation is a
correlation."5 That is, humans ask the question of God when they try to understand
themselves, for their existence drives them towards God from whom they are
separated. And they answer the question about themselves in terms of the answers
from God, who alone is their essential basis. So basically:
"The method of correlation requires that every part of my system should
include one section in which the question is developed by an analysis of human
existence generally, and one section in which the theological answer is given on
the basis of the sources, the medium, and the norm of systematic theology"6
Clayton has shown that a questioning-answering correlation and a form-
content correlation are present in Tillich's discussions in ST and that they have their
basis in his religion-culture correlation.7 He finds each sub-correlation wanting in
itself and even together.
Although it might satisfy the reciprocity condition, 'questioning and answering'
is by itself too shapeless to be an adequate model of correlationship; and,
although it might satisfy the autonomy condition, the dialectic of 'form and
content' as developed in Tillich's later writings on correlation cannot be
1 Paul Avis, The Methods ofModem Theology: The Dream ofReason, Basingstoke: Marshall
Pickering, 1986, p.207.
2Tillich, ST I, p . 60
3Tillich, PTTB, p. 128.
4Tillich, ST I, p.60.
5Tillich, ST I, p.61; see also ibid., pp.62-3.
6Tillich, ST I, p.66.
7J. P. Clayton, The Concept ofCorrelation, pp.155-249 (esp. pp.155-160).
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regarded on its own as sufficiently dialectical to satisfy the reciprocity
condition 8
Clayton is right in what he is positive about in each of the two models, but wrong
about the respective condition each model fails to fulfil. Shapelessness in a
conversation model such as question-answer is more a strength than a weakness. As
we shall soon see, there are no fixed questions and fixed answers. Although for
Tillich the Christian message is eternal, it is not received in a fixed rational
proposition. The answer is given in relation to the contemporary situation and the
interpretation(s) of existence present in it. Clayton's demand of the form-content
correlation to satisfy the reciprocity condition goes against the very basis of the form-
content correlation. This correlation, which is almost identical with the religion-
culture correlation, as Clayton himself recognizes9, suggests a transcendence-
immanence relation between religious substance and cultural form, as we saw in
Chapter I; it is not a reciprocal relation. The transcendence-immanence relation
represents a vertical relationship, which is an internal participation of substance and
form in each other. As substance and form are not apart from each other or alongside
each other (as in the case of the relationship between two human beings) there is in
principle no possibility of reciprocity. Also Clayton's synonymous use of reciprocity
and dialecticality in this connection needs to be corrected. In regard to substance and
form, substance relates to form dialectically with a yes and no, according to Tillich,
as seen before. Form manifests the substance, it has the potential to renew itself in the
power of the substance to become a more adequate symbol; it has the potential to be
emptied of the substance to become profane; and it also has the tendency to raise
itself to ultimacy to become demonic. In a lesser way, form too can also make a yes
and no response to substance, but this response does not have judging power in a
way equal to that of substance. So dialecticality is included, but reciprocity is
excluded in the content-form correlation.
8J. P. Clayton, The Concept ofCorrelation, p. 159.
%. P. Clayton, The Concept ofCorrelation, p.191.
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Here we proceed to discuss Tillich's method of correlation not as it applies to
Tillich's system consisting of five parts with five questions from the human side to
which the respective divine answers are correlated, but in relation to three analytical
processes that we identify.10 They too are correlations. Two of them are explicit in
Tillich's discussion of theological method: kerygma and situation, and philosophy and
theology. The former refers to the existential situation of the theologian, participating
at once in the community of faith and in the wider culture, in the sacred and the
secular, in the theological circle and outwith it. This means that the theologian has to
ask for the kerygma through a concrete interpretation of existence from within the
given cultural context, and show what the response from the kerygma is. The second
correlation, that of philosophy and theology has a similarity with the first in that the
question-answer pattern is preserved. But in the second, a higher or universal
framework for theology is sought. Ontology with its ontological principles and
concepts is regarded by Tillich to provide theology the tools to speak in universal
terms. This theology must take up, without bypassing or abandoning at any stage, the
existential and concrete character that the first correlation demands.
A third correlation, that between the systematic and the historical, is present
in all of Tillich's writings, particularly in his Systematic Theology. As he is writing
systematic theology and not a history ofChristianity or a history of religions, he only
uses examples of the historical. Nevertheless his systematic is informed by the
historical. This correlation is what Tillich suggested as the basis of the new task of
systematic theology in his last public lecture - "new" not in a qualitative sense, but in
the extent of treatment. In all the three correlations, to what extent Tillich's analyses
1 °The three correlations we identify do not correspond directly to the three elements that
Tillich proposes as essential for theological construction, but they do in some way cover all
the three elements, which are: the Christ-event being the content of theology, the rational
element determinig the form of theology, and the element of immediacy or experience of
ultimacy provides the medium of theology. (Tillich, PTTB, p. 135)
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show the mutuality of the two sides of the correlations without one of the sides
dominating the other will be appreciated. Whether the systematic and the historical
approaches in the study of religion are appreciated in their own right by Tillich and
whether his suggestion of the interpenetration of the two promising mutual
developments is viable will be discussed. And finally, what sort of pluralism emerges
from the study as a whole will be presented and its adequacy evaluated.
1. Kerygma and Situation
The theologian has a two-fold existential engagement, for Tillich The one is with the
kerygma. "a person can be a theologian as long as he acknowledges the content of
the theological circle as his ultimate concern".11 The other is with the situation,
which is not "the psychological or sociological state in which individuals or groups
live. It refers to the scientific and artistic, the economic, political, and ethical forms in
which they express their interpretation of existence".12 If attention is paid exclusively
to discovering the "eternal message" within the Bible and tradition to counter a
distorted tradition as Luther and Barth had done, then the theology fails to be
adequate to the situation. If only the situation is addressed without bringing the
eternal message to bear upon it, then "theology would lose itself in the relativities of
the "situation"; it would become a "situation" itself'.13 So kerygmatic theology,
which emphasizes the eternal message, does not accept common ground with the
situation, fearing that it will lose its own ground by entering the situation. And
secular theologians draw out the kerygma from the situation and thereby lack a
higher criterion to evaluate the situation. Working exclusively from one side of the
11Tillich, ST I, p. 10.
12Tillich, ST I, pp.3-4.
13Tillich, STI, p.5.
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correlation being thus inadequate, Tillich calls for "a theological method in which
message and situation are related in such a way that neither of them is obliterated" .14
It is this working from both sides that makes a theological system open to
new insights and to revision, unlike a kerygmatic theology which reproduces "the
content of the Christian message in an ordered and systematic way".15 But even
kerygmatic theology is done in a situation and addressing the situation with the aim
of transforming it. It is in the way that the Christian message is presented that it takes
a stand in opposition to the situation and to culture. And this theology also makes use
of philosophical terms and methods (which belong to the situation), which Barth
acknowledged, though not his fanatical pupils.16 Apologetic theology demands the
concreteness of participating in one's own religious tradition and outwith it, namely
the situation. This two-fold concreteness, which we now consider, will show Tillich's
two-fold commitment: the one to grasp the eternal message relevant to the situation,
and the other to renew and develop symbols in response to the situation.
Kerygma, or the Christian message, presupposes the theologian's positive
relationship with the concrete religion to which s/he belongs.
The participation in a religious reality is a presupposition of all theology. You
have to be within the circle of a concerete religon in order to interpret it
existentially. This is the "theological circle" which theology cannot (and never
should try to) escape. This circle is not vicious, but its denial is dishonest, for
it could be denied only in the name of an assumedly higher ultimate, which
immediately would establish the same circle.^
Tillich's emphasis on the existential-critical element which we observed in our
discussion under "Christ the Criterion" corresponds to his demand for the existential
character of theology encountered here. By this participation in the circle the
14Tillich, 5TI, p .8.
15Tillich, PE, p. 84.
16Tillich, PE, p.84; See Tillich, PTTB, p. 129.
17Tillich, PTTB, p . 131.
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theologian avoids the danger of overlooking important phenomena of the religious
heritage through which the Christian message could be better expressed. However it
is not just mere familiarity with what is of value in the community of faith that is
important. Rather faith is more actual and with content in a community of faith:
The religious language, the language of symbol and myth, is created in the
community of the believers and cannot be fully understood outside this
community. But within it the religious language enables the act of faith to
have a concrete content.
Although this participation in a religion is important, the kerygma is not to be
identified with the creedal formulations of the religion, including Christianity. The
community witnesses to the fact of the keryma or the the Word which comes from
beyond and becomes "immanent, creating a divine structure of reality", in a person
and in the community of faith.19 Here we have the unconditional character of the
kerygma connected with its conditioned, concrete form.
It is the failure to recognize this double-aspect of the kerygma that a theology
becomes narrow and exclusivist. Here the role of symbols comes into the discussion.
If God and the Christ, as we saw earlier, could only be expressed through symbols,
then it follows that the kerygma, which points to them, in its representative function
is basically a set of symbols but with some rational interpretation. And under religious
symbol, Tillich includes myths, dogmas and modern philosophical interpretations of
the ultimate and religion, as we shall see.
Three aspects of Tillich's understanding of the religious symbol relevant to the
discussion of the kerygma and its relation to the situation will now be recalled to
appreciate Tillich's pluralism. The first is the point that the holy as the object of one's
ultimate concern can only be expressed in terms of symbols. The way symbols come
1 8
10Tillich, DF, p.24. The community of faith cannot offer the content of faith in a creedal
statement (ibid.) which a secular theologian can grasp from outwith the circle.
19Tillich, PE, p.210.
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to represent the holy for a particular group depends on the group's experiences and
the different and increasingly self-aware and scientific ways of accounting those
experiences. So on the one hand each group in its history would have had symbols
preserved over a long period of time and lost some when new ones become more true
to their concrete experience. On the other hand there will be differences and yet not
without some structural similarities between the religious symbols of one group and
another. The relation of kerygma to situation is evident in this statement of one aspect
of the religious symbol. The kerygma is preserved through its many forms. The two
main forms of symbols are the sacramental and conceptual, the former being
characteristic of earlier periods and the latter being characteristic of the present time,
although the conceptual element is not absent in the sacramental symbol and the
sacramental not absent in the conceptual. In Tillich's religious typology we saw the
sacramental being the basis of the mystical and the ethical religions. This insight can
be seen to have two implications for his theory of symbols. The one is that all
religious symbols have a sacramental character, which means that each points to the
holy. The conceptual element is implicit, for even sacramental religions include
conceptions of reality as a whole and some understanding of the proper actions within
the consecrated universe. The other implication for his theory of symbols is that
though the sacramental symbols are fundamental, the conceptual symbols are higher.
Whereas sacramental symbols are aimed at reinforcing cult and ritual with some
concept of identity, prosperity and growth, conceptual symbols such as equality,
justice and community bear the sacramental element of the holy's presence in each of
these concept-forms and their forms of realization.
This leads to the second point from Tillich's symbol theory, which is that a
religious symbol in virtue of its connection not only with the conscious actions of the
group but with the "collective unconscious" it will live as long as the group manages
to adapt the symbol or kerygma to the new situation without losing its substance. Not
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just affecting the intellect but the total human person, symbols open up deeper levels
of reality and special levels in the human soul. It is this character of symbol that saves
symbols from being replaced by other symbols. The "group unconscious" or the
"collective unconscious" is related to the symbol such that it sees the group's very
being in the symbol. A symbol dies only when the inner situation of the group
changes, when it no longer produces a response in the group.20 The Christian
kerygma has both the sacramental and conceptual character. This is expressed in the
forms: "Logos has become flesh" or "Jesus is the Christ". These are not meaningful in
themselves unless they are borne witness to in the community and through the
sacraments of the Church. Tillich states: "Jesus is the Christ" is the "fundamental
dogma. All other Christian dogmas have a supporting and protective role".21 The
fundamental dogma is the Christian kerygma and the dogmas that interpret this have
been and must be developed by being responsive to the situation and its conceptual
forms. In other words, the theologian's enquiry is directed towards the concrete logos
which is experienced thfough the medium of the church,22 and at the same time the
enquiry results in the expression of the kerygma such that the kerygma is protected
from being lost in the situation.
It is this idea of the protective function of the dogma that makes Tillich see
some gap between the kerygma and its proper expression in the history of
Christianity. "The whole history of Christian dogma is a continuous narrowing down,
but at the same time a defining,"23 The narrowing is seen by Tillich to be necessary
for maintaining the church's very identity. Though Tillich makes this narrowing down
as a general statement, the four examples that he gives relate to periods of intense
20Tillich, TC, pp.56-58; Tillich, DF, pp.41-43. A symbol is 'adequate' only as long as it
expresses "an ultimate concern in such a way that it creates reply, action, communication"
Z/Tillich, 571,23-4.
^Tillich, UC,65. Also see ibid.,62-6.
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confrontations (Barth against the Nazi, the Roman church against the Renaissance,
the Reformation against the Roman church and the Counter Reformation against
Protestantism). This means that the narrowing down happens when absolutist
tendencies are challenged in the name of the kerygma. Tillich may be right in so far as
theologies of individuals such as Barth are concerned, when everything human is
subjected to the divine instead of seeing the human and the divine in a correlation. But
to say that a narrowing down is happening to all theologies in a period such as
Luther's and Calvin's (whom Tillich commends for a certain method of correlation)
and to every attempt of the Church is to contradict his own claim that dogmas play a
supportive function in relation to the fundamental dogma. If Tillich had used
"protective" only in the limited sense of defining the Christ dogma such that it is free
from ambiguities that the religious or secular ideas of the situation threatened it with,
then our charge is invalid. Tillich points out that while dogmas affirm something, they
also reject something. For instance the positive statement of God's creatorship in the
Apostle's creed is at the same time the negation of dualism. Protective dogmas arose
to challenge new doctrines that seemed to distort the fundamental Christian
substance. The negative character becomes more evident in later dogmas.24 And
Tillich sees the necessity of philosophy to give more accurate theoretical formulations
to protective dogmas, which were themselves prone to misinterpretation.25 (The
discussion of the Correlation of Philosophy and Theology is thus anticipated.) It
appears that Tillich saw the attempts of the Church in developing dogmas purely in
negative terms. When he observed that dogmas both preserve and conceal,26 did he
simply think of a preservation of dogma as simply an identity-affirming act of the
Church, or also as concerned with a proper revealing of the dogma? Certainly, as we





positive correlation of kerygma and situation. We might suggest that Tillich's
evaluation of the history of dogma as a narrowing down needs to be qualified or
totally challenged on the basis of further research.
The revealing character of the dogma leads to the third aspect of the religious
symbol. The third aspect is in fact a logical consequence of and a fuller statement of
the first. The first aspect stated that the holy can be expressed through finite symbols
(and hence that the holy is immanent in them). The third aspect is that of the symbol
expressing the fact of the ultimate transcending the form infinitely, which can only be
done by "an element of self-negation. That symbol is most adequate which expresses
not only the ultimate but also its own lack of ultimacy."27 We have already seen that
in Christianity the Christ, the Cross and the Protestant principle are symbols which
negate themselves in addition to pointing to their ground. These symbols are special in
that they resist any literal interpretation of symbols. They perform the important
function of a religious criticism of religion, for according to Tillich rational or
scientific criticism cannot create or criticize the truth of religion, and hence of myth or
symbols. Thus he attacks the "reactive literalism" of those within the theological
circle, for their literal interpretation of symbols. These people fail to seek the truth
honestly and prefer to repress the questions raised by their questioning minds,
invoking the authority of the Church or the Bible, to losing their certainty.28 A literal
interpretation of a symbol for Tillich is idolatry. Whitehead makes the same point in
relation to dogmas 29 According to Tillich, it is the self-negating function of the
symbol that gives it universal significance, which we have shown to be absolutist if
Tillich had meant that only Jesus the Christ met the condition for it, although had
Tillich carried through his project of setting up formal criteria through his critical
27Tillich, DF, p.97.
28Tillich, DF, pp.52-53.
29"Idolatry is the necessary product of static dogmas." (A. N. Whitehead, Religion in the
Making, New York: Macmillan, 1926, p. 147)
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phenomenology and through the Protestant principle, he would have held on to a
pluralist position consistently.
All the three aspects of the religious symbol together affirm the character of
symbols as forms or mediums, as relative to people, time and situation, and as the
definitive character of true symbols. Cantwell Smith is in agreement with the first two
aspects of the religious symbol but not the third aspect in the above discussion when
he points out that "every religious symbol in whatever tradition can mean different
things, at different levels, to various men" and hence any interpretation of the symbol
"must be suggestive rather than conclusive".30 Whereas Smith speaks about symbols
being unique and perhaps more inclusive and consequently the need to refrain from
any definitive interpretation of them, Tillich on the one hand would emphasize the
symbol as definitive for the believer in the revelatory situation, not by acquiring any
special meaning but in revealing the religious substance by negating itself, and on the
other hand would see the need for this revelation to be received by the situation in
terms of its questions. We will now address the question of the importance of the
importance of the situation in relation to the theologian's task.
With reference to his own time, especially as far as the Western context was
concerned, Tillich thought that the Christian symbols were still around, although not
in terms of their power to draw everyone into a revelatory correlation. But at the
same time, he did not think that secular symbols could totally replace the religious
ones. And hence he pointed out that symbols of the present cannot be said to be dead
easily if they are still accepted (even by a certain section) because they might be
"dormant" and hence "capable of being reawakened".31 For Tillich, science has no
power to replace religious symbols, and the theologian on his part should not
30W.C. Smith, The Faith ofOtherMen, p.43.
31Tillich, DF, p.97.
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advocate to the situation as to which religious symbols are appropriate. "Theology as
such has neither the duty nor the power to confirm or negate religious symbols. Its
task is to interpret them according to theological principles and methods."32 In
performing this interpretative task, theology identifies inadequate symbols on the one
hand and plays a definite prophetic role in religion by demanding a new revelatory
situation on the other. Only a new revelatory situation can replace the preceding one.
Tillich does not restrict the revelatory situation to the Church. The situation
and culture have a religious element. The prophetic voices are there in culture, in
those who can be considered as part of the "latent Church", which is "a Church in
which the ultimate concern which drives the manifest Church is hidden under cultural
forms and deformations".33 "The Church and culture are within, not alongside, each
other. And the Kingdom of God includes both while transcending both."34 This
mutual participation of Church and situation justifies Tillich's claim that Christian
symbols are still not dead. This mutual influence can also be seen as the basis of
Tillich's suggestion in one of his seminars that the visual arts, drama, poetry and the
novel could offer "fresh interpretations of the Christian symbols".35
An analysis of this mutual engagement between Christianity and the situation
as an essential part of Tillich's theological enterprise is also a reason for his being
considered a pluralist. The present reality of the visibility of the presence of many
religions in the situation should from a Tillichian standpoint receive serious attention.
But this will be done in the last section of this chapter, after we have appreciated here
how he considers the situation generally as important for theology, and after we have





considered the importance of philosophy and history for the theological enterprise in
the next two sections respectively.
Tillich's consistent commitment to doing a "theology of culture" is an
expression of his addressing the situation. Theology of culture analyzes "the theology
behind all cultural expressions".36 This process involves the theologian going beyond
her/his theological circle, for committed as s/he is to the logos structure of what
concerns the her/him ultimately,37 this should be reflected on in the light of the logos
expressed in the various cultural forms. The theologian should press on beyond the
tradition with a yes and no in terms of the universal logos. This makes the task of the
theologian of culture "analytic rather than synthetic, historical rather than
systematic."38 In carrying out this specific theological analysis, the theologian of
culture also engages with and draws from the various analyses of human existence
from other cultural disciplines: "The analysis of the human situation employs materials
made available by man's creative self-interpretation in all realms of culture."39 In
addition to gaining from such analytical and critical approaches, Tillich also focusses
his attention on the special movements of the situation which present the kairos for a
new order or fellowship that would operate through churches and cultural and
political movements, taking the "form of resistance against the distortion of humanity
and divinity which necessarily is connected with the rise of the new systems of
authority" 40
With every major change in the situation, the appropriate analysis of the
situation should determine the way the kerygma provides the answer. The present
situation varies from the early Greek church's "question about finitude, of death and
36Tillich,£n,p.39.
37Tillich, £71, p.25.
38Tillich, ST I, p.39.
39Tillich, ST I, p.63.
40Tilhch, PE, p.232.
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error", or from the Reformation's "question of a merciful God and the forgiveness of
sins". Tillich saw the question of his time as self-estrangement being overcome to
create "a reality of reconciliation and reunion, of creativity, meaning, and hope."41
Two main answers, from opposing poles, were observed by Tillich to answer the
culture characterized by the spirit of industrialism. Supranaturalism was seen to resist
the industrial spirit, for which it used categories taken from naturalism and created a
supernatural above the natural. Its mistake was that of interpreting doctrine, cult and
life of the past in literal terms. Liberal theology was seen to offer the other answer,
which it did by adapting itself to the industrial age by reinterpreting traditional
symbols in contemporary terms, but lost its message and ability to judge culture in the
process.42 Supranaturalism only said "no" to the culture from above culture.
Liberalism said yes but from within culture. Against the inadequacies of these, Tillich
found Existentialism offering a religious judgment of culture from within culture:
"protesting] against the spirit of industrial society within the framework of industrial
society". It pointed out that industrial society's "experiences of emptiness and
meaninglessness, of dehumanization and estrangement" are the result of humans
having become part of the reality created by them, having become means to ends
which are themselves means. However the idea of an ultimate end is lacking in
Existentialism 43 By a dialogue with such a philosophy that interprets the situation
adequately, a theology of culture serves as a "creative source for systematic
theology" 44
41Tillich, ST I, p.49.
49
Tillich, TC, p.45. Supranatural theology places God in a realm beyond the natural one as a
transcendent object. For Tillich this is a conditioning of the unconditional, relegating God to a
different realm and God's decisive acts to different times (creation, redemption,
consummation), thereby making God no more a matter of ultimate concern. (See Tillich, PE,
p. 82)
43Tillich, TC, pp.45-46.
44Tillich, ST I, p.40.
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Though Tillich has applied his kerygma-situation correlation to good use in his
analysis of the relation between Christianity and culture, the claims that he makes for
Apologetic theology in respect of other religions betrays a certain superiority. Instead
of putting forward a formal principle of the answer being present in but not
determining the question of the situation, which could be claimed as true in the case
of all religions, Tillich seems to suggest that the Christian answer is the only proper
answer to questions arising from all situations and cultures. Other answers too are
superceded by the Christian answer.
Apologetic theology must show that trends which are immanent in all religions
and cultures move toward the Christian answer. This refers both to doctrines
and to the theological interpretation of theology .45
Tillich's imperative for Apologetic theology is understandable in the light of the
meaninglessness of the situation which needs to be addressed with a concrete answer.
And since he sees this meaninglessness as a universal condition, he is enthusiastic
about providing a universal answer. He finds the Christian kerygma offering such an
answer, one which is universal and concrete at the same time, in the Logos doctrine:
the "Logos who has become flesh". Through a subtle philosophical argument he
shows that the universal Logos, which is not an abstract concept, is also concrete in
every particular instance.
Only that which has the power of representing everything particular is
absolutely concrete. And only that which has the power of representing
everything abstract is absolutely universal. This leads to a point where the
absolutely concrete and the absolutely universal are identical.46
Tillich's idealist tendency makes him propose one unambiguous instance which would
be true for all other ambiguous realizations. This unambiguous-ambiguous relation is
true both for the Christ's relation to the realizations of individuals and of religious
45Tillich,£TI,p.l5.
46Tillich, ST I, pp. 16-17.
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traditions. Christian theology is the theology because is represents an unambiguous
union of the universal and the concrete in the Christ.
Christian theology is the theology in so far as it is based on the tension
between the absolutely concrete and the absolutely universal. Priestly and
prophetic theologies can be very concrete, but they lack universality. Mystical
and metaphysical theologies can be very universal, but they lack
concreteness.47
There is an element of exclusiveness about the Christian answer here. But it
cannot serve as a basis for regarding Tillich as an absolutist given Tillich's
correlational approach based on his ontological-existential framework. Ontology
suggests that there definitely are answers to existential questions. And he wants to
identify the Christ as the way of closing the gap between question for answer, from
the side of humans, and answer to question from the side of God So Tillich is
actually working to meet the methodological demands of his framework, which of
course has consequences for his theology of religions, rather than showing that
Christianity has any factual content that makes it superior to other religions. This is
evident in his statement that "the assertion of faith that in Jesus Christ the Logos
has become flesh" cannot be proved but only accepted. The Jesus-Logos doctrine
is in practice limited to the Christian theological circle and is its existential
criterion. But what is Tillich's basis for making this existential criterion into a
formal criterion, valid for other religions too?
To answer this, Tillich's critical phenomenology must be recalled. The two
moments of Tillich's critical phenomenology may be observed to be present in his
claims for Apologetic theology. The divine answer is received in the revelatory
situation of the first moment (the concrete existential-critical moment) but the
phenomenological task of the second moment (the intuitive-descriptive moment) is
exercised to show the universal meaning of the answer. Apologetic theology starts
47Tillich, 5TI, p.16.
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from the concrete standpoint of one's religion, and establishes a formal criterion,
on the basis of which this same theology can be called the theology. There is a
circularity in this approach because the formal criterion is based on one religion,
which same religion then is elevated as meeting the criterion perfectly. Tillich
himself is aware of the problem of circularity elsewhere, and states that in spiritual
matters this is unavoidable, because what is attained has been attained only because
it was there in the first place. The very process of correlating divine answers to the
human situation presupposes that the answer is present. The questions of the
situation are important in so far as they determine the form in which the answers
are received.
So any special claim of one's own religion should partly be seen in the light
of this tension between the existential criterion and formal criterion, including the
following claim of Tillich: "Christian theology has a foundation which infinitely
transcends the foundations of everything in the history of religion which could be
called "theology.""48 It is certainly puzzling that while Tillich on the one hand is
working with a clear awareness of the tension between the existential criterion and
the formal criterion, on the other hand he simply elevates the existential criterion to
a formal criterion. He seems to absolutize his own formal criterion without being
open to the possibility of the Christian criterion requiring to be in a dialectical
tension with a criterion emerging as a formal criterion from another religion.
In discussing the significance of apologetic theology, the fact of the
theologian's relation to the contemporary interpretations of human existence already
suggested her/his critical acceptance of the thought-forms and language in wliich the
quest for life and meaning are expressed. This critical function which the theologian
must exercise demands a framework, a philosophical framework, in terms of which
48Tillich, ST I, p.18.
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the existential questions can be consistently interpreted. Situation's implied demand
for a theoretical framework will now be discussed in relation to theology's further
tasks.
2. The Correlation of Philosophy and Theology
Tillich in fact proposed philosophical theology as another name for answering
theology or apologetic theology, which "although based on the same kerygma, tries to
explain the contents of the kerygma in close interrelation with philosophy".49 It is not,
however, the same correlation as the earlier one, for now the questions asked are
more universal, not just the interpretations of existence limited to the special realms of
knowledge and life. Philosophy
primarily does not ask about the special character of the beings, the things and
events, the ideas and values, the souls and bodies which share being. Philosopy
asks what about this being itself.50
So the question philosophy asks is basically about the object theology approaches and
understands in different ways.
Philosophy necessarily asks the question of reality as a whole, the question of
the structure of being. Theology necessarily asks the same question, for that
which concerns us ultimately must belong to reality as a whole; it must belong
to being. Otherwise we could not encounter it, and it could not concern us. Of
course, it cannot be one being among others; then it would not concern us
infinitely 51
From the perspective of this study, that of determining Tillich's pluralism, the
philosophy-theology correlation will be examined to see if the philosophy Tillich
develops allows theology to broaden both its framework and to address wider issues
of reality as they emerge in the concrete situations of different cultures. This will be
49Tillich, PE, p.84. See also ibid., pp.83,89.
50Tillich, PE, p.85. Also: "Philosophy asks the ultimate question that can be asked, namely,
the question as to what being, simply being, means." (ibid.)
51Tilhch, STl pp.20-1
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done here in two stages. First whether philosophy and theology address the same
question(s) so that philosophy can contribute to theology's concerns will be discussed.
And second whether Tillich's ontology takes into consideration the important
philosophical insights of other religio-philosophical frameworks will be briefly
discussed by limiting ourselves to Tillich's examples.
That philosophy and theology address the same object has been pointed out.
Theology identifies this object as ultimate concern or being-itself. Philosophy asks the
question of "what is", and in doing so the ultimate concern, which is true of every
philosopher, is brought into reality as a whole, which is being investigated.52
Although all philosophers do not accept the reality of ultimate concern, let alone
professing that ultimate concern figures in their investigation, Tillich still believes that
the philosopher is related to an ultimate concern by the fact of being human. He points
out that humans in their long history have asked the question of being in
prephilosophical terms - through language, art, cult and social life - and in terms of
methodical philosophy.53 All religious and theological literature show the
interdependence between prephilosophy and philosopy54 on the one hand, theology is
present in metaphysical systems such as classical Greek philosophy, and religio-
philosophico-ethical systems such as Vedanta Hinduism (with its mystical
speculations) and prophetic monothiesm of Judaism (with its ethical, legal and ritual
expressions based on divine law).55 Also, from a historical analysis of the modern
period, we have shown under "Religion and Culture" that the secular humanist
emerged out of a religious background and cannot remove that basis without losing
53See Tillich, ST I, pp.63-4.
53Tilhch, BRSUR, pp.9-10.
54Tillich, BRSUR, p. 10.
55Tillich, ST I, p. 16.
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her/his account of truth. In the same way, "the philosopher cannot escape his
theological background".56
In a statement about what the human capacity to develop language reveals of
human nature, Tillich shows that the connection between ultimate concern (the fact of
transcending one's finite situation) and philosophy (the development of universal
concepts):
Language is the expression ofman's freedom from the given situation and its
concrete demands. It gives him universals in whose power he can create
worlds above the given world of technical civilization and spiritual content.
Conversely, the development of these worlds determines the development
of language.57
Language has a direct relationship with the religious act: "Without language there is
no act of faith, no religious experience! This refers to language generally and to the
special language in every function ofman's spiritual life."58 Here a strong connection
between religion and its expressions in cultural life is reflected. This implies an implicit
rejection of mystical religion or mystical theology that claims a pure identity with the
ultimate and an empty silence as the means to salvation. (As we have seen and shall
see, the mystical element in the sense of immediate awareness of the divine is essential
for every worthwhile theology.)
If religion is universal in that it seeks to transcend every finite form, but at the
same time is related to the concrete situation, then the philosophy that can help a
theology that interprets the at once universal and concrete religious experience must
be comprise of analytical tools that are suited to the universal and concrete. Tillich
addresses the universal in terms of an "essentialist" analysis, and the concrete in terms
of an "existentialist" analysis:




The first deals with the unity and diversity of life in its essential nature. It
describes what I venture to call "the multidimensional unity of life" Only if
this unity and the relation of the dimensions and realms of life are understood,
can we analyse the existential ambiguities of all processes correctly and
express the quest for unambiguous or eternal life adequately.59
The two analyses are different, and are to be correlated. But even this correlation
would require a framework, which would give a proper structure to the correlation.
Tillich proposes and develops an ontological framework as adequate for this purpose.
Although ontology appears to be more essentialist, by positing nonbeing with being
and a tension between the two Tillich makes his ontology capable of comprehending
the existential as well. "Ontology is not a speculative-fantastic attempt to establish a
world behind the world; it is an analysis of those structures of being which we
encounter in every meeting with reality."60
How does one validate and develop an ontology that comprehends reality
in universal and concrete terms? The epistemological question is about the basis of
ontological concepts in terms of the apriori status of the concepts. These concepts
are not known prior to experience. They are only known by critical analysis of
various forms of experience, but the ontological concepts are presupposed in every
actual experience.61 So Tillich suggests the human as the key to the ontological
structure:
Man occupies a pre-eminent position in ontology, not as an outstanding
object among other objects, but as that being who asks the ontological
question and in whose self-awareness the ontological answer can be found.62
But he claims that the same concepts are at the same time true of all living beings and
of the inorganic realm.63 For Tillich ontology is primarily concerned with the
59Tillich, ST III, pp.12-13.
60Tillich, ST I, p.20.
61Tillich, ST I, p. 166.
62Tillich, ST I, p. 168.
"One can speak of self-centeredness in atoms as well as m animals, wherever the reaction to
a stimulus is dependent on a structural whole". (Tillich, ST I, p. 169) And also: "All beings
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structure of being, on which structure all ontological concepts are based. The basic
ontological structure is the relation between the self and world. With his identifying of
a structure as the basis of his ontology he seeks to save it from the error of one-
sidedness, which is evident in a philosophy based on the self alone such as Fichte's
subjective idealism; a one-sided philosophy based on the world alone is found in
Hobbes. In these one-sided philosophies after a construction based on either the self
or the world, because the opposite in each case cannot be avoided there is an
"irrational leap" towards it.64 But for Tillich:
There is no self-consciousness without world-consciousness, but the converse
also is true. World-consciousness is possible only on the basis of a fully
developed self-consciousness.65
It is in the dynamic interactions between the self and the world that changes on both
sides happen, the structure itself remaining unchangeable preventing one-sided
interpretations (the isolation of self from the world or vice versa is not possible in
reality). This self-world structure helps the self to relate to the manifold contents of
the world perspecively. Hence the world is not a sum of contents but a "structural
whole" as expressed by the Greek kosmos, and Latin universum.
The whole opposite man is one at least in this respect, that it is related to us
perspectively, however discontinuous it may be in itself. Every pluralistic
philosopher speaks of the pluralistic character of the world, thus implicitly
rejecting an absolute pluralism.66
Ontology's insistence on the primacy of the structure of being is a resistance against
beings being regarded as things without subjectivity. It also means that "ontology
cannot begin with things and try to derive the structure of reality from them".67 The
structure of a subject and object is present in every asking of the ontological question,
have an enviroment which is their environment." (Tillich, ST I, p. 170)
64Tillich, ST I, p. 171.
65Tillich, ST I, p. 171.
66Tillich, ST I, p. 170.
67Tillich, 5TI, p.173.
235
for there is "an asking subject and an object about which the question is asked". The
subject-object relation in turn
presupposes the self-world structure as the basic articulation of being, the self
having a world to which it belongs - this highly dialectical structure - logically
and experientially precedes all other structures. Its analysis should be the first
step in every ontological task.68
The primacy of structure in ontology has a positive significance for the
question of pluralism. Structure suggests that all beings possess all the elements of the
structure, but there is no ideal way for the elements to constitute themselves. So one
form of actualization cannot judge another. In the sphere of moral actions, structure
demands that each individual make moral decisions to become a person. This
structure remains common for all cultures, though the "ethical content ofmoral action
has progressed from primitive to mature cultures in terms of refinement and
breadth"69 The structure itself is not relative such that each culture has its own
structure, implying the impossibility of direct comparisons, but creative acts in culture
provide new contents to both functions of theoria and praxis, including those of
morality and religion.70
This ontological structure then provides Tillich with a frame which is
universally valid and which is presupposed in every actual structure and experience.
Ontology is possible because there are concepts which are less universal than
being but more universal than any ontic concept, that is, more universal than
any concept designating a realm of beings. Such concepts have been called
"principles" or "categories" or "ultimate notions".71
Beyond the basic structural level, Tillich identifies three levels and their respective
ontological concepts. We shall appreciate the theological significance of these three
68Tillich,^ri, pp.164-165.
69Tillich, ST III, p.355.
70Tillich, ST III, p.354.
71Tillich, ST I, p. 164.
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levels before we point out how God as the ground of being constitutes the basic
ontological structure. The level which is just above the structural, not in any
dependent terms but as defining the way the structure becomes actual in the next
level which is the existential level, consists of three pairs of polar relations. These are:
individuality and universality, dynamics and form, and freedom and destiny. Each
pole is present in the opposite pole's actualization but as part of the process rather
than as directly relevant to the aim of the process. "In these three polarities, the first
element expresses the self-relatedness of being, its power of being something for
itself, while the second element expresses the belongingness of being, its character of
being a part of the universe of being."72 Individualization and participation as
ontological elements are true for all beings. In humans, becoming a self involves the
particular individual's attainment of self-relatedness, overcoming the possible
divisions within oneself through the element of participation. Similarly the attainment
of communion with other persons involves participation, which is not simply
accidental but essential for the individual. The concept that the human individual is a
microcosmos suggests her/his participation in all levels of life. Tillich sees the failures
of classical nominalism and realism in the former's interpretation of reality in terms of
the individual character of things by rejecting all universals and hence the
participation element, and in the latter's interpretation of reality in terms of the
universals or essential structures that are present in the individual by making the
individual inconsequential before a new level of reality created behind empirical
reality.73 The significance of individualization and participation for Christian theology
is pointed out by Tillich as the individual's participation in the New Being manifest in
Jesus as the Christ. Though this mutuality of the two elements is demanded by the
72Tillich, ST I, p . 165.
73Tillich, ST I, pp . 177-178. Tillich points out: "The word "realism" means today almost what
"nominalism" meant in the Middle Ages, while the "realism" of the Middle Ages expresses
almost exactly what we call "idealism" today" (ibid., p . 178, n.2).
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Christian faith, Tillich's religious typology shows the prominence of the
individualization element in the prophetic religions and the prominence of the
participation element in the sacramental and mystical religions.
The next pair of elements, dynamics and form, has special theological
significance too, especially in respect of the concept of God. To be something is to
have a form, a structure. Dynamics "cannot be thought as something that is; nor can
it be thought as something that is not. It is the me on, the potentiality of being, which
is nonbeing in contrast to things that have a form, and the power of being in contrast
to pure nonbeing" 74 According to Tillich, Christian theology fought against Greek
philosophy's raising of the dynamic element or nonbeing as the ultimate principle.
Christianity did this by placing form in the depth of divinity. In Thomas Aquinas,
however, static form characterized the doctrine of God as actus purus. The lack of
the dynamic element in God was introduced by Protestant mysticism drawing from
the insights of Duns Scotus and Luther. This polar dialectic might have a special role
to play in expounding the concepts of God in the world religions. But it should be
used as an analytical tool by giving due consideration to the intellectual framework to
which the concepts of the divine belong. This means that the dynamics-form analysis
should be considered as one of the useful tools, not the only possible or best
analytical tool.
The last pair of polar elements are freedom and necessity. Freedom is a
transcendence of destiny, which is the essential nature of being, to make existence
possible. Destiny is the concrete structure that is us, from which our decisions, which
express our freedom, arises. "Destiny is not a strange power which determines what
shall happen to me. It is myself as given, formed by nature, history, and myself. My
74Tillich, ST I, p. 179.
destiny is the basis ofmy freedom; my freedom participates in shaping my destiny."75
The polarity of destiny and freedom correspond to the relation between essence and
existence in the next level in Tillich's ontology, as we shall see.
After the structural level and after the level with three pairs of ontological
elements, Tillich speaks of being as it is manifest in actuality, in historical existence,
in the third level of his ontology. Basically the two principles effective in this level are
essence and existence. Tillich points out that this level is anticipated by destiny and
freedom. But freedom does not correspond to existence, for freedom is an element or
a positive force that makes humans human, whereas existence is not a necessary
condition that humans should be in, although it is the actual state humans are in due
to freedom's unity with finitude. "Finite freedom is the turning point from being to
existence."76 Existence is the condition in which the universal principles or the pairs
of polar elements manifest themselves. Now the threat of individualization and
participation losing their unity becomes a possibility. In losing the one, both are lost.
Loss of self-relatedness results in loneliness, in which event participation or
communion with others is also lost. Similarly, loss of participation results in surrender
to the collective, in which event individuality and subjectivity are lost. Next, in the
case of the polarity of dynamics and form, in the anxiety of dynamics about losing
itself in forms it might make a break with form to end up in chaos, losing both
dynamics and form. And the anxiety about what form vitality and intentionality would
take might result in confining oneself to the forms at hand, thereby paving the way
for losing both dynamics and form. Finally, the polarity of freedom and destiny lead
humans to anxieties that might result in the loss of both. One's freedom is threatened
when s/he realizes that her/his freedom has the almost impossible task of acting in
accordance with the demands of her/his destiny. And one's destiny is threatened when
75Tillich,STI,p.l85.
76Tillich, ST I, p . 165.
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it is not accepted without reservations by freedom, which acts with an arbitrariness
towards destiny because of its resistance to only some part of one's destiny being
realized.77 The threat that emerges from the three polarities in human existence have
theological significance for Tillich in that they represent the one question (in different
forms dependent on the situation) of salvation that humans ask for. The question of
existence is answered in terms of the Christ, who is the symbol of the reunion of
essence and existence.
The fourth and final level of Tillich's ontology has to do with a special
function within existence, namely that of the mind grasping and shaping reality 78
This function is taken out of the existential level to a new level simply for the purpose
of analysis, recognizing the fact that epistemology has an identity of its own in any
philosophical and systematic theological inquiries. The mind grasps reality through
forms called "categories". Tillich identifies four main categories: time, space,
causality and substance. Each of the categories relate to an encounter of the self to
the world in which an anxiety-courage union in the self corresponds to a being-
nonbeing union in the world. Ontology does not see time as either negatively as
transitory or positively as creative. Rather "time unites the anxiety of transitoriness
with the courage of a self-affirming present". In order to be one has to have space.
But finitude implies that one does not have any definite space, and there is the final
threat of losing all space. There is therefore the anxiety of spacelessness on the one
hand, and courage to affirm the present and with it space on the other hand. By
accepting ontological insecurity one accepts security in the very acceptance. Cause
refers to that which precedes a thing or an event. It suggests the power of being in a
thing - the thing by itself being contingent. Thus an anxiety of the lack of necessity of
one's being arises. Courage is the acceptance of one's contingency, such that one rests
77Tillich, ST I, p. 198-200.
78Tillich, ST I, pp . 192-198.
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in herself/himself. Substance is that which underlies the flux of appearances. And
since substance is nothing beyond its appearances, there is the anxiety of losing one's
substance in constant change. Courage is the act of attributing substantiality to an
appearance - an act of "affirming the finite, of taking one's anxiety upon himself" 79
The question of the possibility of courage in all the four categories is, for Tillich, the
question of God. Hence the theological significance of this fourth level.
God or being-itself has been presupposed or asked for in every ontological
concept. We shall now point out how being-itself is significant in this structure, and
not enter into any full discussion of his understanding of God, which has already
been done earlier. God precedes the ontological structure as its very basis. Tillich
finds God presupposed, even if not acknowledged, in all philosophical and
theological systems.
The theological concepts of both idealists and naturalists are rooted in a
"mystical a priori," an awareness of something that transcends the cleavage
between subject and object.80
And he points out how the philosophical disposition leads to the asking of the
question of ultimate reality, thereby showing the closeness of the philosophical quest
and the religious quest:
It is our finitude in interdependence with the finitude of our world which drives
us to search for ultimate reality. This search is a consequence of our encounter
as finite beings with a finite world. Because we stand between being and
nonbeing and long for a form of being that prevails against nonbeing in
ourselves and in our world, we philosophize.81
The fundamental philosophical question arises from an existential basis, but is asked
in universal terms as a question of "the mystery that there is anything at all".82 And
because the question refers to that which precedes every form and quality but at the
79Tillich, ST I, p . 198.
80Tillich, ST I, p . 9.
81Tillich, BRSUR, p. 14.
82Tillich, BRSUR, p.6.
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same time present in every form and quality, that ground of all being can be only
thought of in most general terms:
But being-as-such has neither static nor dynamic implications. It precedes any
special qualification. It points to the original fact that there is something and
not nothing and to the power of that which is to resist nonbeing. 83
Since God, for Tillich, refers to this fundamental reality in which alone the essential
nature of humans are to be found, even the hostility of humans to God is only an
affirmation of the fact that they belong to God.84 Being-itself precedes any particular
understanding of God. So since atheisms are rejections of particularly defined
theisms, the rejections have nothing to do with being-itself. Reason itself belongs to
the depth of reason and is dependent on this depth for its preservation. Tillich
suggests the ontological relationship between being-itself and being as the source of
the relationship between the depth of reason and reason:
The depth of reason is the expression of something that is not reason but
which precedes reason and is manifest through it. .. This is not another field of
reason which could progressively be discovered and expressed, but it is that
which is expressed through every rational expression 85
So the correlation of philosophy and theology is valid because "there is a
point of identity between the ultimate of the philosophical question and the ultimate
of the religious concern".86 The ways in which the ultimate is sought and expressed
are however different: philosophy doing its task conceptually, and theology doing it
through symbols. (But increasingly theology interprets and reinterprets the religious
symbols in dialogue with the prevalent thought-patterns.) The philosopher abstracts
from the concrete expressions of religion and creates "generally valid concepts
concerning religion. The theologian, on the other hand, claims the universal validity
83Tillich, BRSUR, p. 16.




of the Christian message in spite of its concrete and special character."87 The
common pursuit of the two but the distinctness of their functions is put succintly by
Tillich:
Philosophy and theology are divergent as well as convergent. They are
convergent as far as both are existential and theoretical at the same time. They
are divergent as far as philosophy is basically theoretical and theology is
basically existential.88
Tillich's idea, appreciated earlier, that all spiritual elements are within each other
despite their distinct character, allows him to see reason and faith in their common
concern and in their mutually-related functions.89 This means that "philosophy and
theology are not a priori in conflict. Whether they are or not depends on the special
character of both."90 Being and meaning, which concern both philosophy and
theology, are never given in any absolute terms, although they are asked in every
existential quest and expressed in a plurality of experiences and systems of
understanding of reality.
The philosopher's theoretical task in terms of the ontological framework has
been appreciated in this section. In the last section, the theologian's concrete task of
participating in one's religious and historical situation to discover and interpret the
kerygma in a relevant manner. These two correlations come into play in the
theologian's task, which starts with a concrete connection with revelation, before s/he
moves ahead to perform the critical task of examining the adequacy of the forms in
which the message is contained in the light of the universal principles offered by




Tillich, PE, p.88. Also: "Theology deals with what concerns us inescapably, ultimately,
unconditionally. It deals with it not as far as it is but as far as it is for us" (Tillich, PE, p. 87)
89See Tillich, DF, p.75.
90Tillich, PE,216.
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response to the questions of the situation. Revelation is the starting point of the
theologian because that is the basis of all religious phenomena.
Revelation is first of all the experience in which an ultimate concern grasps the
human mind and creates a community in which this concern expresses itself in
symbols of action, imagination and thought.91
Although revelation is experienced concretely, the theologian is nevertheless in touch
with the rational structure which is evident in the rational forms which express the
revelation (depth of reason being identical with revelation):
The rational approach seems to fall outside the revelatory situation and to be
without any revelatory function. Indeed, reason is not revelatory. But in every
creation of reason the depth of reason is present and makes itself felt, in form
as well as in content.92
The theologian is on the one hand conditioned by the concreteness of the revelation
which he seeks to expound, and on the other hand by his situation and the criteria
with which s/he evaluates her/his material. For this reason one cannot do a theology
that is objective and meaningful for all:
In every assumedly scientific theology there is a point where individual
experience, traditional valuation, and personal commitment must decide the
issue. This point, often hidden to the authors of such theologies, is obvious to
those who look at them with other experiences and other commitments.92
Hence Tillich's suggestion that theology should be done in the concreteness of
experience and thought which is possible through a kerygma-situation analysis. And
from our discussion above, it follows that the results of the kerygma-situation analysis
should be processed in the light of an ontology such as Tillich's.
A critical assessment of Tillich's ontology will now be made. First, the term
"being" is itself a suspect term because of the meaning it has acquired: either an
essential quality or a supreme living reality underlying empirical reality. Here being
91Tillich, DF, p.78.
92Tillich, ST I, p. 140
93Tilhch, ST I, p . 8.
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has a static sense. But Tillich looks at being in dynamic terms: on the one hand
affirming reality in all its expressions, and on the other showing that these expressions
are determined by the interplay of polar elements, the most basic of them being 'being'
and 'non-being'. Second, Tillich's claim that ontology is an essential structure valid for
reality as a whole, for the religious reality and for the experiences of all kinds of being
seems to be too tall a claim. How can he claim that all realities can be comprehended
through a few polar concepts, which are mainly shown to be true in the case of human
experience? Tillich simply "confirms the essential character of the ontological
structure"94 by showing how existential threat is real and how one loses oneself in a
decision to act on the basis of one side pole of a polarity. He states that ontology is
valid for all kinds of being by analogy.95 In any case, Tillich is not suggesting that
systematic theology should itself be developing a complete (if at all possible)
ontological system: "Systematic theology cannot, and should not, enter into the
ontological discussion as such. Yet it can and must consider these central concepts
from the point of view of their theological significance."96
Third, Keith Ward's criticism of Tillich as a theologian of inner experience,
which we refuted earlier, might have some validity here. It might be said that ontology
can limit the scope of theology to the realm of the individual, ignoring social and
historical factors that influence religion and theology. Tillich is keen to address
psychological and sociological problems, but he seeks to interpret the situation in
terms of the ontological concepts.97 He takes the ontological concepts to the social
and historical realities to analyze them. Thus he discusses highly social concepts like
love, power and justice in ontological terms, and underlines the common basis of both
ontology and theology: "the ontological and the theological are in one point identical:
94Tillich,Sri,p.201.
95See Tillich, ST I, p. 185.
96Tillich, ST I, p. 164.
97See Tillich, <STI, p.198.
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both deal with being as being".98 Tillich's view that the historical conditions by
themselves are not as significant for the theologian as human self-interpretations of
them coupled with his view that ontology is presupposed in every existential
experience and in every existential interpretation leads him to prove the validity and
usefulness of his ontology by choosing the work of philosophers as examples. Thus
his ontology which sees every interpretation of the human reality as presupposing a
certain dynamic between essence and exitence: essence and existence as two realms in
Plato; the two represented as potentiality and actuality in Aristotle; the two contrasted
with each other in the later Schelling, Kierkegaard and Heidegger; existence derived
from essence in Spinoza and Hegel; and essence derived from existence in Dewey and
Sartre.99 He would see his ontology as neither alienating essence and existence nor
reducing the one to the other, but affirming the two in their proper relation. Essence is
fulfilled only in its actualization as existence, and existence seeks to be united with
and moves towards its essence for its fulfilment. Also, Tillich's preoccupation with the
ontological as compared to the historical is his concern to judge the situation in terms
of a criterion or universal structure. This logos or universal structure expressed in
terms of a subject-object relation is, for him, the basis for comparing various
interpretations of the respective reality in the given period. Hence he points out that
an existentialist interpreter of the situation cannot avoid terms which presuppose the
universal. Similarly without some universal basis, the radical positivist cannot judge
history.100
In this account of Tillich's ontology we have mainly made statements to show
the theological significance of the above ontology. Only in a few instances were
references made to philosophical or theological positions with their tendencies
98Tillich,ZPJ,p,107.
"Tillich, ST I, p. 165.
100Tillich, UC, p.56..
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towards polarization rather than mediation from an ontological perspective. In line
with the purpose of this study, we are not required to show how thoroughly
mediating Tillich's theological approach based on ontology is, nor required to
establish that he is a pluralist on the basis of offering one way in which the common
basis of the religions and quasi-religions can be appreciated. Viewing his ontology
with this concern, it will not be difficult to show that theological attempts in the
various religions either emphasize one polar element or work out a creative tension
between the two. The ontological analysis can on the basis of its complex frame with
concepts which relate to existential and objective factors in a wide range of human
experience be seen as a more helpful tool than Tillich's religious typology to
appreciate the various forms of religion. It might be possible to see more variations
within the mystical and prophetic religions. Also, since Tillich's approach sees
ontology in correlation with theology, the theologies of the religions can also demand
revision of the ontology. Ontology is meant to help clarify, define and interpret
theology in relation to wider reality. Ontology is not meant to determine theology.
Only with this openness can ontology serve as a useful tool in the analysis of
the human situation and of systems of thought, including theologies. Its commitment
to both sides of the polarities suggests a judgment of each concrete situation in terms
of both poles. The moment of judgment which is filled with ultimacy can become the
kairos for finding a new tension between the polar elements. So this moment which is
both revelatory and creative at once should affirm both the universal character of
ontology as well as its openness to concrete reality. We have said earlier that Tillich's
starting point is the concrete standpoint and that only through a phenomenological
interpretation which takes other similar concrete standpoints into consideration that
universal principles are suggested. The intuitive-descriptive task of his critical
phenomenology is a continuous task and should be exercised with the availability of
every new data. So the universal principles that have been identified are not final in
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our intuition of them, although a correspondence of them to the logos structure of
reality is claimed. The question about being-itself is universal, but the answers have to
be constantly worked out in a philosophy-theology correlation:
[But] only the philosophical question is perennial, not the answers. There is a
continuous process of interpretation of philosophical elements and elements
of faith, not one philosophical faith.101
In the kerygma-situation correlation, situation was seen as characterized by
historical conditions and interpretations of existence in the given period. And in the
philosophy-theology correlation, history was appreciated as one of the dimensions for
which ontological concepts were applicable and in terms of which the extent of the
validity of the concepts could be assessed. But now we move on to discuss more
directly the relation of history to theology, especially the relation of the history of
religions to the theological task.
3. The Correlation of the Systematic and the Historical
The title of Tillich's last public lecture, "The Significance of the History of Religions
for the Systematic Theologian", is modest in that Tillich limits himself to speaking
from the perspective of systematic theology. However, he also proposes a religious
typology that derives from an analysis based on two identifiable elements in the nature
of the holy, the holy as present and the holy as ought-to-be, which according to him
determine the actual form of a historical religion in its particular context. This
typology then serves as a tool for a systematic analysis of the religions. We have seen
Tillich using this in his analysis of religion and culture (religious reservation and
religious obligation) and in his analysis of the religions (universal revelation and final
revelation). This systematic approach was also seen to be free of a Christian
superiority due to the two elements being interdependent. The latter element in each
'^Tillich, DF, p.94 (italics Tillich's).
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pair is implied in the first as its aim, which means that every religious expression is
valid only in so far as the aim is present.
While discussing Tillich's typology of religion, the point was made that the
two-fold nature of the holy was observed from the concrete religions. Systematic
theology, in virtue of sharing with philosophy concern about the same ultimate, does
draw from philosophy universal concepts which help identify certain common features
between or among the concrete religions. But theology's primary concern is to attend
to the inner consistency of the concrete religion. The nature of this systematic-
historical correlation will now be examined to see if Tillich's approach to this
boundary situation affirms at once the significance of the religious symbols for the life
and practice of the respective communities and the possibility of common and unique
insights that the religions can offer for an interpretation of the contemporary historical
situation.
The aim of the discussion is to show that discussion will proceed in two
stages. First, a systematic principle identified from Tillich's religious typology will be
shown as useful for an interpretation of history in religious terms. This will involve a
highlighting of the place of Christ as the "centre of history". Second, to what extent a
systematic analysis of history can be correlated to an articulation of the existential and
traditional meanings of religious symbols of the different religions will be discussed.
Tillich spells out in his introduction to CEWR the systematic analysis that is
suited to an interpretation of history in concrete terms, taking into account the
historical situation generally and the way religions and quasi-religions respond to it:
[A] participant in the dynamics of the situation .. selects facts according to his
judgment of their relative importance, interprets these in the light of his own
understanding, and evaluates them with reference to the ielos, the inner aim
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he perceives in the movement of history generally, and in particular the
history of religion.102
Negatively, Tillich rejects an indifferent attitude towards history generally and the
history of religion particularly.103 Positively, he proposes an understanding of the
historical situation as a participant. This means that the theologian is in some way
aware of the trends in the situation, which trends then he can evaluate from a
theological point of view. In this sense, then, Tillich is not saying anything more than
what he demands of a theologian of culture. The participant approach is concrete on
the one hand, thus giving some authenticity to whatever interpretation is given of the
situation or whatever general understanding of the reality is constructed on the basis
of the situation. On the other hand the criterion of mere participation is likely to lead
to a lesser or greater accurate descriptive account of the situation but lacking in
perspective. Tillich believes in a critical account of the situation, which means the use
of some universal criteria to select the relevant facts in the historical process -
implying that all facts are not equally important.
Culture, as representing the special forms relating to a certain historical
situation, is important for the theologian for identifying the questions of the time and
at the same time the vehicles for expressing the kerygma. The theologian's critical
task, however, requires that he judge which facts are appropriate from the many s/he
might identify. Cultural creations are therefore essential for understanding the trends
in history, for culture is a continuous interpretation of the moments of history. Hence
Tillich takes the "history of religion and culture" as a single unit and suggests it as the
"broader source of systematic theology".104 He reminds and reaffirms in the
102Tillich, CEWR,2.
101Tillich attacks an "indifferent" attitude towards history, such as Luther's idea that history
is the realm of "God's strange acting". For Tillich: "The absolute - to vary a famous saying of
Hegel - is not so impotent as to remain m separation from the relative. It appears m the
relative as judgment and creation." (Tillich, PE, p.38)
104Tilhch, .STI, pp.38-40.
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introduction to his final volume of ST that he is committed to using "philosophical
and psychological concepts" and discussing "sociological and scientific theories"
rather than making use of biblical language because of the contemporaneousness of
the former.105 In an immediate way history and culture determine the theologian's
language and her/his spirtual life. In terms of his theological function, s/he interacts,
draws from and criticizes various forms of culture. Since the theologian has the remit
to speak to the situation from the situation, s/he must cross the boundaries of bible
("basic source of systematic theology") and history of Christianity or tradition (the
"guiding" element in theological interpretation106) but without losing them in the
development of a contemporary theology.
Theology must be free from and for the concepts it uses. It must be free from
a confusion of its conceptual form with its substance, and it must be free to
express this substance with every tool which proves to be more adequate than
those given by the ecclesiastical tradition.107
However, Tillich warns that one's experience in the historical situation and of
culture should not be confused with history and culture as sources for the theologian.
Experience is not a source but a medium. Hence he criticizes experiential theology for
its claim that "open experience" is a source of systematic theology:
The encounter with great non-Christian religions, the evolutionary scheme of
thought, the openness for the new which characterizes the pragmatic method,
have had the consequence that experience has become not only the main
source of systematic theology but an inexhaustible source out of which new
truths can be taken continually.108
105Tillich, ST III, p .4.
106Tillich, PTTB, p. 133.
107Tillich, ST II, p. 142. Though Tillich sees the biblical disciplines as having "basic
significance" for theology, he gives "full theological standing" to church history and the
history of religion and culture. The criterion for a discipline to be theological is not its
"supernatural origin but its significance for the interpretation of our ultimate concern" (Tillich,
£ri,pp.29-30).
108Tillich, ST I, p .45.
251
The distinction between source and medium is crucial for Tillich. "The medium colors
the presentation and determines the interpretation of what it receives."109 Being a
participant in the situation does not make one's experience itself a source or a form.
Revelation can come to a saint or prophet, but "it comes against him and to him and
not from him."110 This is Tillich's indictment against religious sects in their special
claims and their isolationism. In contrast to such making a norm of subjective
experiences, Tillich suggests that one participate in the historical situation such that
one's ultimate concern is at once ultimate and concrete. "He who wants to know the
power of reality in the depth of his historical existence must be in actual contact with
the concrete, unrepeatable tensions of the present."111 The emphasis on the historical
and not the experiential is made by Tillich in respect of the Christ event:
The event on which Christianity is based ... is not derived from experience; it
is given in history. Experience is not the source from which the contents of
systematic theology are taken but the medium through which they are
existentially received."112
Tillich is not worried that a study of history will reveal that God has no place
in the experience and interpretations of it in people in the present time, and thereby
lead to the end of theology, a theology based on the concept of God. For he sees the
idea of God as a permanent part of human experience, appearing differently in
accordance with social changes:
Historical forces determine the existence of the idea of God, not its essence,
they determine its variable manifestations, not its invariable nature. The social
situation of a period conditions the idea of God, but it does not produce it .113




113Tillich, ST I, p.220.
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Historical forces influence the understanding of God on the one hand, and the
universal and concrete aspects in the conception of God and also the two elements of
his religious typology on the other.
The development of the meaning of God has two interdependent causes: the
tension within the idea of God and the general factors determining the
movement of history (e.g., economic, political, and cultural factors).114
The way Tillich sees the importance of history for theology is by identifying how
history is interpreted.
Mystical religions have a negative attitude towards history, and so its
interpretation of history is rejected by Tillich. They have a non-historical
interpretation of history: "Historical existence has no meaning in itself. One must live
in it and act reasonably, but history itself can neither create the new nor be truly
real."115 Tillich finds a mystical element at the root of a materialistic understanding in
socialism, and shows that this socialist approach interprets history from the
perspective of natural science in mechanical terms, just like the bourgeoise
materialism it was fighting against. In contrast to this form of socialism, he presents a
socialism (Religious Socialism) which is profoundly aware of history and accepts the
new in terms of conflict, not as the result of a natural process.116 He also sees
Christianity as the background to Utopian ideas117 of a stage of reason in bourgeoise
thinking, of a stage of classless society in working-class movements and of a stage in
the evolutionary process. Another interpretation of history but one which is a
historical interpretation of history is found among the churches. This is an
interpretation of the "transcendent" type. It is inadequate because it separates the
Kingdom of God from history. After Christ's saving act in history, nothing essentially
114Tillich, 571,220.
115Tillich, ST III, p.375.
116Tillich, PE, pp.34-35.
11711 Utopia, from 'outopos', can never be completely secular for it expects a reality which 'has
no place in history'(Tillich FR, p.68). Though it is not clear
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new is expected to happen in history. The Kingdom of God is identified with a
supranatural order attainable after death instead of seeing it as a dynamic power on
earth.^ 8
In contrast to the two above interpretations, a proper understanding of history is
proposed by Tillich as a "dynamic concept" in terms of the concept of "Principle" as
against a concept of essence, derived from the knowledge of nature:
A principle is the real power that supports a historical phenomenon, giving it the
possibility to actualize itself anew and yet in continuity with the past. ..
"Principle", therefore, is not an ideological concept, but one that is descriptive of
reality. A principle is the power of a historical reality, grasped in concepts.119
This interpretation of history is in Christian terms an affirmation of Jesus as that principle
or power that manifests itself in history not as an isolated event in history or as having
some continuity with the past, but as the "centre of history". This concept suggests that,
"human history, seen from the point of view of the self-transcendence of history, is not
only a dynamic movement, running ahead, but also a structured whole in which one point
1 90
is the centre". In Christ the meaning of history is affirmed, and all events of history are
to be appreciated or judged from this centre.
Tillich suggests that the systematic theologian being concrete, unlike the
philosopher of religion, accepts with the philosopher the "mystical a priori" that transcends
the subject and object but to it adds the criterion of the Christian message, which is
191
unrepeatably unique. But from what Tillich proceeds to say, it is obvious that for him
the "elements of human nature" are crucial for interpreting history, especially the history of
199
religion. What under typology of religion was shown as universal or sacramental
religion is equivalent in systematic theology to the preparation and reception aspects in
ll8Tillich, ST III, pp.379-380.
l^Tillich, PTTB, p. 103 (Italics in original).
120Tillich, ST III, p.390.
121Tillich, ST I, pp .9-10.
122Tillich, CEWR, p. 3.
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relation to the new reality (the Christ) in history. It is, for him, the bringing of the
"spiritual substance" (or better, the religious manifestations) of the religions "under
the criterion of the theological norm". *23 Tillich points out that other religions have
been left undistinguished qualitatively from each other by traditional Christian theologians
because of their ingrained tendency to foreclose the subject of the history of religions,
limiting salvation history to what is given in the Old and New Testaments and to what
continued in church history. The history of other religions are rejected because they are
considered "perversions of a kind of original revelation but without particular revelatory
experiences of any value for Christian theology" and that "they are not bearers of revelation
and salvation". *24 What has been overlooked by these theologians, Tillich complains, is
the fact that in practice "Jews and Christians were both influenced religiously by the
1 7S
religions of conquered and conquering nations".
In contrast, for Tillich, the history of religions is theological because the criterion
for a discipline to be theological is its power to contribute to the interpretation of our
ultimate concern, and not its claim to supernatural origin. ° And he accepts a broad
understanding of the history of religion.
A theological history of religion should interpret theologically the material
produced by the investigation and analysis of the prereligious and religious
life of mankind. It should elaborate the motives and types of religious
expression, showing how they follow from the nature of the religious concern
and therefore necessarily appear in all religions, including Christianity in so
far as it is a religion.127
We have already discussed Tillich's typology of religion and appreciated its systematic
character in the fact of the two-fold nature of the holy provides the basic structure.
123Tillich, PTTB, p. 133.
124Tillich, FR,84.
125Tillich, FR,84.
126Tillich, ST I, pp.29-30.
127Tillich, ST I, p.39.
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The typology also showed that it could comprehend historical developments. That is,
a mystical religion always remains a mystical religion in spite of its need of and
openness to the prophetic element. Similarly, an ethical religion never loses its
predominant prophetic spirit in spite of its need for and openness to the mystical
element. For both religious life and theological thought in a concrete situation the
systematic and the historical together can offer better scope for understanding.
The three dialectical approaches that determine Tillich's theological method
have shown the possibility of doing theology by developing adequate tools for
analysis of broader and complex realities. The kerygma-situation correlation showed
the necessity of and the possibility of a theology that explores the nature of religion as
ultimate concern in the light of tradition and the contemporary cultural forms. The
philosophy-theology correlation showed the importance of theology reflecting on its
concrete material in the light of universal principles of an ontology that is appropriate
to analyzing human existence. And thirdly, the correlation and the systematic and the
historical showed the importance of analyzing history for the plural notions of
meaning that are present in the situation. Only a constant analysis from the side of
meaning and from the side of history is adequate because meaning and historical
conditions influence each other. All the three dialectical approaches affirm pluralism in
that they constitute a theological method which must take other concrete expressions
in addtion to one's own seriously as well as find or develop broader conceptual
systems to include the various phenomena. This is the basis for moving on to
designate Tillich's pluralism as dialectical and to portray some features of it.
4. Towards a Dialectical Pluralism
If method stands for the inquiry into the validity of the various ways in which the
object or subject matter of a discipline can be approached, then it is under theological
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method that we must finally focus on the various means by which we conducted our
analysis of Tillich's thought to determine his pluralism. In this particular study, method
has occupied the last place as regards treatment, first, because identifying Tillich's
theology-of-religions position is the main task, and second, because each of the means
can be appreciated only in terms of its actual function in the description of the
particular reality or dynamics as found in Tillich. Thus we have discussed the
significance of the following means employed by Tillich in his theology: ultimate
concern-preliminary concern dialectic, religion-culture dialectic, the type-determining
elements of his religious typology, the two-fold elements of his critical
phenomenology, the revealing-and-self-negating character of religious symbols, the
kerygma-situation correlation, the philosophy-theology correlation and the sysematic-
historical correlation. In various places we have indicated the mutual significance and
consistency of these means. These means revealed the importance a dialectical
approach for understanding reality, especially reality from a religious standpoint.
This is the basis for designating Tillich's theology of religions "dialectical
pluralism". The dialectical method that characterizes his theology is consistently
applied by Tillich in affirming plurality of religious experiences, religious systems and
cultural movements and cultural forms which bear an ultimate concern. Although
Tillich's understanding of other religions came through academic study for the most
part of his life, Tillich declared and committed himself, in the last decade of his life, to
flesh-and-blood contact with representatives of the living religions, especially
Buddhists. His dialectical approach in relation to the religions, therefore, demanded
dialogue, which for him was a "dialectic of (mutual) acceptance and criticism". The
nature and usefulness of dialogue as found in Tillich will now be discussed to examine




The participant approach of the theologian's concern with the historical, as
discussed in the last section presupposes the theologian's place among other
participants. The way the theologian appreciates the significance of history
presupposes contact with the feelings and ideas and creative acts of people who are
concerned about history. The directness of the encounter is seen by Tillich to be an
important element both for its practical consequences of dealing with the important
issues of justice, peace and the preservation of the created order, and of discovering
the religious world of the other as the other re-presents it within a context of mutual
quest and mutual criticism. Thus Tillich points out that isolation is no longer possible
in political or religious respects, for what we have is the "one world" and it demands
our concerted effort to answer the question, "what do we do with it [the one
world]?"1 The stress on the role of dialogue and the scope of dialogue in its widest
agenda is here stated.
The dialogical approach can be appreciated better by showing what it is
opposed to. First, it is opposed to any form of persuasion or coercion that seeks to
establish one form of life or thought as final. Religions and secular traditions do have
value for contemporary society, not in their efforts to convert people to their
doctrines and practices but in their contributions to hope and meaning and to all that
these would involve (such as the reordering of all structures that divide and exploit
humans and the physical world). In this sense, "dialogue loses the character of a
discussion of dogmatic subtleties and becomes a common enquiry in the light of the
world situation."2 A dialogue of this kind is suggested at the end of CEWR:
1 Tillich, ERQR, p.46. Here the unity that Tillich refers to are the convergences between
socialism and Christianity in the particular German situation.
2Tilhch, CEWR, p.63.
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Not conversion, but dialogue. It would be a tremendous step forward if Christianity
were to accept this! It would mean that Christianity would judge itself when it
judges the others in the present encounter of the world religions.
In his Dynamics of Faith, Tillich answers the question of conversion,
starting with a critical review of the various senses and contexts in which the term
is used.4 One usage is to refer to a "spiritual experience" when one becomes aware
of an ultimate concern from the earlier state which lacked ultimate concern (or as
Tillich makes himselfmore precise, hidden). In this sense every spiritual experience
is a conversion. Another meaning of the term is that of a "change from one set of
beliefs to another". If a set of beliefs is not related to an existential connection with
the ultimate concern, then conversion has no significance. If however, one set is
more serious than another in focussing on the ultimacy of the ultimate concern,
then conversion to that worthy set is crucial. This kind of conversion, for Tillich, is
not concerned with the comparison of the sets of beliefs of the religions proper.
Rather it has reference to the beliefs of a religion like Christianity over against
those of a secular faith. In this case, a "methodological inquiry into those elements
of the conflict which can be approached by inquiry" is suggested together with a
"witness to those elements of the conflict which drive to conversion". This two¬
fold task is suggested by Tillich as adequate, because without arguments (which
are inappropriate for one's relation to the ultimate concern anyway) and hence
without fanaticism one will be able to move from the secularist belief system,
where the ultimacy of the ultimate has been eroded, to Christianity, where the
chances of demonizing the ultimate is less on account of the self-critical Protestant
principle. Thus, conversion here, "is not a matter of prevailing arguments", but "a
matter of personal surrender" to the ultimate concern.
3Tillich, CEWR, p.95.
4Tillich, DF, pp. 123-125.
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Tillich is aware that realistically everyone cannot come to profess one form of
faith. Conversion in its proper sense is not an intellectual acceptance of a different
form of belief, but rather an existential participation in the revelatory situation.
However, since faith is a matter of ultimate concern, one expresses it in universal
terms as well as expects universal fulfilment.
If missions try to bring about the conversion of many from one faith to
another, they try to bring about the unity of faith in humanity as a whole.
Nobody can be certain that such unity will be reached in the course of human
history; nobody can deny that such unity is the desire and hope ofmankind in
all periods and in all places. But there is no way of reaching this unity except
by distinguishing ultimacy itself from that in which ultimacy expresses itself.5
Now although from one's own perspective one is keen to see one's religion in
universal terms, one usually does not ask about one's own conversion to another
tradition, but one does seek to attain higher levels within one's own tradition. The
purpose of missions is neither the saving of individuals from eternal condemnation
nor the "cross-fertilization of religions and cultures" but "the actualization of the
Spiritual Community within concrete churches all over the world"6
Tillich notes among his Japanese enquirers a desire to find the ground of
their religions and cultures. Hence Tillich's answer is that of pointing to the
criterion under which all religions can renew themselves.
'We don't want to bring you another religion. We want to point to a criterion
which is the criterion over and against all religion, including our own. If you
accept this criterion you may judge yourselves as much as you judge us and
perhaps we can unite in the acceptance of this criterion, because this criterion
is nothing other than the majesty of the divine or holy itself over against any
particular form in which it appears.' In this way we stand on our basis, as
Christians, as Protestants, and on the other hand we are wide open, for the
other religions do not want replacement. They want to be witnesses to that
which is greater than we are, not only we as human beings but also we as
Christians and Protestants.7
5Tillich, DF, p. 125.
6Tillich, ST III, p.206.
7Tillich, ERQR, pp.73-74.
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That conversion in the narrow sense (of change from one tradition to the other) is not
asked for by others is also testified where missions have been successful. Tillich can explain
the nature of the change in terms of his religious typology. Tillich rightly points out that in
the Indian context, Christian missions were successful more among the masses, due to
Protestantism's humanist element impacting on the people through medicine and
science.8 The transformation element of the prophetic religion was welcome news for
the oppressed masses. Either society transformed from within as in the case of
Buddhism, Jainism and Sikhism to attain social status and freedom, or they converted
to the prophetic religions ofChristianity and Islam.
A second inadequate approach to dialogue is the mistake of demanding an
unconditional statement that all religions are equal. On the one hand it is a rightful
demand in a democratic state in which every religious group should have equal rights.
Samartha points out that the Neo-Hindu idea of the equality of religions (sarva
dharma samanvaya tattvci) originated in connection with "a political affirmation of
the relationships between different religious communities... than a theological
statement on the relationships between religions". This is not the traditional Indian
view, which is one that proposes that a particular religion find a place among the
coexisting religions. It is not enough for a religion to stay among other religions and
simply affirm its relative or universal validity. Rather each religion would be expected
to represent its truth in a colloquy of religions. This approach is also found among
some learned hindus.9 Tillich would approach the equality question in more
8Tillich, ERQR, p 38.
9Samartha highlights the pluralism expressed in three critical Hindu responses to a 1839 text
claiming Christian superiority. These orthodox hindus argued for mataikya (the unity of all
religions) and matavirodha (the noncontradictoriness of the religions) on the basis of three
hindu concepts: dharma suggesting plurality on account of the diversity of human nature;
adhikara (aptitude, competence, eligibility) refering to the reason for a person being bom
(birth being no accident) in a particular religion, namely that of performing the required
sadhana (discipline); and adhikarahheda (differences in aptitude) being not a matter of
choice but given by God. (S.J. Samartha, "The Cross and the Rainbow", p.74 and p.86 n. 18)
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dialectical terms, that each religion shares with every other religion the sense of
ultimacy and absoluteness of revelation on the one hand. At this level religions are
seen in their transparency to the ultimate and hence there is a certain affirmation of
their unity rather than equality. On the other hand the concrete character of symbols
and religious expressions must be judged. So there is no equality at this level in any
positive way; negatively, all equally stand under judgment.
The criterion of every faith is the ultimacy of the ultimate which it tries to
express. The self-criticism of every faith is the insight into the relative validity
of the concrete symbols in which it appears.10
The dynamic character of religion demands dialogue as the way of mutual
renewal and the possibility of inclusive theology and inclusive community. Tillich's
statement of the basis on which dialogue should be take place, reflects his religion-
culture correlation, his revelation-religion dynamic and the tension he has drawn
between the larger and narrower concepts of religion:
A dialogue between representatives of different religions .. first presupposes
that both partners acknowledge the value of the other's religious conviction
(as based ultimately on the revelatory experience), so that they consider the
dialogue worthwhile. Second, it presupposes that each of them is able to
represent his own religious basis with conviction, so that the dialogue is a
serious confrontation. Third, it presupposes a common ground which makes
both dialogue and conflicts possible, and fourth, the openness of both sides
to criticisms directed against their own religious basis.11
All the three methodological principles with their ultimacy and concrete elements are
implied in all the four presuppositions. The ultimacy element is implied in the first and
third presuppositions in stronger terms, as "conviction" and "common ground" are
possible only with reference to the ultimate, the unconditional. The mutual dynamics
between the ultimacy and concrete elements is stronger in the second and fourth
presuppositions, as representing one's faith and accepting criticisms from the
dialoguing partner demand the comparison of cultural forms of one tradition with
10Tillich, DF, p. 123.
11Tillich, CEWR, p.62.
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another on the one hand and constantly evaluating the nature of ultimate reality that
emerges at every stage of the dialogue against one's own present understanding as a
way towards developing new models on the other hand.
Tillich speaks about real criticism of the other; not just self-criticism in the
presence of the other. M. Gandhi, despite his high regard for the Sermon on the
Mount and other New Testament parts, does not appreciate dialogue in its proper
sense because he saw Christianity (not just the acts of the colonizers) offering nothing
positive to India but providing the occasion for Hinduism to reform itself.12 Self-
criticism in the context of dialogue is a positive thing because it helps one rediscover
forgotten truths of one's own tradition. But to dismiss any positive influence from
another tradition, as Gandhi does, is either an expression of Hindu superiority or a
statement based on the view that religion is both a private and a non-rational affair.
What underlies Gandhi's statement cannot be resolved here, but it must be pointed out
that the latter is often emphasized as a deterrent against dialogue, for the fear that
there would be a communal breakdown rather than understanding. Dialogue being
serious encounter, one is free to criticize the other. In this event there will be a "fair
valuation of the encountered religions and quasi-religions" as an outcome of mutual
judging.13
The principal principles of "openness" and "receptivity" that had
characterized Christianity in its formative period,14 are of importance for Tillich in
the new formative period, when Christians need to respond to both the religions
proper and the quasi-religions. In that early period, Christianity had interacted with
other religions and philosophies such that





Christianity judged, was judged, and accepted judgment. The dynamic life it
showed was nourished by the tension between judging the encountered
religions in the strength of its foundation, and accepting judgment from them
in the freedom its foundation gives.15
Tillich is clear that judgment happens at two levels: within and between religions.
Sometimes he sees the process of criticism in three moments: "criticism,
countercriticism and self-criticism".16
The dialogical mode of sharing and understanding truth is itself an
application of the dialectical method. There is mutual acceptance and mutual
judging, which leads to identifying what unites these two positions by transcending
them. We shall now see how this method characterizes Tillich's pluralism.
Dialectical Pluralism
The dialectical method is consistently used by Tillich in his theology. He finds
it adequate because he sees polar elements in existence, in the Ground of being, in the
revelatory situation, in the epistemological situation, and in the universal structure of
being. He sees the divine relating to humans in dialectical terms with its unconditioned
yes and unconditioned no. This dialecticality that characterizes every religion gives
each religion the right to dialogue with another religion in equal terms. In fact the
concrete meeting of religions should help in the identifying of these unconditioned
yes-es and unconditioned no-s. This dialectical relation between "Religion" and
"religion", which Tillich consistently seeks to explore, can be the basis of our
suggestion that Tillich's theology of religions is a universal theology of religions, but




It is possible to think in terms of and to develop a universal theology of
religions if concrete religions express common features. Hick identifies
salvation/enlightenment/liberation as the common concern of the major religions,
arising from the fact of the unique perceptions of ultimate reality.17 Similarly Knitter
sees a soteriological concern underlying all religions, and suggests "the promotion of
liberation" by the religions. This, for him, is likely to result in "common judgments
concerning what is true or false, or what is preferable, among different religious
claims or practices" .18 Arriving at such consensus from the depth of each religion is a
validation of the fact of the universality of the soteriological concern, and hence the
legitimacy of a universal theology of religions. We saw Tillich expressing the
soteriological concern as having central importance for theology, namely the
soteriological event of the movement from existence to essence. That for Tillich this
soteriological event is not limited to Christianity but is universal is not fully
appreciated for instance by Knitter. Hence he sees Tillich subscribing to the theory of
"general revelation" in terms of his concept of ultimate concern, which is claimed by
him to be a driving force in every one.19 And Tillich is criticized for elevating the
revelation of Christ above other revelations, for suggesting that other religions
"know" true salvation only through the Christ revelation, which is free of idolatry as
well. Knitter's interpretation of Tillich's Christological statements miss the point that
although Tillich regards the symbols of the Christ and the Cross as "final revelation",
the form of the revelation is relativized before the ground or substance of revelation.
In other words, the Christ as final revelation functions on behalf of the ultimate with
unconditioned yes and unconditioned no to the specific religious experience or
17John Hick, Problems ofReligious Pluralism, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985,
pp.69, 80, 87.
18Paul Knitter, "Toward a Liberation Theology ofReligions", John Hick and Paul
Knitter (eds ), TheMyth ofChristian Uniqueness, p . 190.
19Knitter, No Other Name?, pp.98-99.
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expression for Christians, because the Christ revelation is actual only for Christians as
we saw in the last chapter. This dialectic that Tillich maintains between the
unconditioned and its actual function with its yes-es and no-s in the particular
contexts is a general principle applicable to all religions and secular ideologies.
Tillich's pluralism might be called dialectical pluralism on this basis.
Dialectical pluralism on the one hand appreciates all religions as based on
revelation and expressing itself in historical and cultural life. On the other hand
dialectical pluralism also demands the working of the the holy as ought-to-be for
transformation of life in all respects in the religions - such transformation in radical
ways being possible by the coming together of religions.
The dialectical method must be accepted as a method of describing the
movements of life and history in their inner tensions, contrasts, and
contradictions and in their trend toward more embracing unities. But the
distortion of the dialectical method into a universal mechanism of calculable
processes has nothing to do with reality and with the original meaning of the
method. There are dialectical elements belonging to a given structure which
drive beyond this structure.20
Dialectical pluralism can be seen to be based on Tillich's theology of culture which is a
theological analysis of the situation such that systematic theology might provide
answers through its symbols. But dialectical pluralism demands a further theological
attempt to analyze and provide theological answers in the light of the history of
religions. Thus Tillich envisages "a new religious synthesis which is, like everything
concrete, inclusive and exclusive at the same time and which therefore establishes a
theological circle, just as Christianity does".21
This proposal of Tillich is possible through dialogue. Tillich shows the
importance of the "frontier" or "boundary" situation which allows
20Tillich, PE, pp.258-259.
21Tillich, PTTB, p. 131.
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a crossing and return, a repetition of return and crossing, a back-and-forth —
the aim of which is to create a third area beyond the bounded territories, an
area where one can stand for a time without being enclosed in something
tightly bounded.22
John Dunne takes up Tillich's method and applies it in relation to the religions. Dunne
states: "Passing over and coming back, it seems, is the spiritual adventure of our
time."23 The theological task is for Tillich dialectical, and hence rejects a syncretistic
approach, that is the way of abstracting similar meanings from equivalent examples,
which leads to "depriv[ing] the examples of their concreteness and reducing] their
meaning to an empty generality (e.g., a revelation which is neither Jewish nor
Christian, neither prophetic nor mystical)".24 Tillich's proposal is that Christianity
should draw attention to the larger concept of religion, and regrets that "Christianity
has become a religion instead of remaining a center of crystallization for all positive
religious elements after they have been subjected to the criteria implied in this
center."25 Concrete religions are needed to give concrete expression to faith, but the
Protestant principle is equally important to judge concrete religion. Kung too opts for
a dialectical approach. He reflects Tillich's approach when he suggests a "tension-rich
synthesis"the goal is not a compounding of various features from various religions,
nor a mingling of gods (theocracy), nor a fusing of religions, but rather, a dialectical
"transcending" (Aufheben) of conflicts through inner mediation, which at once
includes affirming, denying, and overcoming antagonistic positions."26 Gilkey's
approach is not much different from Tillich's: "A dialectic or paradox combining and
interweaving both one part absoluteness and two parts relativity, a relative
absoluteness, represents a posture essential to public and political praxis".27
22Tillich, "Frontiers" in FR, p.53.
23J. Dunne, The Way ofAll the F.arth, New York: Sheldon Press, 1972, p.vii.
24Tillich, STl, p. 107.
25Tillich, CEWR, p.84.
26Kung, "A Christian Response", p. 180.
27L. Gilkey, "Plurality and Its Theological Implications", John Hick and Paul Knitter (ed ),
TheMyth ofChristian Uniqueness, London: SCM, 1987, p.47.
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And Tillich certainly does not fall into a relativism that Ogden thinks threatens
the pluralist approach. Ogden points out that pluralists are employing some normative
principle tacitly to say that all religions are valid, if they are not to fall into complete
relativism. And this norm belongs to one particular religion or philosophy.28 So the
way of overcoming the relativist danger of pluralism on the one side and the absolutist
position itself together with the absolutist tendencies of"monistic inclusivism" on the
other side is, for Ogden, a "pluralistic inclusivism"29 "that religions other than
Christianity can also be formally true even if, in point of fact, none of them actually is
true or has as yet been shown to be so in a reasoned way".30 Ogden makes a
difference between the is true in relation to Christianity and can in relation to other
religions. The is is affirmed to counter relativism. One way by which Ogden tries to
overcome the special claim that he makes for Christianity is in terms of his
Christology from below. He distinguishes his inclusivism which sees the Christ-event
as representative of salvation and not as the absolutistic or monistic inclusivisms
which see it as constitutive of salvation. "The Christ event cannot be the cause of
salvation because its only cause, and the cause of this event itself, is the boundless
love ofGod ofwhich this event is the decisive re-presentation."31
In contrast to Ogden's pluralistic inclusivism, Tillich's approach can be
called an inclusivistic pluralism, for Tillich's position is basically pluralist in that it
affirms formally that all religions are true in terms of their revelatory character.
Only in terms of their concrete manifestations are religions distorted Tillich's
pluralism however takes on the special character of being inclusivist in the sense of
28S. Ogden, Is There Only One True Religion ..., pp.70-7.
29S Ogden, Is There Only One True Religion ..., pp.x-xi.
30S. Ogden, Is There Only One True Religion ..., p.83; and p.84.
31S. Ogden, Is There Only One True Religion ..., p.93; and pp.84-93. Ogden, however, gives
constitutive significance to the Christ for the Christian religion by constituting the word and
sacraments as the "means of salvation", (ibid., p.98)
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appreciating and integrating concrete forms belonging to others with one's own, a
possibility in Tillich's dialogical approach. Inclusivism used in relation to pluralism,
as we are suggesting here, is free from the general or absolutistic inclusivism,
which basically denies the permanent value of the forms belonging to traditions
other than the absolute one. The dialectical approach which inclusivistic pluralism
thus includes a creative side with the critical side, just as the Protestant principle
has a primarily critical role but yet involving a creative role.
In essence, Tillich's pluralism is radical in its affirmation of the plurality of
religions and standpoints. It affirms unconditionally the universal structure of being on
the one hand, and seeks to seeing the manifestation of the ground of being in every
religious and cultural tradition on the other hand. This affirmation of both the
universal and the concrete is the basis of Tillich critical, constructive and inclusivistic
approach to the religions, seeking to understand them and to interpret them
adequately with reference to the existential and historical questions of the time.
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CONCLUSION
This study has argued that Tillich is a pluralist of a kind which acknowledges the
universal character of religion but always expressed concretely. It is a case of "the one
and the many" or the one in the many. In regard to theological enquiry, "the one", or
religion in unversal terms, is never available as such, and hence any idea of a common
core or common religious frame is rejected by theologians who insist on their
historicist and empiricist assumptions. Tillich's approach is that the universal is in the
concrete, in every concrete religion, and hence the universal can be constructed
through systematic and historical investigations of a concrete religion together with
other concrete religions. The common basis that Tillich proposed was first
appreciated in this study in terms of his concept of religion.
The concept of religion has helped to identify religion in essential terms, which
recognizes that a religious concept like every other concept includes, interprets and
hides a number of concrete facts. But it is a necessary part of the cognitive function of
culture.1 Theology cannot avoid this task of framing concepts, according to
Whitehead, for that is the way of "discarding artificial abstractions or partial
metaphors" and of "evolving notions which strike more deeply into the heart of
reality".2 We have shown that this task is important for Tillich too, and that such a
concept, religion as ultimate concern, is identified and claimed to be adequate (the
showing to be adequate being carried out in a number of sections in the study) to the
religions proper and the quasi-religions. This definition itself is pluralist because
instead of pointing out any qualitative or level distinctions between religions, Tillich
has shown that all concrete religions have the larger definition as their basis but have a
narrower concept which is unique to them. In systematic terms, Tillich has identified
1Tillich, ,STni, p.75.
2A.N. Whitehead, Religion in the Making, p. 131.
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religious reservation and religious obligation as present in religions and cultural
movements with varying emphases.
Despite the larger definition's formal character, which means that the same
condition has to be met by every religion to be regarded a religion including
Christianity, if any finality were to be claimed for the larger definition then a claim for
Tillich's pluralism will come under some threat, because the larger definition is taken
from the Judaeo-Christian tradition in the first instance. But the fact that Tillich does
not claim finality for his larger definition and does not simply qualify and categorize
experiences and interpretations which meet this larger definition as religious, he is not
a weak pluralist. In fact he suggests a mutual influencing of the larger and narrower
definitions, which means that the larger definition is open to revision. The common
basis that the larger definition provides is important because a claim of "plurality"
rather than mere "difference" in relation to the concrete religions is possible only on
such a ground. An affirmation of plurality without such a definition will be one made
on the basis of non-religious criteria, which usually are political or cultural criteria.
Then, in Chapter II, Tillich's two-fold characterization of the divine which is
found in every divine-human encounter, namely, the holy as present (or the holy that
gives) and the holy as the ought-to-be (or the holy that demands) was considered. The
role of these two elements were shown to be present in each religion, although in
somewhat broken terms and hence the predominance of one of the elements, giving
rise to a typology. The elements seeking fulfilment in a higher type was seen as the
possible highest type in the typology, and in principle its realization is not excluded
from any concrete religion. Tillich's attempt in respect of the typology anticipated the
correlation of the systematic and the historical, which we discussed in the last chapter.
The typology showed the possibility of observing some systematic character in the
mutual functions of the two aspects of the holy in the concrete, historical religions. It
270
is constructed on the basis of theological analysis and with a certain familiarity with
the history of religions.
In Chapter III, Tillich's analysis of theology of religions positions were
analyzed in dialectical terms. The two polar positions of absolutism and relativism
were discussed and their respective merits and demerits were identified. These polar
positions were for Tillich the bases to see a higher approach in universalism. Two
forms of it, absolutist universalism and relativist universalism were discussed. It was
evident that Tillich's approach was demanding a dialectic of the universal and the
concrete in more rigorous terms.
In Chapter IV, four criteria in Tillich were identified and discussed so as to
determine the nature of Tillich's pluralism. The criteria, namely revelation, God, the
Christ and the Protestant principle, showed Tillich dialectically affirming the
immanence of the divine in human existence, in culture and in concrete religions, and
also dialectically judging every concrete form. This meant a clear authenticating of
every religion in the name of the ultimate, neither raising one religion above others
nor seeing each religion as a mere function of culture.
And finally in Chapter V, we appreciated Tillich's dialectical method in terms
of three important analyses significant for his systematic theology as well as his
theolgy of religions. The kerygma-situation correlation suggested Tillich's openness to
expressing the kerygma in the light of the concrete religious symbols and experiences
of one's tradition and in the light of the cultural self-interpretations of the time. Then
the theoretical frame most useful for theology's reflection of its subject matter in
universal terms was identified as an ontology, and it was discussed. Then we moved
on to discuss the systematic-historical correlation to see the mutual importance of a
structural frame that is needed to interpret history, and concrete historical engagement
to verify and revise the structure. These then formed the basis to identify Tillich's
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pluralism as a dialectical pluralism, which on the one hand affirms universality and on
the other hand particularity. Being a dialectical and a systematic approach, there is no
hierarchy of the universal over the relative, nor a relativism in which the universal is
made meaningless. Tillich's approach affirms the possibility of approaching the one
from the other; not being bound to a pattern of moving only from one end to the
other. Thus the common basis of the religious principle and the plurality of forms,
which together constitute the frame for affirming Tillich's pluralism, point in the
direction of a radical and critical pluralism.
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